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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
WAGE MATTERS & GLOBALIZATION:
SOUTH FLORIDA’S LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT PLANT NURSERY WORKERS AND
BUSINESS PROTECTIONISM IN THE AGE OF NEOLIBERALISM
by
Alejandro Angee
Florida International University, 2012
Miami, Florida
Professor Alex Stepick, Major Professor
Ornamental plant production in the State of Florida is an anomaly with respect to
current theories of globalization and particularly their explanation of the employment of
low-wage, immigrant labor. Those theories dictate that unskilled jobs that do not need to
be performed within highly developed countries are outsourced to where labor is
cheaper and more flexible. However, the State of Florida remains an important site of
ornamental plant production in the US amidst a global economic environment of
outsourcing and transnational corporate expansion. This dissertation relies on 50 semistructured interviews with insiders of the Florida plant nursery industry, focus groups,
and participant observation to explain how US trade, labor, and migration policy-making
at local levels are not removed from larger global processes taking place in the world
since the 1970s. In Florida, elite market players of the plant nursery industry have been
able to resist global trends in free trade, operating instead in a protected market. They
have done this by appealing to scientific justifications and through arbitrary
implementations of neoliberal ideology that keeps small and middle range business
alive, while maintaining a seemingly endless supply of marginalized and exploited lowwage, immigrant workers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Transcending Localities
Late in 2011 the state of Alabama passed the United States’ harshest contemporary
anti-immigration law in an effort to drive away large numbers of undocumented
immigrants residing in that state. As the New York Times editorial titled “It’s What they
Asked For” reported, the move sought to reach what some of its proponents described
as “attrition through enforcement,” in a strategy where expensive police-state roundups
would be eliminated by making the life of undocumented immigrants hard enough so that
they would leave on their own (October 19, 2011). According to the editorial, the
Alabama legislature followed the lead of Arizona which had implemented a similar law,
and included provisions that gave local police enforcement the right to ask about the
immigration status of individuals, forced public universities to deny admittance to
undocumented immigrants, sought to determine the immigration status of public school
students and to measure their economic impact to the state, made the transportation of
undocumented immigrants a crime, and prohibited renting housing to undocumented
immigrants. But the law presented residents of the state with an array of unintended
consequences, particularly for farmers who within days of the law’s passage were
already reporting an exodus of their farm labor and a shortage of hands to pick the
harvests across the state.
The passing of the Alabama and Arizona anti-immigration laws brings to light a
plethora of issues that lie at the front of America’s social structures and institutions. At a
normative level, the laws demonstrate that a variety of racial and ethnic conflicts that
have affected the country’s history are still alive in the collective conscience of a nation
that has for so long battled over the inclusion of ethnic minorities into its national identity.
At a structural level the laws demonstrate the ways in which policy makers and the
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general public often fail to recognize the broader political, economic, and cultural
dimensions associated with the movement of people across international borders and
the implications that this process has for a variety of actors across class, racial, ethnic,
political, and geographic boundaries.
To many observers, the conditions highlighted by the passage of such harsh antiimmigrant laws respond to issues that are of national or “domestic” nature, but in
actuality are embedded in a variety of relations and dependences which are often
transnational or global in scope and which require a deeper examination of the collective
attitudes and institutional arrangements from which they emerge. The issue of
dependence was promptly observed In the case of Alabama when even in a period of
steep unemployment the state’s farmers had a difficult time filling those jobs left behind
by the exodus of immigrant laborers. Policymakers ignored a variety of relationships
between the farming entrepreneurs, their workers and the worker’s communities, and the
dependence that the U.S. as a whole has created and maintained for foreign labor. This
dissertation demonstrates and documents some of those manifold links for the case of
the plant nursery industry in Florida.
In this manuscript I argue that U.S. trade, labor, migration, and policy making at the
state levels are not removed from the larger global processes taking place in the world
since the 1970s. At the core of these processes are market players and rules that
benefit sets of powerful actors over others and which often result in the marginalization
and exploitation of less powerful individuals such as workers and immigrants. But the
ways in which these configurations take place at the level of particular U.S. states vis-àvis that of independent nations have often been ignored by the literature on
globalization. Such an omission provides an important link to understanding how the
processes of global transformation work, especially since decision-making may be
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embedded in lower levels of governance or dictated by the interactions and deeds of
actors that are removed from the federal level of policy making.
Traditional views of the process of globalization taking place in the world since the
1970s often describe the process as the transformation of capitalism through
international trade regulations that benefit the world’s powerful corporations through a
process by which technology and communication shift sites of production to areas where
labor is “cheaper” and more flexible (see for example Greider 1998, Stiglitz 2002, Harvey
2005, Glyn 2006). Such understandings of globalization have also been complemented
by cultural theories that promote an evolutionary view of globalization, and which focus
on global reproductions and re-configurations of new forms capital, labor and
technologies (Tsing 2005). Such monolithic views have come to dominate the academic
readings and popular perceptions about globalization with narrow definitions that
essentialize globalization as a one-way process in which labor and the environment in
peripheral sites are transformed by the direct efforts of powerful actors in the developed
world. But what, if any, implications arise from traditional forms of capitalist production in
localities at the core within the context of current global economic tendencies? How are
processes of globalization affecting and affected by social interactions and institutional
arrangements at these non-peripheral sites? And what contributions can social scientists
make to current theories of globalization about the patterns of socio-economic
globalization taking place in developed countries?
In this document I focus on the idea that globalization, rather than being a one way
process, is a process of multiple dimensions, directions, and outcomes that operate in
rather discontinuous scales, conditions, and time frames. I focus on the idea that
beneath those observable patterns and trends globalization “is about relations of relative
power, dependence as much as exchange, and how otherness becomes naturalized or
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provokes resistance;” thus, far from being simply a technical matter, globalization is
deeply embedded in political processes (Tabb 2001; 13). In this sense, globalization is
said to be mediated by a process of governance networks that potentially operate from
the local to the transnational and which require a variety of social mechanisms to
enforce contracts and standards of judging what is considered permissible behavior by
participants.
I argue that processes of governance shed light on how decisions made by a variety
of actors influence the degree to which global configurations of trade, labor, capital,
culture, ethnicity, and class are produced or reproduced in localities of the developed
world. In other words, it is the analysis of a variety of interactions between influential
actors and their relationship to less and more influential groups, which reveals the
processes of globalization occurring in the world today. Thus, the differences in power
relations and dependencies among economic elites, their workers, related governmental
agencies, and policymakers are an essential theme to the work here presented.
For this reason, I follow Nader’s (1972; 289) call to anthropologists to “study up” as a
way of understanding the processes whereby power and responsibility are exercised,
while generating knowledge about those who shape attitudes and control institutional
arrangements. As Nader argues, anthropology in the U.S. is filled with literature on the
poor, the disadvantaged and minority groups, often neglecting to study the middle and
particularly the upper classes. In this sense, Nader (1972; 289) asks us to consider
whether anthropologists should “study the colonizers rather than the colonized, the
culture of power rather than the culture of the powerless, the culture of affluence rather
than the culture of poverty.” These questions are of particular importance to this
manuscript, and as Nader contends, it is appropriate to study the bureaucratic
institutions in the United States because such institutions and their network systems
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affect the people that anthropologists have traditionally been concerned with all around
the world.
To this end I focus on the state of Florida and its vast plant nursery industry, where
the state’s subtropical climate and warm temperatures enable the year-round production
of ornamental plants often without the use of greenhouses. But the issue of climate is
only secondary to the development of the industry in the state, where the majority of
plants are grown under specific agricultural regulations that prohibit any nursery stock,
plants, roots, seeds, and other plant products from being imported into the country
(United States Department of Agriculture, Plant Protection Act). 1 This form of agricultural
regulation has prevented the plant nursery industry from relocating overseas and from
reshaping its nature into one of mere brokerage or distribution as has been the case with
most of the cut flowers and ferns sold in the U.S today. However, at a deeper level, the
plant nursery industry must rely on a legislative authority that protects it from foreign
competition, even under current trends of trade liberalization agreements with
neighboring Mexico, Colombia, Canada, and a variety of other nations.
At the same time that legislation has protected US production of nursery plants, the
industry has come to depend on an imported low-wage, flexible, immigrant workforce for
a variety of tasks that range from cleaning, packing, and fumigating, to more traditional
agricultural functions associated with planting and maintaining the shrubs and foliage.
Many of these workers are marginalized by their legal status, as well as by a variety of
economic trends that have helped to diminish conditions for workers in the United States
while weakening those organizations and institutions designed to protect them. This
1

The Plant Protection Act (PPA) became law in June 2000 as part of the Agricultural Risk
Protection Act. This law consolidates all or part of 10 existing U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) plant health laws into one comprehensive law, including the authority to regulate plants,
plant products, certain biological control organisms, noxious weeds, and plant pests.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/pdf/PlantProtAct2000.pdf
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process is embedded in a variety of global, regional, and local contexts that have largely
intensified within the context of the neoliberal restructuring process of the last three
decades (see Greider 1998, Stiglitz 2002, Harvey 2005, Glyn 2006 for a description of
structural changes within the context of neoliberal restructuring of the last three
decades). In the case of Florida’s plant nursery industry, an anomaly with respect to
current theories of globalization and particularly their explanation of the employment of
low-wage, immigrant labor seems to emerge. Specifically, since those theories indicate
that unskilled jobs that do not need to be performed within the most highly developed
countries are outsourced to where labor is cheaper and more flexible (see Greider 1998,
Stiglitz 2002, Harvey 2005, Glyn 2006). Thus, cheap and specifically immigrant labor is
required in developed countries only for the work that is place bound, such as cleaning
of office buildings, and highly perishable agricultural goods. In theory, however, nursery
plants could be grown more “efficiently,” that is with lower production costs, in many
other countries, such as is the case with much of the cut flowers sold in the U.S.; yet,
nursery plant production remains strong in the state, demanding that a large labor force
is mobilized to supply low-wage labor to U.S. plant nursery employers.
In several ways, this dissertation looks at globalization from the ground up. Rather
than concentrating on powerful corporate actors and their expansion of power and
dominance around peripheral sites, I look at a variety of local actors, interactions and
processes embedded in regions of the developed world. In this sense, I argue that
power relations at local levels produce new forms of institutional arrangements across a
variety of economic, racial, political, and institutional levels that are transnational and
global in scope. To this end, I concentrate on a variety of groups hierarchically
positioned within Florida’s plant nursery industry, ranging from the political elites, the
state’s governing regulatory agencies, and plant nursery producers to the low-wage
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immigrant workers who do the manual labor in farms throughout the state. Specifically,
in this manuscript I seek to answer:
• Why and how has Florida remained one of the most important sites of nursery plant
production for the U.S. market amidst neoliberal economic restructuring of the last 3
decades that has generally moved commodity production from the U.S. to
developing countries where it is deemed more efficient and less expensive to
produce? And, how must current theories of globalization be adjusted to account for
South Florida’s large nursery trade?
• What are the implications for the large, immigrant labor force of the plant nursery
industry in terms of working conditions, rights, and benefits? And do labor-migration
theories accurately account for current processes of globalization or do these
theories also represent an anomaly in their relationship to policy implementation
within the plant nursery industry?
I first got involved with the plant nursery industry in 2007 when as a graduate student
at Florida International University (FIU) the opportunity arouse for me to study the
frequency and extent of wage and hour abuses in a variety of towns in the state of
Florida. The opportunity presented itself thanks to the work performed by the Research
Institute on Social and Economic Policy (RISEP) at FIU, which is dedicated to serving
social justice organizations in the state of Florida with empirical research on significant
issues relevant to low- and moderate-income families and individuals. As part of a
broad, statewide campaign to combat wage theft and other forms of wage abuses, I had
the opportunity to get involved in the actions of several organizations that depended on
RISEP for research and which worked together with the research institute to improve the
working conditions of Florida workers. The experience resulted in my direct participation
in and support to a variety of local organizations, which, later acted as gatekeepers to
plant nursery workers and officials that proved quite valuable for the research here
presented.
Since the summer of 2007, I spent time in the offices of WeCount!, a community
organization in Homestead that actively sought to help their members collect unpaid
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wages from their employers as part of their overall organizing strategy. Homestead, is
the epicenter for most of south Florida’s food and ornamental agriculture and is home to
large immigrant communities of Mexican and Guatemalan agricultural workers. As part
of my original research of wage and hour violations and wage theft, I documented the
cases that many of the area’s nursery workers were seeking to resolve through the help
of WeCount! I also attended County commission meetings that pertained to worker
issues, and I was able to meet many political and organizing figures who were in one
way or another related to the plight of the workers.
In turn, the process led me to meet a variety of industry players who ranged from
workers to community organizers and public officials, who were in one way or another
victims or investigators of the kinds of abuses that were allegedly taking place within the
industry. During this time, I also met a variety of individuals whose lives were embedded
in very marginal spaces of class, labor, and migration. Many of these men and women
were immigrants from the global south, specifically Mexico and Guatemala, who had
come to the U.S. in search of a piece of the “American Dream,” but who seemed to me
to be living in the geographical and cultural margins of a society that knew little about
them and which did not acknowledge the reasons for their presence.
As I delved deeper into the fabric of plant nursery production and of the community
dynamics taking place in its surrounding areas I discovered that many of the
assumptions about globalization and labor migration that I had learned in graduate
school did not match the kinds of processes taking place at the ground level; specifically,
theories that viewed that globalization as a linear process where multinational
corporations expand to productions sites in the developing world in search of efficiency
and profitability. This led me to question the process by which immigrants come to the
state of Florida in search of jobs in the plant nursery industry and into the ways in which
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regulation and process work to influence their migration, their economic and labor
integration, their fragile permanence and their marginality. Ultimately my questioning led
me to “look up” at the industry with an institutional focus on how those structural
processes are actually formulated and institutionalized. I knew that the focus of my work
needed to be the workers, their strife, and what I perceived to be their marginalization,
but I felt compelled to address the institutional arrangements associated with the
industry’s elites.
Early on I recognized that the federal government’s regulation of agriculture
fundamentally protected plant nursery production in the U.S. Unlike food agriculture,
plant nursery production largely produces ornamentals that are not highly perishable and
thus can be produced in other areas of the world. However, a strongly maintained
regulatory system ensures that no planted organisms or soil are imported into U.S.
grounds. Such prohibition protects U.S.-based producers of ornamental plants, but it
also makes them dependent on low wage labor, which in the U.S. is primarily immigrant
labor. This type of regulation holds the key for a system that in many ways defies the
notions about globalization that have become embedded in public and academic
discourses while also serving as the justification for a system that enforces old and new
marginalization and alienation of immigrant laborers who are often rendered voiceless by
those political and economic structures that benefit from their labor.
To address some of my major questions, in chapter two I discuss the literature and
theory on neoliberalism and globalization with an emphasis on: (1) the contradictions in
the implementation of neoliberal policies and the theories’ basic premises; and, (2) the
formation of regulatory regimes which produce new forms of legality to advance their
own economic interests. In the chapter I argue that while neoliberalism centers on a
framework of macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization, and the privatization of
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the economy (Harvey 2005; Clarke 2005; Munck 2005Fernandez-Kelly 2007), neoliberal
policymakers have had to shift from theoretical foundations toward an application
characterized by inconsistency and opportunism (Clarke 2005). These inconsistent
applications arise from neoliberalism’s emphasis on the individuality of rights and
freedoms, accountability, and entrepreneurship, which contradict the desire for
significant forms of collective life (Harvey 2005).
In addition, I discuss how the resilience, adaptation, and reproduction of traditional
industries and business groups are centrally related to economic incentives and market
conditions that are politically arranged, and which can be observed in the state’s
willingness to overlook labor violations of social security, minimum wage, and working
conditions. These relationships are forged by values, norms and expectations which
groups in society hold and which result in political decisions to protect the role and
function of the traditional firm (Berger and Piore 1980). This discussion will bring to light
how other forms of cultural and economic trends help to produce discontinuities in the
processes of globalization that are driven by a variety of non-corporate, nontransnational actors in localities of the developed world.
Chapter three presents the literature and theory on immigration, and specifically on
the modes of incorporation of low wage labor immigrants to the U.S. economy. In
addition, the chapter presents a look at what many scholars interpret to be the use of
U.S. immigration policy as a deliberate attempt to provide some employers with a nearly
endless labor supply of a low-wage, vulnerable, un-organized labor force. In the chapter
I review the literature on the adverse conditions experienced by low-wage workers in the
U.S., arguing that the process of U.S. bound labor migration is the result of neoliberal
trends that create a demand for this type of workers in a variety of localities and contexts
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of core countries despite large unemployment rates and decreasing modes of
manufacturing and production.
Chapter four presents an overview of the Plant Nursery industry in the State of
Florida, including a detailed explanation of the industry and its importance to the
livelihood of thousands of immigrant workers as well as a significant contributor to the
state economy. In this context I will present the industry in terms of economic impacts,
labor impacts, the characteristics of the labor force, and the types of crops produced.
This chapter includes an in-depth look at the industry based on reports and official data
available and supplemented by some of my interviews, setting up the rationale and
theoretical importance in how the industry and its location demonstrate those
discontinuities in neoliberal restructuring that I engage in this manuscript.
Chapter five presents my research findings in relation to the main research question
of how Florida has remained a strong site of local plant nursery production despite a
strong shift toward free trade in a variety of U.S. industries. First, the chapter will focus
on the way in which contradictions of the application of free trade manifest themselves in
the State and are negotiated by State actors such as the Department of Agriculture and
the local producers. Second, the relationship between State players and private actors is
analyzed with a focus on the formation of regimes that affect policymaking to advance
their particular business interests.
Chapter six seeks to answer my second research question regarding the implications
for the immigrant labor force of the Florida Plant nursery industry. This section will
describe my findings in terms of how the adverse conditions that the local labor force
may face including, wages, benefits, rights, and labor conditions. I want to demonstrate
that the plant nursery labor force faces similar conditions to those experienced generally
by low wage workers of the U.S. economy as reported in the literature. To describe
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Florida’s plant nursery workers’ labor conditions, I will rely on ethnographic data from my
original research with plant nursery workers.
I complete this dissertation with a discussion of the theoretical and empirical links
between the regulated nature of the industry, its strong political organization, and the
implications these have in terms of power imbalance and marginalization for the
workforce. In addition, I will provide suggestions for future research.
Research Design and Methodology
As I argued above, it could be argued that from a neoliberal perspective nursery
plants could be grown more “efficiently,” that is with lower production costs, outside the
U.S., as is the case with much of the cut flowers sold in the U.S. Yet, despite economic
prescriptions that would project a “withering away” of plant nursery production in the
U.S., the industry has remained strong in specific areas of the country such as
California, Florida and Texas. Such anomaly can be explained by theories that highlight:
(1) political arrangements that are forged by values, norms and expectations of interest
groups in society in efforts to protect the role and function of traditional firms (Berger and
Piore 1980); (2) how in search for pragmatism, neoliberal policymakers have had to shift
from theoretical foundations toward an application characterized by inconsistency and
opportunism (Harvey 2005); and (3), the way in which political and economic elites are
related in mutual bonds of dependency, allowing them a high degree of political leverage
and contributing to the formation of regulatory regimes (Rapley 2004). These trends
have important implications for the immigrant labor force required for plant nursery
production and which must deal with vulnerabilities associated with aspects of immigrant
incorporation, immigration policy, human capital, and exploitation through wage theft as
well as through the denial of rights and benefits. With these considerations, this
research addresses the following questions:

12

1. Why and how has Florida remained one of the most important sites of nursery plant
production for the U.S. market amidst neoliberal economic restructuring of the last 3
decades that has generally moved commodity production from the U.S. to
developing countries where it is deemed more efficient and less expensive to
produce? And,
2. How must current theories of globalization be adjusted to account for South Florida’s
large nursery trade?
3. What are the implications for the large, immigrant labor force of the plant nursery
industry in terms of working conditions, rights, and benefits? And,
4. Do labor-migration theories accurately account for current processes of globalization
or do these theories also represent an anomaly in their relationship to policy
implementation within the plant nursery industry?
In this section, I describe the research methodology for this dissertation, including
the population, sample, data collection and analysis, as well as issues associated with
confidentiality of data, and research limitations. The scope of work detailed in this
section was designed to follow a two step research strategy. The first stage consists of
building a profile of the nursery industry through archival research, and other secondary
data sources. The second stage focuses on interviews performed on a sample of
workers and elite members of the South Florida Plant Nursery Industry. In the
manuscript I use industry elites to refer to members of the industry who are not laborers
and who have in one way or another power within and insider knowledge of the plant
nursery industry. This denotation thus includes owners and operators (also referred to as
producers), professional association representatives, lobbyists, scientific regulators, and
other industry insiders from banking and related agricultural businesses.
Research Strategy
The data collection process for this dissertation was designed to pursue a two step
research strategy. Data collection for the first stage (S1) took place over a six-month
period. During this time, I collected and analyzed a variety of secondary and archival
data sources including a search of government and industrial data and reports. For the
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most part, that meant data and information that could be accessed through the web or
through the services of the FIU library system, which is part of the larger University of
Florida library system. In order to uncover data and research available on the Florida
Plant Nursery industry and specifically about industry structure, status, and commodity
chain I turned to a wide variety of secondary data sources. I began with a search of
government and industrial data and reports. I sought relevant data from the national and
state level down to the county level through the 2007 Survey of Agriculture in order to
get an idea of volume of sales in the industry at both the state and county levels and the
size of the industry in the state of Florida, and in the relevant counties of Miami-Dade,
Orange, and Lake; as well as information on the demographics of employers and
employees. While my search through the 2007 Survey of Agriculture yielded valuable
information at the state and county levels in relation to nursery size, sales volumes, and
demographic characteristics of operators, the search yielded no information on the
gender or ethnic/racial characteristics of the industry’s labor force.
I also performed an extensive search through company and industry ally websites for
relevant information including annual reports, biographies of top executives, product
descriptions, and other information, which help to identify major finance mechanisms,
players, and brokers. Also, for information on a subsample of the largest companies I
searched Dun and Bradstreet Directories, which have limited information on private as
well as public companies.
Finally, I conducted a search of news articles in the print media of Florida. I did this
through Lexis-Nexis: Academic, which is readily available through the University of
Florida library system. From this search I expected to find what practices, facts and
public perceptions have been reported about the industry, but most articles concentrate
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on particular popular plant types, or more social/community related activities of industry
players.
Following these searches, I utilized the largest statewide trade organization, the
Florida Nursery, Growers, and Landscape Association (FNGLA), and its local chapter in
Orange and Lake Counties (a combined chapter) and in Miami-Dade County. Both
chapters publish newsletters and have extensive contact information for their large
membership of growers. I found the FNGLA to be open and helpful and a valuable
source of information about marketing and commodity chains. My most significant
sources of information were a variety of surveys and reports produced by industry
associations and industry-related research groups. These include articles and reports
produced by the University of Florida Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS),
articles in scholarly journals such as the Journal of Environmental Horticulture, and
articles in trade publications such as American Nurseryman. I tried whenever possible to
update outdated reports and article information through the use of the 2007 Survey of
Agriculture, the Agency for Workforce Innovation, and through the Florida Research and
Economic database.
Despite the importance, recent growth, and interest in the Green Industry, there is
very little information available at the national level regarding the industry’s economic
impacts (Hall, Hodges, and Haydu 2005). Although the USDA conducts regular nursery
crop surveys to collect information at the grower level, data are often incomplete for
some states and grower cash receipts reported do not reflect the broader economic
impacts generated by this industry (Hall, Hodges, and Haydu2005). In addition, U.S.
Census data are subject to similar limitations, including problems of low response rates
and poor data accuracy, while local economic data maintained by State comptrollers is
filled with misclassification errors and non-compliance on the part of industry
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participants. Recently, the Industrial Classification System (NAICS) has been developed
to ensure more robust estimates; however, no data has proven to accurately capture the
economic impact of the industry, including issues that are significant at the state level
(Hall, Hodges, and Haydu2005).
My searches and conversations with industry professionals revealed that no study
has been undertaken to describe the demographic characteristics of the industry’s
workforce; and, while the Census of Agriculture does collect demographic information on
farm operators, it does not estimate demographic information for employees. In addition,
to my knowledge, only one report highlights the working conditions and abuses faced by
the workers of plant nurseries, but the study is specific to Miami-Dade County and I
should exercise caution about generalizing these findings at the state level. Economic
data collected by the census of Agriculture and a variety of industry analysis often
separate the farm operations into a variety of categories such as Nursery Crops,
Floriculture Crops, Green house Crops, or even Greenhouse and Nursery Crops; thus,
making comparisons between years and regions very difficult in terms of size, profits,
and types of crops of industry producers.
I also found it difficult to report nursery-specific labor and wage statistics, since
information related to nursery workers are often aggregated with other kinds of
agricultural farm workers and laborers. Thus, the information I report on labor and wages
comes from articles and reports that sample segments of the industry, but there, too, I
found discrepancies between reports, making the numbers at least speculative, and hard
to generalize, making me highly skeptical about their accuracy.
To learn all that was needed for a full and detailed structural and commodity chain
analysis of products from an industry with such diversified products and producers as
the plant nursery industry, I turned to interviews with key industry players. These
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interviews were designed to uncover information not available through the often lacking
secondary data sources.
Stage 2(S2), consisted of the acquisition and analysis of transcribed interviews from
a sample of workers and elite actors. I define elite actors as those individuals who
occupy positions of power within the industry and include nursery farm owners,
lobbyists, and U.S. Department of Agriculture scientists and regulators. The Interviews
with plant nursery workers included basic demographic questions about migratory
status, language, education, gender, age, income, place of birth, and length of time in
the country as well as open-ended questions inquiring about rights, benefits, the impact
of wage theft among those who have been victimized, the conditions that preceded the
northbound migration process, and the process of settlement and integration to the local
culture and economy. Interviews with plant nursery elites included business information
about trade and labor, industry pressures and competition, marketing, transportation,
and employer-employee relations.
I interviewed a few key industry players to explicate gaps in the secondary data
sources. These informants range from plant nursery employees/operators to industry
specialists in commerce, trade, finance, or marketing. Through previous research in the
plant nursery industry I have identified approximately 20 growers in Miami-Dade County
who were willing to talk about the industry from their perspective and who could act as
starting points for a variety of snowball samples. Snowball sampling has been proven to
generate adequate variation when the number of starting points is multiple (Trost 1986;
Chavez, McMullin, Mishra, and Hubbell 2001). I asked them for recommendations of key
figures known to them and attempted to arrange interviews with them as well. Other
recommendations for interviews were solicited from the local chapter of the Florida
Nursery Growers and Landscape Association (FNGLA).
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The analysis of these interviews addresses the financing mechanisms and
institutions used by nursery growers for land and supplies and for crop production,
including government subsidy programs; the economic health of the industry as
measured by profitability, percentage of market and other indicators according to
availability of secondary data; the major competition – within the industry in Florida, and
from national and international competitors; the real and perceived threats/challenges
facing the FL nursery industry, including labor supply, health, safety and environmental
regulations; the trends in the industry, for example, consolidation, increasing sales,
wholesale vs retail (including on-line marketing, start-ups, buying habits of consumers;
and, How nursery products get from the nursery to the consumer.
Question 1
Why and how has Florida remained one of the most important sites of nursery plant
production for the US market amidst neoliberal economic restructuring of the last 3
decades?
To answer this question I relied on information acquired through both steps of the
research strategy. The first stage of this research strategy concentrated on a variety of
third party papers, reports, and public statistics about the state of Florida’s plant nursery
industry. The results describe the structure of the industry with a focus on the main
finance, marketing and transport mechanisms most generally used in and by nursery
growers as well as the national and international status of the industry. It also outlines
the commodity chain from producer to final consumers. This first stage thus,
demonstrates the solidity of the Florida plant nursery industry within a national and
international context. Next, I rely on my interviews with industry producers, regulators,
lobbyists, and other industry insiders in order to focus on those institutional
arrangements and social interactions that permit the plant nursery industry to remain

18

strong in the state of Florida and highly competitive within a growing globalizing
industrial environment.
Transcripts and field notes from interviews were entered into MAXQDA, a data
management and analysis program, to identify ideas, patterns, descriptors, key words,
and contextual information. I performed a systematic analysis of the transcribed
interviews and the secondary data sources with a focus on the institutional
arrangements that help to maintain the industry local and the structural conditions that
may be at play behind regulation (e.g., values, norms, land attachment, profits,
competition, business interests, traditional arrangements, competition, laws, etc.). In this
step, I also created the commodity chain through the use of MAXQDA Maps, which
allows the user to integrate and graph quantitative, qualitative, and secondary data
sources in a graphic model in order to provide a detail picture of the structure of the
industry and of the social interactions that are embedded in it.
Question 2
How must current theories of globalization be adjusted to account for South Florida’s
large nursery trade?
For this question, I focused on the interviews with industry elites acquired in the
second stage of the research strategy in order to address gaps in traditional neoliberal
and globalization theory. I hypothesize that South Florida’s nursery industry does not fit
the predictions of globalization theory and the use of labor because of institutional
arrangements that disallow competition from foreign-produced nursery products.
Neoliberal theories predict that employers try to keep labor costs as low as possible;
paying less than the legal minimum, for instance. However, free trade and neoliberal
theories fail to explain how an industry can get away with breaking labor laws; or, how
an industry such as South Florida’s plant nurseries, can compete successfully against
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foreign competition where labor costs are likely to be even lower than those obtained by
violating labor laws.
For this question I will rely on the analysis of transcripts and field notes from
interviews through the use of MAXQDA, to identify those institutional industry
arrangements that do not fit within the traditional frameworks postulated by existing
neoliberal and globalization theories. To this end, I will analyze the discourses and
policies of industry elites and observe if and how these fit traditional postulations of
neoliberal theory and globalization presented in the forthcoming literature arguments.
Question 3
What are the implications for the large, “imported,” labor force in terms of economic
incorporation, working conditions, rights, and benefits?
The plant nursery industry in the state of Florida has come to rely heavily on low
wage workers from the developing world. Thus, this is an essential component of this
dissertation, as the conditions for workers are markedly different for those of industry
elites. For this question I focus on the interviews collected on the second stage of
research with industry elites and focus on the data collected with workers, employers
and professionals of the plant nursery industry. Again, I rely on the analysis of transcripts
and field notes from interviews through the use of MAXQDA, to identify how a variety of
institutional arrangements impact the industry’s use of immigrant labor. In addition, I
compare and analyze the workers’ and employers’ answers to observe any patterns that
may emerge in regards to migration, exploitation, marginalization, and other conditions
embedded within the employer-worker relationship. In addition, data analysis for this
question relies on field notes done during participant observation in the fieldwork phase
of the dissertation at various localities of plant production. I hypothesize that despite a
series of normative discourses from industry elites that promote inclusion and
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opportunity, the workers find themselves marginalized through a variety of policies and
institutional arrangements that largely benefit the elite class.
Question 4
Are labor-migration trends in the industry consistent with current theories of
globalization or do they represent an anomaly in their relationship to policy
implementation?
For this question, I rely on my interviews with both industry elites and workers of the
plant nursery industry gathered on stage 2 of the research plan. I analyze transcripts and
field notes from interviews through the use of MAXQDA, to identify those institutional
industry arrangements that do not fit within the traditional frameworks postulated by
existing theories of migration. To this end, I analyze the discourses and policies of
industry elites in relation to migration management, their views on the use of foreign
born labor migrants and observe whether or not these fit traditional postulations of
migration theory presented in the forthcoming migration literature argument. I also
analyze how the views, values, and practical implementations of employers in regards to
their foreign born labor force affect the broader policies that dictate and affect the
movement of workers across international borders.
Research setting, sample and data sources
Miami-Dade County and the state of Florida are home to a lucrative plant nursery
and landscaping industry. A 2006 report by the University of Florida’s Institute of Food
and Agricultural Sciences (UF/IFAS) places this industry second only to that of the state
of California in terms of national industry value. Total sales of landscaping and nursery
firms in the state averaged $15.2 billion in 2005, growing by approximately 54% since
the year 2000 (Hodges and Haydy 2006). Overall, the industry provides close to 294,000
jobs, with about 65% of them being full-time positions. Miami-Dade County tops the list
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of sales, with an estimated $1.9 billion in 2005 and a labor force of about 40,000
(Hodges and Haydy 2006).
The industry can be divided into three distinct segments, with nursery growers,
landscape sales, and garden center retail sales being managed under similar conditions
and often, under the same operation. The largest of these segments is garden center
retail, which provides live plants, horticultural hard goods, and other supplies to garden
centers and retailers throughout the country. Garden center retail was responsible for
producing close to $7 billion in sales in 2005 (Hodges and Haydy 2006). Landscape
sales, the second largest segment, consists of installation, maintenance, and design of
landscapes primarily for developers, office buildings, retail malls, and outdoor city
projects. The landscape segment’s total 2005 sales represented over $5 billion (Hodges
and Haydy 2006). Finally, nursery grower sales represent the third sales segment of the
industry. This segment’s sales in 2005 was about $3 billion and consisted mainly of
tropical foliage, shrubs, potted flowering plants, liners, trees, and turf-grass among
others (Hodges and Haydy 2006).
It is often difficult to separate information pertaining to these three areas of industrial
production; however, this dissertation focuses specifically on plant nursery production. In
the literature floriculture and greenhouse production are synonymous and distinct from
nursery crops, which are plants grown mostly out of doors in fields or containers.
Nursery and floriculture/greenhouse production are the two sectors where most of the
workers of concern to this study are concentrated within the larger complexly integrated
and inter-reliant structure of the Green or Environmental Horticulture industry. In many
cases, researchers combine both categories (nursery and floriculture or
nursery/greenhouse) into a single analysis, while in many others the sectors are treated
separately. In addition, industrial analyses often include or lump these two sectors with
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other large areas of the Green industry, such as retail, landscaping, re-wholesaling, as
well as a variety of suppliers of seeds and raw materials for production and installation of
green industry products. These industry sectors are highly interrelated; therefore, my
look at industry structure and commodity chain contains many of these important sectors
as well in order to situate and give a contextual comparison of the sectors of concern
(greenhouse and nursery crops). For the purpose of this manuscript, I have separated
greenhouse or floriculture and nursery crops whenever data is available for both types of
horticultural production, but in most cases I treat them as a single sector depending on
the availability of information and the sources which inform this study.
Interviews and participant observation for my dissertation took place in a variety of
settings in the state of Florida. Employer interviews took place in the counties of MiamiDade, Orange, and Volusia which are important centers of plant nursery production.
Interviews with industry elites, that is industry regulators, professional business
representatives, and political actors were conducted in Miami-Dade County, Orange
County, and Alachua County, which are important centers of economic, research, and
political control of the industry. Interviews with Workers were conducted in Homestead in
the southern tip Miami Dade County and home to a large community of immigrant farm
nursery workers from the area’s industry.
Interviews with workers and elites of the Florida plant nursery industry for this
dissertation were conducted between the summer months of 2007 and the winter of
2010. My sample consists of 70 individuals who work within or are related to the plant
nursery industry. The sample includes interviews with 40 plant nursery, low-wage,
immigrant workers in Miami Dade County, a focus group of 10 workers with the same
demographic characteristics, and 20 interviews with industry insiders, employers,
professional representatives, and regulators of the industry located throughout the state
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of Florida. The sample of workers is made up of 35 Guatemalan workers, 13 Mexican, 2
Haitians, and one Puerto Rica. In terms of gender, the worker sample is made up of 15
females and 35 males. The 20 interviews with members of the industry’s elite are made
up of white non-Hispanics and contain only two females in banking and research
positions that support the industry, who do not directly work within it.
Early attempts to access the workers often proved difficult, as they were often wary
of strangers and individuals outside their ethnic/social networks. I was able to gain
access to workers through local community organizations which serve the immigrant
industry workers through a variety of services such as English classes, legal supports,
housing, worker training, and leadership training related to community organizing. These
organizations facilitated access to workers and served as entry points to commence
multiple snowball samples. Previous collaborative efforts with faculty at Florida
International University (FIU) had connected me with a variety of community
organizations, facilitating entry points and access to their members for the initial
snowball samples and continuous participant observation. These organizations leaders
and organizers lead me to workers who were later contacted using a purposive sample,
in which I used my knowledge of this specific group to select those informants with the
necessary knowledge of the conditions experienced by workers of the plant nursery
industry. Snowball samples allow the researcher to locate one or more key individuals
and ask them to name other likely candidates for the research. For this reason, snowball
sampling is very useful in studies of social networks, which may include elites and other
bounded and difficult-to-find populations such as undocumented immigrants (Bernard
1988).
For operators, I selected a random sample from a list of plant nurseries provided to
by the Florida Nursery, Growers and Landscape Association, (FNGLA); a great majority
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of these nurseries were members of the FNGLA. Most of the operators I contacted
agreed to participate, except in some of the larger nurseries where access was
controlled by receptionists and assistants who blocked contact with the individuals in
management positions.
Interviews
The interviews conducted were unstructured, in-depth, and open-ended. They
sought to explore any political arrangements that disallow competition from foreignproduced nursery products as well as the relationship between the industry’s labor
needs and its use of low-wage, immigrant labor. Because my informants hold different
industry positions and play different roles, the structure of each interview followed a
different course of action. The interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder,
and then transcribed into text for further analysis (Appendix 1 shows the topic areas
covered in the interviews).
Confidentiality, Safety of Data, and Human Subjects Protection
Protecting the identity of all research participants is a major responsibility of this
research project. Many of the target participants were immigrants who are
undocumented in the country. In addition many participants were vulnerable or fearful of
employers who may have abused them in the past. As a result, no identifiable individual
personal information was collected in this research project and informants’ real identities
will be concealed through the use of pseudonyms. All interviews and focus groups were
recorded acoustically, and in the recording process only first names were used to
identify participants.
All participants were provided a written copy of the research objectives, a
description of risks and benefits, and the pertinent contact information of the researcher
and the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at FIU. Spanish speaking participants were
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provided a Spanish version of all information (Guatemalans whose native language is
Mayan were included in the sample only if they could communicate at least at a simple
conversational level in Spanish).
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II. NEOLIBERALISM AND GLOBALIZATION
In this chapter I focus the global socio-economic transformations of the last three
decades, emphasizing the role that neoliberal trends have played in the reconfiguration
of traditional forms of capitalist production. In this context, I discuss the contradictory
process embedded in the application of neoliberal policies, the formation of regulatory
regimes needed to implement such policies, and the process by which traditional
industries have been able to navigate through changes in the political economy of
developed nations. I also provide an introduction to the concept of sanitary and
phytosanitary policies in agriculture, emphasizing the way in which such regulations are
problematic for the fulfillment of an international free trade agenda while exemplifying a
series of discontinuities in the process of economic globalization. Finally, I discuss the
decline in labor conditions in the U.S. and the implications for a growing low-wage,
immigrant, and flexible workforce in the United States.
Neoliberal Theory and Practice
Nneoliberalism can be described as “a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2005:2). In this
sense, neoliberalism views free market exchange as an ethic capable of guiding human
action and behavior, holding that social good can be achieved by maximizing the extent
and frequency of market participation, and emphasizing the proposition that economic
growth is better advanced when the flow of goods, services, and capital is unconstrained
by government regulation (MacEwan 1999; Shaikh 2005). However, within the context of
modern day political and economic structures and due to neoliberalism’s emphasis on
freedoms and individual rights, neoliberalism must rely on the State to ensure that an
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appropriate institutional framework is established. This means that in order to create and
preserve these practices the state must make use of ‘official’ structures such as the
military, defense, police, and the legal system.
It is important to distinguish neoliberalism as a system of thought from neoliberal
restructuring as an actual application of this system of thought. Neoliberalism in its
theoretical sense emerged from neoclassical economic formulations that prescribed the
market as capable of reshaping individual and collective stability through competition
and unfettered markets. Later, supported by a variety of moral neoclassical prescriptions
about individual autonomy and decision-making, neoliberalism developed in harmony
with Enlightenment ideas that upheld the high political value of liberty (Harvey 2005;
Clarke 2005; Fernandez-Kelly 2007). A framework thus evolved around the notion that
markets are proficient mechanisms for the creation and distribution of wealth as well as
a precondition for the dissemination of democracy and the institutions of political liberty
(Fernandez Kelly 2007). To this end, neoliberal restructuring centers on a variety of
practical implementations of macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization, and the
privatization of the economy (Munck 2005).
The distinction between neoliberalism as a system of thought and neoliberal
restructuring policies and implementation is important because in search of pragmatism
neoliberal policymakers have had to shift from theoretical foundations toward an
application characterized by inconsistency and opportunism (Clarke 2005). Such forms
of fragmentation have been the focus of much critique and analysis, particularly as its
contradictory implications have reshaped a variety of structural processes, from the
establishment of economic, legal, and labor regimes to assaults on democracy and civil
society (see Sassen 1998; MacEwan 1999; Rapley 2004; Canterbury 2005; Harvey
2005; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005). More specifically, this fragmentation has been
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able to create contradictory positions that are political and economic in nature but which
carry implications for the restructuring of a variety of social structures (Rapley 2004).
First, a problem inherent in the theory and practice of neoliberalism arises from its
emphasis on the individuality of rights and freedoms, accountability, and
entrepreneurship, which contradict the desire for significant forms of collective life
(Harvey 2005). Whether collective or individual, these rights and freedoms are highly
regarded tenets of democracy, but under neoliberal implementations create a tension by
demanding that political measures are put in place in the interest of economic prosperity
(Canterbury 2005). Thus, “while individuals are supposedly free to choose, they are not
supposed to choose to construct strong collective institutions” such as trade unions or
political parties with a platform of state interventionism (Harvey 2005: 69). To this end,
the role of the state should be to support the rule of law, individual property rights, and
institutions that promote the free function of markets and trade, and to use its
monopolistic control of the means of violence to maintain such freedoms at all cost
(Harvey 2005).
The contradiction has become particularly apparent through the struggle led by
environmentalists and labor groups around the world as they negotiate through a variety
of challenges between the interests they represent and those of corporations and the
state (see Greider 1997; Nissen 2002; Tsing 2005; Shelly 2007). Such conflicts are the
result of a significant bias in neoliberal practice toward the commoditization of labor and
the environment, where the neoliberal State sides with “good” business practices, while
opposing the collective rights of labor or the regenerating needs of the environment
(Harvey 2005). In this sense, the neoliberal state is hostile to forms of social solidarity
that tend to restrict capital accumulation and as a result, trade unions and other social
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movements are disciplined or destroyed in the name of the liberties of individual
workers.
A second contradiction emerges from the view that markets work better when free
from government regulation, since for neoliberalism the market represents rationality in
terms of the most efficient distribution of resources (Munck 2005). But as Polany (2001)
points out, the market has been the result of an ongoing intervention on the part of the
nation-state, which works to impose market organization in a conscious and often violent
way. Under neoliberalism the state becomes a market player itself, helping to reshape
and create new market-oriented policies which in turn facilitate the development of a
new form of capitalism (Munck 2005). The result is a system in which corporate
institutions “secure compromises between management and workers by making appeals
to the national interest” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 179). Still, regardless of how
powerful the role of corporate and financial interests become, nation-states must
continue to adopt policies that promote “fair” market competition, free movement of
capital, and curtail the movement of labor across national borders (Robbins 2002).
In the belief that regulation should be controlled and managed through market
mechanisms (e.g., tax incentives or impositions, trading rights, trade liberalization, etc.)
and not through governmental interventions, neoliberalism can create dangerous
conditions for workers as well as the environment by referring containment, planning and
regulation to the forces of the market. Within the context of current modes of global
capitalist production, such changes bear important implications for individuals and the
environment as corporations and individuals rarely pay the full or real costs associated
with production and consumption (Robbins 2002). This condition can result in market
failure if firms and individuals “avoid paying the full costs attributable to them by
shedding their liabilities outside the market.” (Harvey 2005) As an example we have
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individuals or corporations that avoid costs by dumping toxic waste or workers that are
exposed to dangerous chemicals that may cause physical harm (Harvey 2005:67).
Clearly, at some point someone will have to pay for these costs, whether through higher
taxation, health costs, lower wages, or otherwise paid for by future generations (Robbins
2002).
These contradictory scenarios further demonstrate that establishing neoliberalism as
a practical form of social organization through deregulation of market structures requires
that a variety of policies are put in place. No matter how small the role of government
becomes, a neoliberal system will require a structure of implementation and control. In
this sense, it has become increasingly clear that with the mobilization and establishment
of a global intellectual, political and economic class, neoliberalism has become a real
political project throughout nearly the entire world and certainly within the U.S. which
strongly attempts to shape the world according to its ideological foundations (Clarke
2005; Munck 2005). In this sense, globalization is seen as the extension of neoliberalism
through different levels of regional, international or global integration. As Leisnik (1999)
explains, the neoliberal project sees in globalization the advantages of efficient
production, financial discipline, cheaper products and services, and a global approach to
unemployment and welfare.
But how has the neoliberal project been able to achieve global permanence in the
last three decades? As several authors have shown, advocates, prescribers, and
followers of neoliberalism have been able to position themselves in positions of power
and decision-making throughout a variety of influential financial and political regulatory
bodies (Stiglitz 2002; Harvey 2005; MacEwan 2005). In the next section I focus on the
formation and maintenance of regulatory regimes as powerful mechanisms in the
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expansion of neoliberal trends across the globe and their influence in the processes of
globalization taking hold in the world today.
Regulatory Regimes
Much discussion about the economic restructuring of the last three decades has
centered on the role that multinational corporations have come to play in the world’s
economy since the late 1970s. In many ways, the multinational corporation has become
the best equipped institution to perform the task of global integration by shifting the
power of government toward a few financial institutions through the use of private
financial resources for public purposes. In this sense, multinational corporations have
been able to acquire power to enlist, maneuver, and manipulate government institutions
and international agencies toward the creation of policies that facilitate their agendas
(Robbins 2002). However, the mission of the corporation is nothing without a system that
legitimizes its role as an engine of change; and in this sense, it has been the role of
powerful elites to reshape and influence governmental agencies and international
regulatory bodies in search for world-wide economic stability (Stiglitz 2002). In this view,
it is only after several steps have been taken by powerful political and economic elites
that corporations can advance their agendas in developing countries through direct
investment.
One way through which political and economic elites have succeeded in
consolidating a position of power and accumulation is through the establishment of
influential networks and more specifically through the implementation of regulatory
regimes (Rapley 2004). It can be argued that in modern capitalist society, both, political
and economic elites are related in mutual bonds of dependency, which allow them a high
degree of political leverage and the ability to exclude the masses from the political
process. The notion regulatory regime formation is largely present throughout the
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literature on neoliberalism and globalization, although different authors have
conceptualized the issue as one of power restoration to the economic and political class
through imperialism or authoritarianism (see Canterbury 2005; Radice 2005; Tabb 2001;
Rapley 2004). However, and independent of conceptualizations being used, consensus
in the literature is strong that the implementation of neoliberal reforms of the last 30
years has served the best interests of the global power elites (see Canterbury 2005;
Radice 2005; Tabb 2001; Rapley 2004. Light (2007), explains this phenomena as a
latent function of the globalization process, in which actions aimed at to serve world
interests, largely serve the interests of powerful political and economic groups.
The establishment of regimes by political and economic elites has also had an
impact on traditional modes of commodity production in the developed world. Berger and
Piore (1980) foresaw some of these issues as embedded in the relationship between
market expansion and the survival of traditional industries, 2 where the survival and
permanence of the traditional sector and its role can also be understood as resulting
from inherent features and tensions among actors in advanced industrial societies. Just
as in the neoliberal context of globalization, the resilience, adaptation, and reproduction
of traditional industries and business groups are centrally related to economic incentives
and market conditions that are politically arranged, and which can be observed in the
state’s willingness to overlook labor violations of social security, minimum wage, and
working conditions. As in the case of global economic development, these relationships
are forged by values, norms and expectations which groups in society hold and which

2

Berger and Piore (1980:91) define traditional industries as those that produce the same goods
and services as other, modern firms in the market, but which are characterized by smaller firm
size, higher labor capital ratios, lower productivity, and other characteristics associated with
small, independent property owners, farmers, shopkeepers, artisans, and certain small and
medium businessmen.
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result in political decisions to protect the role and function of the traditional firm (Berger
and Piore 1980).
Whether in the form of authoritarian or democratic governing, the relationship
between economic and political elites must work within the structure of the state. In this
sense, the neoliberal state can be described as a governing apparatus for which the
freedoms embodied in it reflect the interests of private property owners, businesses,
multinational corporations, and financial capital (Harvey 2005). It could be argued that
the state in turn responds to claims from capital by producing new forms of legality that
advance the interests of certain economic actors while weakening those of others
(Sassen 1998). In this sense, it becomes clear that globalization “is about relations of
relative power, dependence as much as exchange, and how otherness becomes
naturalized or provokes resistance. Far from being a merely technical matter,
globalization is a deeply political process (Tabb 2001; 13).” Through this lens, we can
see how globalization is mediated by a series of governance networks that operate at
both transnational and local levels, and which require a variety of social mechanisms to
enforce contracts and standards of judging what is considered permissible behavior by
participants.
In economic terms, the formation of such regimes has resulted in a polarization of
the wages and salaries of workers as well as of the use of land, and the organization of
labor and housing markets (Sassen 1998). For the labor market, this shift has signified a
strict regularization of unionization rights and of the suppression of strikes, as these are
viewed in opposition to the objectives of the power elite (Harvey 2005). Similarly, in its
domestic applications, neoliberal restructuring has truncated the rights of access to food,
water, education, work, land, medical care, and a variety of other public amenities
(Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005). Under the current phase of political and economic
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developments, the opportunities for labor and capital to meet in the market-place have
changed dramatically (Shelley 2007). Technology has facilitated this process by allowing
deals to be discussed and formalized across the world over cell phones and money to
be transferred at the push of a button. However, for millions of potential and low-wage
workers, the conditions at the marketplace are not the same as for those with the ability
to influence finance, trade and production. For the workers, the decisions and processes
of incorporation into a regional or even global economy are more complex and dramatic
(Dusster 2006).
It is precisely in the area of labor where the push to deregulate the functions of
regulatory agencies that (under the premise that market forces better solve the problems
of income distribution) neoliberal restructuring has remained loyal to its theoretical
foundations. Since the early 1980s, labor market deregulation has resulted in the
decreased value of the minimum wage, increased employment insecurity, a widening of
the wage gap, and significant losses in employment protection (Saad-Filho and Johnston
2005, Glyn 2006). Marx saw this as an inevitable product of capitalism, where
accumulation for a minority grows exponentially with its ability to exploit labor out of a
weakened and powerless labor force (Marx [1867] 1978). In the context of neoliberalism,
higher value is given to flexibility in production or manufacturing, resulting in increased
job insecurity, lower wages, and a loss of benefits for the working class (Harvey 2005)
Many of these practices can be traced back to the late 1960s, when a crisis of
profitability resulted from an excess of productive capacity in relation to effective demand
(Greider 1997). Many U.S. transnational corporations responded by relocating
production sites to less unionized areas of the country – usually in the south – or to less
developed countries in an attempt to lower wage costs and to restore profitability
(Greider 1997, Stiglitz 2002). By opening factories in developing nations, transnational
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corporations were able to save on production costs while justifying free trade as an
equalizing force that would bring positive economic changes to the countries where they
settled (Fernández-Kelly and Massey 2007). Again, in its regional and global
implications, neoliberal regimes proved to establish a new discipline of labor and
management that largely benefits lenders and shareholders while providing a diminished
role of the state in the development of welfare and development (Saad-Filho and
Johnston 2005). For the US labor market, the shift toward a global expansion of
neoliberal economics also signified a variety of other trends that have largely intensified
since the 1980s.
Take for instance the noticeable increase in low-wage jobs in the United States in
recent decades. In many ways, this change has been the result of the same global
forces that have channeled investment and manufacturing jobs to developing countries,
whereas the United States’ industrial production has moved overseas, the traditional
manufacturing base has downgraded into a second-rate manufacturing sector
characterized by a large supply of low paid, semiskilled, and unskilled production jobs
(Sassen 1998). In developed nations, these circumstances degrade the conditions of
work in a similar legal climate of poor nations, as industry has revived many old forms of
exploitation and abuse outlawed long ago in the advanced economies, “including
dangers to workers and the use of children as expendable cheap labor” (Greider
1997:34).
More examples can be observed as sweatshops have re-emerged from New York to
Los Angeles, and as manufacturing sectors feel the pressure to remain competitive in
the global-economic landscape labor standards and wages embark in a race to the
bottom, where gains in capital have increasingly become losses for labor (Greider 1997).
In addition, many U.S. companies have downsized or simply closed as they have
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become victims to the laissez-faire rules of free market policy, causing massive layoffs
and disrupting the lives of individuals and families along with the consumption and
saving patterns at the macroeconomic level (Otero 1996).
In essence, the aforementioned problems of neoliberalism and economic
globalization have intensified by corporate actors, who backed by political and economic
elites, have pursued a defensive strategy based on lowering wage costs. This strategy,
“has proved to be incompatible with increasing standards of living for large sectors of the
population” and in the case of Mexico resulted in a less equitable society, with a large
number of people under the poverty line and declining real wages for unskilled work
(Otero 1996:5). In the U.S. some of these consequences have been particularly harsh in
those industries that cannot be transferred to other regions of the world since they are
not able to compete against globally movable industries, and end up depending on some
of the lowest wage workers available in the labor market. Jobs in industries such as
hospitality, construction or farming of perishable goods in the developed world have
become increasingly dependent on a mobile workforce in order to perform jobs in those
specific locations where work is place bound. Under the current phase of neoliberal
restructuring, this condition often puts many industries at a disadvantage in relation to
those firms that can exploit labor by finding it cheaper abroad (Shelly 2007).
However, many of the claims made by the critics of neoliberal globalization need to
be reconsidered in the light of economic indicators of recent decades that postulate that
the number of people in poverty have decreased significantly, particularly in Asia and
Latin America and that wages paid by American multinational corporations abroad pay a
premium wage that is higher than the going national rates of those countries where
production is taking place (Bhagwati 2007). In structural terms, the world has also
witnessed a significant economic growth in those countries that have welcomed
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international investment in manufacturing and services, such as China and India, which,
would also indicate a positive outcome to some of the policies adopted through the
breaking down of barriers to trade and finance (Bhagwati 2007, Stiglitz 2002). It is hard,
however, to ignore many of the questions that positive changes in specific geopolitical
areas bring about, such as the growth of poverty in the African continent or the economic
demise of Russia after the fall of the socialist block (Bhagwati 2007, Stiglitz 2002). In the
end, what these different scenarios seem to point out is the degree to which neoliberal
globalization has provided a fragmented and uneven setting for growth and development
with increase in inequality in a variety of areas such as concern for the environment, the
rights of labor, democracy, and human rights (Stiglitz 2002, Trouillot 2003).
In the following section, I look at the establishment of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) as a practical implementation of neoliberal policies, focusing on the
way in which the decisions of powerful actors had a wide effect on a variety of
socioeconomic social structures, institutions, and the individuals who despite being
excluded from the decision making process, suffered its harsh effects.
NAFTA – Free Trade Policy in Practice
Taken together the contradictions in the theoretical and practical applications of
neoliberalism and highlighted in the previous section can be seen in the implementation
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As Fernández-Kelly and
Massey (2007) explain:
The interests of capital are reflected in the considerable emphasis NAFTA puts on
intellectual property rights, patents and copyrights, and the rights and privileges of
ownership compared with its curious silence on issues related to labor and the
environment. From the American point of view, the twin purposes of NAFTA were
thus to provide manufacturers free access to Mexican workers, thereby enabling a
new international division of labor, while at the same time giving investors
unhindered access to Mexican property and financial assets.
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The negotiations that lead to the establishment of NAFTA did not include trade unions,
public interest organizations, or small business associations, implying a deliberate
attempt to benefit particular corporate interests, while disregarding the interest of
excluded groups (Gelinas 2003; Fernández-Kelly and Massey 2007). It is possible that
inclusion of trade unions and other public interest organizations would have allowed a
more democratic and egalitarian system that could benefit workers and the environment
through a more inclusive development process. Instead, NAFTA created an array of
negative and dangerous conditions for workers and the environment in Mexico and the
United States (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Gelinas 2003; Otero 19996).
The North American Free Trade Agreement was established in January of 1994,
seeking to open Mexico and Canada’s service markets, ease restrictions in the area’s
auto industry, open access in Mexico to U.S. agricultural products, provide fair rules for
investment, and increase access of Mexico’s state owned energy companies to U.S.
firms (Kingsolver 2001). However, as Randall (1992) explains, the motivations for the
involved nations were quite different. For the U.S., motivations can be understood in two
specific ways. First, political aspirations projected to establish Mexico as a model-tofollow for other politically and economically unstable nations of Latin America through
the establishment of similar trade agreements in the area (Randall 1992). Second, the
agreement was an investor’s charter of rights and freedoms that gave U.S. multinational
corporations priority over environmental, social, and economic policies in Mexico and
Canada (Gelinas 2003). These views acquire stronger validity in light of the impacts that
NAFTA has had on the U.S. In terms of job impact, several studies contend that NAFTA
has been responsible for thousands of lost jobs in the U.S. – although these have been
offset by the creation of greater number of jobs during the economic boom of the 1990s and there is no evidence that NAFTA has had a discernible effect on the U.S. aggregate
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trade balance (see Mary E. Burfisher, Sherman Robinson and Karen Thierfelder 200, for
a complete analysis).
For Mexico, the treaty called for an upgrade to the country’s industrial and
technological base, the creation of jobs, the expansion of international markets for
Mexican products, and provided an effective way to foster domestic reform while
achieving continuous economic growth (Randall 1992). However, in Mexico “import
liberalization, the overvalued exchange rate, high absolute and real interest rates, and
domestic divestment have generated disincentives for manufacturing” (Otero 1996:80).
In the end, NAFTA resulted in an increase of import-oriented industrialization with limited
links to the local economy and with limited impact on the creation of manufacturing jobs
in Mexico. In addition, manufacturing became dominated by U.S. transnational
corporations and a few domestic monopolies which were quickly able to adapt to
changes in face of restructuring (Otero 1996). Thus, those firms that could not adapt
struggled or perished, producing a high degree of industrial mortality in the early years of
NAFTA (Heath 1998). Manufacturing growth was roughly .06 percent between 2000 and
2006, with employment falling 15 percent, and indicating the degree to which industrial
development in Mexico has served U.S. interests by increased productivity and wage
suppression while substantially reducing the profitability of Mexican-owned industries
(Delgado Wise and Cypher 2007).
On the agricultural side, the NAFTA policy that accompanied economic restructuring
focused on bringing subsistence farmers out of “unproductive” farming and aimed at
privatizing 50% of Mexico’s land base 3 to invest in export production of fruit, produce,
3

As a result of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 created the
Ejido as a land tenure system which granted land to the “landless” and the “displaced” through
agrarian reform and land redistribution which largely benefited the indigenous and peasant
populations of the country by creating communal lands for cultivation (Vazquez Castillo 2004).
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and other crops (Stephen 2007). As Stephen (2007:125) explains, NAFTA produced
unintended consequences for farmers in the lower ranks of the economic ladder by
allowing
Ever-increasing amounts of U.S. corn – primarily yellow corn for animal feed – and
other products to enter Mexico to compete with those produced by subsistence
farmers… Rather than knocking out all corn farmers in Mexico, U.S. imports of
yellow feed corn in combination with the end of guaranteed prices… resulted in an
increase in corn production among middle size and larger farmers with access to
irrigated land. This phenomenon drove out subsistence farmers that could no longer
compete with the middle and large growers who had access to better technology in
irrigation as well as the financial power to deal with the growing costs of production.
This trend had unintended consequences for peasants, as they became
proletarianized and sought to find employment in a variety of industrial sectors or
sought economic advances in the U.S. labor market.
Proponents of NAFTA expected to control Mexican migration to the U.S. under the
logic that job creation and increased economic development in Mexico would deter
migration flows to the U.S. (Kingsolver 2001). This strategy is consistent with the view
that “the U.S. Government has attempted to promote economic growth in the migrantsending countries by encouraging direct foreign investment and export-oriented
international development assistance, in the belief that rising economic opportunities in
the developing world will deter emigration” (Sassen 1998:32). However, as Sassen
(1998) explains, there is a separation of migration and labor migration within the
conceptualization of NAFTA in which there exist some considerations regarding the
regulation of service workers in finance and investment 4 – presumably skilled and more
likely to become ‘mainstream Americans,’ but no considerations for low-wage, poor and

4

The 1990 Immigration Act increased the limitations to the family reunification clause of the U.S.
immigration policy while the1993 passing of NAFTA increased some of the technical categories
through which people from Mexico and Canada could migrate to the U.S. Specifically, these new
qualifications gave rise to an increase of business visas, student visas, and intracompany
transferred personnel from Mexico, while a strong militarization of the Southern U.S. Border
through operations “Blockade” and “gatekeeper” fervently sought to keep low wage immigrants
from entering the country Fernandez-Kelly and Massey (2007).
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uneducated labor migrants. As a result, migration is left to be enforced and regulated by
state agencies that view migration not as a function of structural conditions, but instead
as the outcome of individuals seeking better opportunities for themselves (Sassen
1998).
Several scholars point out that rather than controlling immigration NAFTA actually
increased it (see Sassen 1998; Stephen 2007; Castro 1990). The number of migrants
from Mexican villages and rural communities who relocated within the country and to the
United States increased 352 percent between 1980 and 2002, while in the United States
this meant a 452% increase of rural migrants from Mexico between those same years
(Stephen 2007). The flow has been influenced by the implementation of policies aimed
at de-regulating the flow of capital, goods, services, and information while ironically,
regulating the flow of labor and delegating its control to state agencies that are
separated from the economic emphasis behind treaties like NAFTA (Sassen 1998).
Trade Regulation in a Sea of Free Trade
The movement of people across international borders is not the only controversial
issue that follows the establishment of global and regional neoliberal policies. NAFTA
opened up a variety of markets for U.S. based companies and products to enter Mexico
and Canada; however, there still remain a variety of policies designed to protect plant
health and consumer health in developed countries that curtail the trade of goods
between international actors in the opposite direction. Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
measures, for instance, have been established to protect living beings, that is humans,
animals, and plants, from the dissemination of pests or disease (Burnquist, Barrs,
Miranda, and Filho 2004). Theoretically, within the context of trade liberalization and
global integration, these measures have been sought to facilitate production and
exchange, reduce transaction costs, and improve quality; however, at the practical level,
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a variety of conflicts arise between domestic regulations and international trade systems
as regulations often work to restrain international competition (Burnquist et al. 2004).
In the broad international context, an international SPS agreement is governed by
the WTO and specifically seeks to “protect and improve the current human health,
animal health, and phytosanitary situation of all Member countries” and “Protect
Members from arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination because of different sanitary and
phytosanitary standards” (Henson and Loader 2000). One of the main issues associated
with SPS restrictions is that individual nations can take legitimate measures to protect
the health of living organisms given the risk level that they deem “appropriate” as long as
such measures do not unnecessarily restrict trade (Henson and Loader 2000). The
Agreement, thus, distinguishes between protection and protectionism, which is defined
as trade regulations that go beyond the desired level of protection. These measures are
not supposed to discriminate against trading partners of identical or similar quality
conditions and cannot be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence that ensures
their adequate level of protection (Burnquis et al. 2004).
To this end, the SPS Agreement recognizes that
Pest or disease free-areas are largely determined by geographic and other
ecological conditions, and not by political boundaries, such that they may be part of
one country, several countries, or all countries. Import protocols must therefore be
based on a risk assessment that evaluates claims by exporting countries that certain
regions are free of quarantine diseases or pests, or that prevalence of quarantine
pests and diseases is low (Burnquist et al 2004: 168).
Still, the U.S. strongly restricts the importation of plants and plant products through the
Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) program. But as the liberalization of tariffs and
other trade regulations in agricultural and food products has continued to expand, much
criticism has been directed at the proliferating use of “technical” measures for food
safety regulations, labeling requirements, and compositional standards by the U.S. and
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other developed nations. For many developing nations, this growing trend reflects a
wide-held recognition that technical measures can, and are being used as barriers to
free trade by developed countries (Henson and Loader 2000).
Examples of the interaction between SPS regulations and international trade abound
in a variety of economic and agricultural journals; however, the relationship between
SPS regulation and the social interactions which facilitate them in developed countries
has not been explored. Neither has their relationship to patterns of international
migration nor their consequences within the larger global and regional neoliberal
restructuring trends of the last three decades. I hypothesize that the answers to these
questions are deeply embedded within the relationship between economic elites,
traditional industries, corporate power, and policy-making highlighted in this chapter, and
will address them in the results section of this manuscript.
Neoliberal Restructuring and the Reorganization of Labor in the U.S.
In this section, I discuss how work has been reorganized to reduce the power of
labor to demand better wages and benefits. Capital, with the collaboration of the state
have downsized, threatened to close or move shops either to lower wage regions of the
U.S. or abroad, and demanded more flexibility from workers through part-time and
temporary jobs that generally pay lower wages with fewer or no benefits. These moves
have been supported by the withdrawal of the state from the regulation of workers and
worker conditions, including specific regulations from the state that undermine the ability
of workers to organize.
Several authors have argued about the degree to which economic restructuring
changes of the last 30 years have been able to transform the labor market through the
use of a variety of strategies (see Blau 1999: Grenier 1988; Lamphere, Stepick, and
Grenier 1994; Sassen 1998; Bonacich and Applebaum 2000). As these authors
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demonstrate, such measures occurred largely within a context of industrial
(re)organization, and corresponded to specific changes implemented by capital in the
early phase of neoliberal restructuring. These measures have entailed the use of distinct
strategies such as the use of low-wage, low-skill labor, through which companies are
able to maintain low production costs and resist rising wages; the movement of centers
of production to areas of the country where wages are lower, particularly in rural areas of
the south, or by threatening to close shop and move to Mexico or other developing
countries, and; by downsizing and the flexibilization of the workforce.
Flexibility has become the new industrial model for operations, reflecting changes of
economic restructuring in a post-Fordist production system where mass production has
moved beyond the assembly line into smaller batches of market-specific production
(Bonacich and Applebaum 2000). According to Green (2003; 39) flexibility can be
described as the avoidance of fixed costs, a fixed labor force, and fixed rules, which
permit “the adjustment of supply to demand by cutting the risk of long term investment,
adjusting the labor force to production needs, and limiting rigidities due to union and
legal restrictions that regulate wages, benefits, social welfare payments, and working
conditions.” Flexibility can take many forms, including: (1) increase in homework
operations; (2) work given to subcontractors who in turn hire their own workers under,
often, irregular and unregulated conditions; (3) a variety of temporary, short-term and
part time jobs; and (4) a decreasing opportunity for unionization (Bonacich and
Applebaum 2000).
Previous to this phase of restructuring, an ‘accommodation’ had been reached
between organized labor and industry as a result of labor-favorable legislation of the
New Deal, The policies of the New Deal gave workers protection and ability to organize
and bargain collectively while creating an environment where “in exchange for union-
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demanded wages and benefits, workers would cede control over industrial production to
management” (Bonacich and Applebaum 2000: 6). The cost of this arrangement was
transferred to the market-place in terms of higher prices for goods and services, but it
was accepted under the premise that higher wages and benefits would provide workers
with expendable income to promote the cycle of consumption and production that would,
in turn, generate jobs and prosperity (Bonacich and Applebaum 2000). The trade-off
lasted until the 1970s, when capital began to blame high costs of labor as the reason for
limited competitiveness and as resulting from the intervention of trade unions (Bonacich
and Applebaum 2000). The trade-off thus began to erode as new plants opted to remain
nonunion while capital selectively applied patterns of plant relocations, closings, and
other alternatives that prepared the field for massive assaults on organized labor in the
1980s (Nissen 1990).
To combat the phenomenon of “market distortions,” capital introduced a variety of
policies aimed to control and reduce workers wages and benefits beginning in the 1970s
(Campbell 2005). Such changes were accomplished through six concrete activities that
determined the new shape of the capital-labor relations under neoliberal restructuring
and included: (1) increased foreign production, increased domestic unemployment, and
downward pressures on wages and benefits; (2) the introduction of wage freezes and
wage cuts; (3) the elimination of Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) clauses from
workers’ contracts; (4) the emergence of two-tiered wage structures that gave new
workers significant lower salaries for the same work in comparison to established
workers; (5) the replacement a full-time workers by part-time or temp workers in order to
generate savings on health, pensions and other benefits, and; (6) union avoidance and
union busting sanctioned by the government (Campbell 2005). In addition, by giving
managers strong incentives in the form of stock options, institutional shareholders gave
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managers strong incentives to do whatever they could to boost company profits. The
implementation of managerial incentives, again, often meant the destruction of jobs,
plant closings and a loss of wages and pension levels as prime means of achieving
shareholder value (Glyn 2006).
In addition, while promoting the relocation of plants and offices abroad, a large
demand grew to fulfill a number of low wage jobs that could not be transferred overseas,
creating an expanded supply of low wage jobs in the U.S. (Sassen 1998). To this end,
Glyn (2006) shows the way in which low-wage labor has been negatively impacted by
the displacement of low skilled manufacturing from imports, advancements in technology
which have displaced workers in tasks which can be routinized, and the “bumping down”
of workers to jobs that had been previously reserved for the least qualified. Faced by
technical progress and structural change, the less skilled were forced to accept lower
relative pay in order to remain employed, with unemployment as the only alternative
(Glyn 2006P). For the advocates of labor market deregulation, reducing benefits, cutting
employment protection, and allowing the minimum wage to decrease signify a trade-off
which would ultimately result in job creation, but the evidence of cross national studies
demonstrates that change in job creation has not been significant in countries where
such measures have been set in place (Glyn 2006).
After a significant hiatus in American industry, sweatshops5 re-emerged in a variety
of U.S. cities since the 1970s and 1980s (Rosen 2002; Bonacich and Applebaum 2000).

5

The sweatshop concept has traditionally been used to analyze production of garments and the
dreadful working conditions embedded in that type of production. As Bonacich and Applebaum
(2000: 3) explain, “a sweatshop is usually defined as a factory or a homework operation that
engages in multiple violations of the law, typically the nonpayment of minimum or overtime wages
and various violations of health and safety regulations.” Other authors expand the definition to
include factories that fail to pay a “living wage” to their employees. Ness (2005) uses the term to
describe the working conditions and environments of workers in New York City’s greengroceries,
further adapting the applicability of the term to fit other industries. Similarly, Bender and
Greenwald (2003) point out the validity of the term to encompass, industries in manufacturing
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Previously, pro-labor legislation had secured workers the right to organize and provided
them an environment of relative agreement between capital and labor that lasted until a
variety of economic changes began to take hold in the 1960s and 1970s (Nissen 1990;
Applebaum and Bonacich 2000; Harvey 2005; Glyn 2006). One example, elucidated by
as Lamphere, Stepick, and Grenier (1994) showed how changing structural demands for
flexibilization created new sources of conflict while deteriorating working conditions for
garment workers in South Florida garment plants. Again, the search for flexibility on an
already flexibility-demanding industry and changes at the macroeconomic level brought
real changes to garment the industry in the U.S. Such changes have been similar in
other service and manufacturing industries as these are pressed to reduce labor costs
through the minimization of job stability, subcontracting, benefit reduction, and union
condemnation (Bonacich and Applebaum 2000).
Production of garment manufacturing is in many ways similar to other industries in
the U.S. Specifically, industries that depend on seasonality tend to be risky and highly
competitive based on a variety of factors which may include: (1) low-tech, labor and
intensive production, with low capital requirements; (2) the unpredictability of cycles that
leads employers to externalize risks by contracting out labor and enhance flexibility; (3) a
presence of powerful retailers that intensifies competition among producers; and, (4) low
capital requirements that create an environment of immigrant entrepreneurs who in turn
create low wage jobs for co-ethnics and other labor immigrants (Bonacich and
Applebaum 2000). The issue of contracting has been the center of a great deal of
attention, as it has been used by employers to curtail the influence of organized labor
while passing some of the operational risks on to the contractors (Bender and

with violations of federal or state labor laws, including wage and overtime, child labor, industrial
homework, occupational health and safety, or any other industry violation.
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Greenwald 2003). Some of the major issues in contracting work emerge from a
pressure on bidding (or underbidding) which leads to downward costs that exacerbate
already poor working conditions (Bender and Greenwald 2003). For ethnic
entrepreneurs and middlemen, the issue becomes problematic as they themselves
become victims of the more powerful players in the ‘sweatshop relation,’ and as Shelby
(2007) argues the line between the exploited and the exploiters begins to blur.
As I mentioned earlier, the decrease in working conditions at the industrial setting
came accompanied with decreasing levels of unionization. As Piazza (2002: 13)
explains, for neoclassical economists “unions and collective bargaining represent
significant distortions of the labor market which, in turn, have deleterious effects on the
economy as a whole,” since with unions, social wage-setting is done on a political basis
rather than on efficient market-oriented decision making. This tenet of neoclassical
economics continues to be a strong factor in the neoliberal agenda, affecting the process
by which unions and workers bargain collectively in the labor market. Piazza (2002), on
the other hand argues that when individual workers negotiate wages or working
conditions alone, they suffer from a lack of power vis-à-vis their employers that restrains
them from enjoying higher levels of remuneration and better working conditions than if
they organize or bargain collectively. Unfortunately, by 2004 union density in the U.S.
had fallen precipitously to about 9 percent in the private sector – about a third of the
level that prevailed in the 1970s (Milkman and Voss 2004) .
With the onset of neoliberal restructuring the U.S. government actively supported
various attacks on labor (see Nissen 1990; Campbell 2005). Amidst the depression of
1981-1982 monetary policies where put into place by the administration, undermining
the bargaining power of organized labor (Seybold 1990; Campbell 2005). As shown by
Campbell (2005), the government allowed the minimum wage to drop in real value;
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reinterpreted labor laws in ways that were convenient to the interests of the power elite
including appointment of anti-labor figures to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
and a series of rulings that strongly reduced workers ability to organize unions, strike, or
bargain collectively with their employers. In this sense, the government directly engaged
or supported union busting techniques along with the establishment of the two-tiered
wage system; and, weakened the welfare safety net by reducing unemployment
benefits, trade adjustment assistance, public-service employment jobs, and aid to
families with dependent children.
The attack on labor unions was exemplified by Reagan’s busting of the Air Traffic
Controllers strike that sent a powerful message to corporate interests about the nature of
the administration’s stance on organized labor (Seybold 1990). Adding to the issue were
very sophisticated strategies by multinational corporations in an era where the
pervasiveness of neoliberal ideology undermined the legitimacy of any collective action
that affects the labor market (Milkman and Voss 2004). In this sense, Bronfenbrenner
and Hickey (2004: 38) found that a significant number of employers “aggressively
opposed the Union’s organizing efforts through a combination of threats, discharges,
promises of improvements, unscheduled unilateral changes in wages and benefits,
bribes and surveillance,” as well as a variety of threats of plant closure during organizing
drives.
Despite the setbacks, some authors point to the degree to which rising trends in
neoliberal restructuring have created new conditions for the improvement and growth of
organized Labor (See Nissen 1990; Nissen 2002; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004). As
Seybold (1990: 81) states regarding the policies established by the Reagan
administration, they “have also unwittingly provided the social basis for a resurgent labor
movement” since “the creation of a more polarized, two-tier society provides the social
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and material base for a broad coalition movement for social justice, in which the labor
movement could play a crucial part.” Today, workers in a variety of industries are finding
more sophisticated employer opposition to organizing, coupled with restructuring at the
corporate level, foreign trade investment, and shifts in work and production
(Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004). Still, although the legal, political, and economic
environment continues to negatively affect worker organizing in the U.S., some battles
are being won through a variety of strategies and methods for organizing
(Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004).
The majority of organizing efforts concentrate in relatively small for-profit companies;
however, a growing number of strategies have sought to include non-profit industries
such as hospitals, social service agencies, and educational institutions. The shift has
also sought to include private and immovable workplaces that cannot be outsourced,
such as restaurant work, hotels, and nursing homes (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004).
In addition, as Milkman and Voss (2004) explain, a new campaign to organize the
“unorganized” has been set in motion by the AFL-CIO since the mid 1990s, where more
resources and new strategies have been placed in motion to reach out to workers in
particular industries where organized labor has weakened or did not exist before. New
organizing efforts have produced positive gains, but they have been modest since they
have concentrated in a few occupations and industries and their success has been hard
to replicate across a wide spectrum of industries in the country (Milkman and Voss
2004).
Conclusions
One important aspect of the neoliberal reform of the last 30 years is that its political,
social, and economic ramifications extend through a variety of local, regional, and global
levels. In this sense, with the benefits afforded by technology, capital has been able to
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relocate to far regions in search of cheaper costs of production, while expanding
consumption to foreign markets in search of profitability. At the same time, the
manufacturing base in the U.S. has been reduced or degraded, as low-cost service
industries replace the jobs of the eroded manufacturing industrial base. These trends
have come at the hand of powerful elites and political figures for which neoliberalism has
become a concrete political project that has not only exported jobs and reduced wages
but also has contributed to the demise of trade unions and other forms of collective
action that would protect workers from the adversities of the market. As I have shown in
the previous sections, the demise of these collective organizations has come from
growing direct foreign investment, as well as from deliberate attacks by government and
corporate actors.
By and large, these changes have been facilitated by technology as much as by a
deregulatory system which continues to relegate the responsibilities of state actors to
capital interests under the premise that the social good can be best achieved through
the maximization of unregulated market participation. In this sense, the state itself has
become suspect of inadequately distributing and managing resources and a move
toward market oriented policies began to take shape across a variety traditionally statemanaged ventures. Such a deregulatory process entails the creation of other regulations
and regulatory regimes that ensure that the interests of powerful market actors are
preserved. Again, these changes have had serious implications for labor, as regulation
falls in the hands of actors who represent those interests of capital and overlook the
interests of individual workers.
The implications for workers in South Florida plant nurseries do not lie beyond the
domain of the neoliberal reforms of the last three decades. But inevitable questions do
emerge in the context of this industry’s traditional use of low-wage immigrant workers
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and the working conditions they have endured for a prolonged period of time.
Specifically, how can neoliberal restructuring be conducive to the deterioration of worker
conditions in an industry where conditions have probably been quite adverse even
before neoliberal changes began to take hold and where international competition does
not pose a direct threat to the erosion of the industry? This may be difficult questions to
answer, at least within the context of unionization, for agricultural workers have
traditionally fallen outside the protections offered by the benefits of collective bargaining.
Furthermore, the exploitation of workers may often be the result of the vulnerability they
possess because of their lack of migratory status, the lack of English skills, or their
marginality from legal resources that could help them advance their interests.
The answer to these questions however may lie within broader structural changes
that resulted from the promotion and relocation of plants and offices abroad and which
expanded a large demand to fulfill a number of low wage jobs that could not be
transferred overseas (Sassen 1998). To this end, Glyn (2006) shows the way in which
low-wage labor has been negatively impacted by the displacement of low skilled
manufacturing from imports, advancements in technology which have displaced workers
in tasks which can be routinized, and the “bumping down” of workers to jobs that had
been previously reserved for the least qualified. In the context of the plant nursery
industry, those structural changes may also be responsible for the attraction of a large
immigrant workforce willing to perform jobs that are labor intensive and offer very low
status to native workers.
There are, however, other areas where neoliberal restructuring may play an
important role in the socioeconomic outcomes of plant nursery workers in South Florida.
In terms of business practices and within the growing nature of sweat shop conditions
across a variety of U.S. industries, the area’s plant nursery industry is prone to respond
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to similar patterns seen by Bonacich and Applebaum’s (2000) study of apparel
manufacturing. Specifically as plant production depends greatly on seasonality, business
tends to be risky and highly competitive considering a variety of factors such as lowtech, labor and intensive production; a presence of powerful retailers that intensifies
competition among producers; and low capital requirements that create an environment
of immigrant entrepreneurs who in turn create low wage jobs for co-ethnics and other
labor immigrants. These trends, along the unpredictability of cycles lead employers to
externalize risks by contracting out labor in search for increased flexibility, while passing
some of the operational risks on to the workers.
At the policy level, the state of Florida lacks a department of labor and must rely on
district offices of the federal Department of Labor to enforce labor law. The state’s
department of labor was transformed [insert date] into the Agency for Workforce
Innovation which according to the agency’s website is partnered with and guided by
“Workforce Florida, Inc” in the running of 90 career centers in the state as well as in a
variety of research, statistics, and program development. At the federal level, the
number of Wage and Hour investigators declined by 14% between 1974 and 2004 with
compliance actions declining by 36%, while the size of the workforce and business
establishments grew 55% and 112% percent respectively (nelp.org). These trends in
labor enforcement and deregulation have occurred within the current period of Neoliberal
restructuring and provide ample room for exploration within the context of wage theft and
other forms of worker exploitation across a variety of industries in the state. For plant
nursery operators, an environment of decreased regulation and enforcement and an
already existing antiunion environment may provide the right conditions to exploit
workers through wage theft and worker misclassification.
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As I have argued on this chapter, neoliberal implementations of the last three
decades have had a dramatic impact on a variety of socio-economic structures of the
world. Specifically, neoliberal policies have helped to shift the power of governments
toward a few financial institutions and a variety of multinational corporations. In many
ways, such transformations have occurred as powerful elites have acquired power to
enlist, maneuver, and manipulate government institutions and international agencies
toward the creation of policies that facilitate their agendas through a system that
legitimizes their role as engines of change. In economic terms, the formation of such
regimes has resulted in a polarization of the wages and salaries of workers as well as of
the use of land, and the organization of labor. For the latter, this shift has signified a
strict regularization of unionization rights and of the suppression of strikes, as these are
viewed in opposition to the objectives of the power elite, while also truncating the rights
of access to education, work, land, medical care, and a variety of other public amenities.
In the next chapter I turn my attention to labor migration and the role that such structural
changes may play on the lives of millions of workers of the developing world as they toil
in fields and factories of the U.S. under current modes of neoliberal policies and
capitalist production.
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III. LABOR MIGRATION TO THE U.S.
More than ever before, a variety of industries in the United States depend on the
labor, and more specifically, on the cheap labor of immigrants to remain competitive
within the context of globalizing economic markets. As I discussed in the previous
chapter, such economic changes have had a significant impact on the restructuring of a
variety of political, social, and cultural arenas through the implementation of neoliberal
economic restructuring of the last three decades (see Sassen 1988, Sassen 1998;
Massey, Durand, and Malone 1992; Goldin 1999). The changes have also had a
dramatic impact on the lives of millions of workers who toil in factories, restaurants, and
farmlands of the developed world. These individuals are increasingly immigrants from
“less developed” areas of the globe who find themselves in a process of incorporation
into capitalist structures (Griffith 1993). These economic developments also have the
ability to place workers in marginal and vulnerable spaces of the market economy, as
they struggle to adapt to changes in the political economy of a globalizing world.
On this chapter I on the conditions and challenges associated with the mobility and
incorporation of immigrant workers to U.S. labor markets. I argue that visible forms of
exclusion, exploitation and marginalization are embedded in a complex interaction of
structural processes where economic incorporation, immigration policy and discourse,
and the politics of labor organizing, help to create an environment of vulnerability that is
propitious for the marginalization and exploitation of the immigrant labor force. To this
end, I discuss the literature on economic incorporation of immigrants into receiving
economies of the developed world, literature on U.S. immigration policy with an
emphasis on its relevance to low-wage immigrants in the workforce, and the ways in
which traditional unionization models have excluded the immigrant labor force. A
substantial emphasis of this argument, however, will center on emerging literature on
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exploitation and marginalization by employers of immigrant workers and the efforts to
protect workers through unions and grassroots organizations.
I will deal specifically with labor migration as a useful classification to represent those
immigrants who only possess their labor power as a source of income. Labor migrants
represent the bulk of migration – both legal and undocumented – to the United States
and should be distinguished from skilled and entrepreneurial migrants who possess
capital for investment or have achieved high educational credentials (Portes and
Rumbaut 2006). Labor migrants have come to represent the stereotypical notions of
contemporary immigrants in the United States; they gravitate toward jobs that the native
workforce refuses to accept, often see themselves as temporary workers planning to
return home, tend to be unskilled, are often unschooled, and often come from rural areas
in their sending countries (Piore 1979, Portes and Rumbaut 2006). The majority of labor
immigrants to the United States cross the border on foot or overstay their tourist visas;
however, many find themselves coming into the country legally through some of the
family reunification preferences procured under the 1965 Immigration Act or through the
use of contract labor (Portes and Rumbaut 2006).
U.S. Labor Migration and Immigrant Incorporation
Notions about the process of migration have been explained through different
theoretical approaches, yet traditional theory and research have centered on the
questions of why migration occurs, how it is sustained over time, and what are the social
and economic consequences of the presence of immigrants in host societies (Shmitter
Heisler 2000). Neoclassical theories view migration as a way to relieve sending
countries from population pressures, overcome rural unemployment, or to generate
needed foreign exchange to industrialize the existing labor force. For receiving countries,
migration presents a clear way to fill those jobs that nobody wants and to overcome
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critical labor shortages (Piore 1979; Sassen 1988; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Such
explanations of migration provide a starting point for the analysis of the origins and
maintenance of migration flows; however, these often fail to consider the relationship
between migration and other important characteristics of the migration process, including
policy implications, social and human capital available to immigrants, or the human toll
involved in the migration process.
According to the neoclassical perspective, labor migrants’ attraction for moving to the
U.S. can be attributed to the relative difference between the levels of wages in North
America to those at their home countries (Piore 19979; Lucas 1983; Portes and
Rumbaut 2006). An international wage gap is said to generate incentives for households
and families of modest means to explore themselves the migration alternative, which
when combined with the establishment of migrant networks and strong demands for
manual labor in U.S. labor-intensive industries, creates the impulse necessary to sustain
the flow of migration. For U.S. employers, the wage gap often provides justification to
cheat their workers, since they may be aware that even when paying below minimum
wage, the workers will conclude that they are still better off than at their home country
(Waldinger 2003). In addition, willingness to work for low wages and no benefits, along
diligence and motivation, makes these workers particularly desirable to employers of a
wide range of economic activities in agriculture, manufacturing, and services that rely on
and profit from this supply of “cheap” labor (Portes and Rumbaut 2006).
The gravitation of labor migrants toward labor-intensive industries that offer low
wages and no benefits has also been understood within the context of a segmented
labor market, where particular types of jobs are associated with distinctive types of
workers (Piore 1979; Waldinger 2003). While some of these jobs are reserved for
natives and characterized by capital intensive factors, which require less labor, others
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are reserved to immigrants or women based on racialization and arbitrary
conceptualizations of who is “best” fit for a particular type of job (Waldinger 2003). Such
divisions of the labor market are said to create ideal conditions for an immigrant labor
force entrenched in the production of dead-end jobs and precluded from accessing jobs
in high end sectors, while institutionalizing two classes of workers (Mahler 1995).
In many ways, the polarization of the labor market with its tendency to allocate labor
migrants to marginal sectors of the economy has continued despite increases in
unemployment and de-industrialization at the hand of economic restructuring of the last
three decades. De-industrialization came accompanied by increased levels of overseas
outsourcing and a measurable loss of middle-income jobs in manufacture in the United
States (Sassen 1990; Mahler 1995; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Shelley 2007). Such
phenomenon, embedded in a basic contradiction between the existence of labor
shortages and unemployment, has resulted in the creation of labor-intensive jobs at the
bottom of the labor market, while encouraging immigrants from developing countries to
participate in a labor market that is largely unattractive to the native-born middle class.
As a result, employers of labor-intensive, low wage workers benefit from: (1) a flexible
workforce that is willing to work uncomfortable hours and is willing to use hazardous
equipment in substandard workplaces; and (2) an organizational flexibility in which
workers can easily be disposed of when they are no longer needed or they complain too
much (Sassen 1988).
The reproduction of such forms of unsecured jobs presupposes the relative
powerlessness of immigrant workers in industrialized countries where labor has obtained
some considerable power and were native workers become politicized, are unwilling to
take undesirable jobs, and have access to welfare benefits as an alternative to low wage
jobs (Freeman 1979; Sassen 1988). These notions about the role of labor migration
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within the context of dual or segmented labor market reinforce the perception that
migrant labor is not used merely as a supply of labor, but specifically as a supply of
cheap labor (Portes and Walton 1981). In addition, the surplus of labor created in the
process benefits employers by enabling them to dispose of workers who protest, strike,
or attempt to improve working conditions at the workplace and replace them with
workers willing to accept inferior working conditions (Griffith 1993; Chomsky 2008).
These and other salient factors are clearly embedded in the relationship of economic
activity and the allocation of workers to specific segments of the labor market where they
may become vulnerable to adverse labor conditions. Specifically, as economic activity is
closely linked to cultural, political, and social phenomena, attention must be given to the
role that certain characteristics of the immigrant labor force play in their inhibited abilities
to find jobs (Griffith 1993). One such example is made apparent by workers that are
semi-proletarianized – that is they survive on a combination of jobs in the labor market
and small-scale subsistence activities such as peasant farming and fishing – since they
may be less willing to complain about unfair wages or working conditions due to the
short nature of their participation in the market economy (Piore 1979; Griffith 1993). This
condition has proven particularly harsh for peasant labor-migrants, as they may consider
the nature of the wage-work temporary and become more desirable and more
exploitable workers in the developed capitalist economies (Griffith 1993).
For immigrant workers, this situation may result in continued hardships, since they
could also be affected by factors such as legal status, race, ethnicity, gender and other
individual and social characteristics (Griffith 1993). Although these conditions alone are
seldom the primary motivators for worker exploitation, the research available does seem
to point out that economic factors as well as immigrant characteristics may play a
determinant role. In the case of legal status, Chiswick (1998) demonstrated that
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undocumented immigrants were not any more likely to be exploited than their
documented counterparts, with short length in the country being a stronger determinant.
However, it has also been shown that undocumented immigrants’ vulnerability arises
from constant fear of detention and deportation, which gives employers the ability to
blackmail workers (Clavita 2005). In addition, as shown by Stepick (1998), low levels of
human capital – that is education, work experience, or other skills – as well as prejudice
and discrimination from dominant groups may influence particular groups to remain at
the bottom-end of the labor market.
Helpful as they may be, models that emphasize the economic characteristics of
individuals and the market, fail to provide a comprehensive picture of the role that factors
such as solidarity and capital accumulation play within the equation of immigrant
incorporation. A different approach sought to illustrate that not all immigrant
incorporation occurred under the functions of a split or segmented labor market. To this
end, the literature on “middleman minorities” explicitly addresses the issues of ethnicity
and economic incorporation by focusing on immigrant entrepreneurship and its relation
to the retention of strong ethnic communities within the host society.
The concept of the ethnic enclave as a distinct mode of immigrant incorporation
presents the idea that certain groups respond to dominant capitalism by creating their
own capitalist system, which could protect them from the risks of the open labor market.
Ethnic enclaves consist of immigrant groups that concentrate in particular geographic
locations and participate in a variety of enterprises that serve their own ethnic
community, as well as the general public (Portes 1983). In this sense, ethnic enclaves
allow immigrant labor to be reproduced through the hiring of co-ethnics by immigrant
entrepreneurs. Through social ties, ethnic enclaves may provide privileged access to
resources; however, they can also act to restrict outsiders from gaining access to
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available resources through particularistic or preferential treatment (Portes 1998;
Waldinger 2003). The establishment of a Cuban enclave has been widely observed in
South Florida where it has often meant restricted labor and economic opportunities for
other immigrant groups and minorities (see Portes and Stepick 1993; Stepick, Grenier,
Castro, and Dunn 2003).
The enclave economy model highlights the relationship between economic activity
and the social relations and structures from which it emerges (Schmitter Heisler 2000).
Central to this issue is the principle of social capital, which is broadly defined by Portes
(1995:12) as the “the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of
their membership in social networks or broader social structures.” For Portes and
Sensenbrenner (1993), social capital is characterized by a series of expectations for
action within a collectivity that affect the goals-eeking behavior of its members within the
economic sphere. For Waldinger (2003) this may come to represent limited access to
resources for outsiders once a particular ethnic group has secured access in a particular
labor market or industry.
In recent years, the development of a comprehensive theory of migration has sought
to include the distinct contexts that trigger migration at the sending country as well as the
many ways in which immigrants become incorporated into the political economy of the
receiving country. In essence, a better integrated perspective of international migration
should involve issues of mobilization, transportation, the utilization and manipulation of
the immigrant labor force within the political and institutional establishment, and the
networks that allow immigrants to obtain economic advancement (Portes and Walton
1981). The “new economics of migration” framework serves to better explain the process
of migration by focusing on the household rather than on the individual as the unit of
analysis in the decision-making process involved in migration (Portes and Rumbaut
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2006). As it has been shown, labor immigrants must deal with housing transportation
and other issues associated with their lives at the host country as well as with a variety
of economic pressures to attend at their home country (Griffith 2006; Shelley 2007).
Because of many of the aforementioned issues, many workers’ may often decide to
remain with an unscrupulous employer or to withstand different forms of exploitation
since they are subjected by pressures to send money home to pay for loans, children
education, or the construction of a house.
Portes and Rumbaut (2006), thus argue that migration and incorporation must be
viewed in light of a variety of factors that include the demand for labor migration in a
context in which,
Demand exists at the bottom of the labor market for menial, low paying jobs and,
higher levels for professional and technical occupations in short supply in the
nation… Second, labor demand must be made known. In earlier periods, the “higher
wages and better meals” paid for work in American Industry were not enough to
activate a labor flow so that paid recruiters had to be sent abroad to apprise foreign
workers and peasants of those facts… To these developments are added the social
networks built by immigrants themselves that can act as human transmission belts,
conveying information about job opportunities… Third, the opportunities must be
desirable. Desirability is less a question of the gross earnings of disparity between
sending and receiving countries than of the meaning that these economic
disadvantages have for households and communities.
Thus, in addition to understanding economic factors, the characteristics of immigrants,
and the socioeconomic pressures they must experience along the migration chain, this
view adds weight to the role that preexisting networks play on the patterns of location
among labor migrants, as they are no longer guided by recruitment efforts, but by the
presence of family and kin already located in the receiving country. Together, these
factors provide a more complete picture of the conditions that affect immigrants’ working
conditions as they stride to improve their economic standing within the world’s
globalizing economy.
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A thorough analysis of the conditions of immigrant incorporation, exclusion and
exploitation, must include the effects that immigration policy and enforcement have on
the location patterns of immigrant groups as well as on the process of economic
incorporation into the host society. In the following section I review a number of
discourse and policy ramifications for labor migrants and their effects of marginalization
and worker vulnerability.
Immigration Policy and Regulation in the U.S.
Coinciding with the resurgence of large-scale immigration to the United States in
recent decades, immigration and immigration policy issues have become hotly contested
in the public arena of the nation (DeWind and Kasinitz 1997). However, a closer look at
the history of the country’s policy and public discourse demonstrates that the United
States has continuously struggled with the social and economic “impact” presented by
the large influx of immigrants (Hayes 2001; Hing 2004). On one side, the public sphere
has often responded to negative outcry during nativist periods fueled by rising
unemployment and fears of national security (Kretsedesmas and Brotherton 2008). On
the other, labor shortages and rapid economic expansion have created popular
acceptance for the need and influx of immigrants. From an academic perspective, the
discussion should bear the questions of what drives immigration policy, and what is its
impact on the relationship between the social structures and individual actors that it
affects.
In this section, I discuss two important aspects of U.S. immigration policy and focus
on the implications that they have on the reproduction of exclusion and inequality for
millions of foreign born workers. First, I discuss the disconnect that exists between
recent structural changes at the transnational economic level and the formulation,
implementation and enforcement of U.S. immigration policy. I also discuss the negative
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effects that immigration policy has had for the labor conditions of migrants, while
benefiting and protecting the business interests that employ them.
Closing Borders in the Era of Open Markets
In the United States, immigration policy and the public discourse that surrounds it are
understood from an individualistic perspective, unconnected to historical events or
current actions of receiving countries in an approach that portrays the state as a
humanitarian actor, which passively receives migrants in need (Sassen 1999, Portes
and Rumbaut 2006). Such widely held perceptions may help to explain the failure and
limited effectiveness of current immigration policies, which emerge as a result of the
short-sightedness between the realm of migration and broader structural changes taking
place within the international economic arena. This framework is perceptually
misunderstood by policymakers in receiving countries, making enforcement and policy
evolve around individual agency as the main mechanism for immigration (Sassen 1998;
Massey, Durand and Malone 2002). Central to this issue is evidence that migrations
occur as a result of dynamics within the geo-political system, where the major receiving
countries tend to receive immigrants from their zones of power (Sassen 1999). For the
U.S., a renewal of mass migration emerging in the 1960s has been largely influenced by
an increase in economic, political and military activity in developing regions of Asia, Latin
America and the Caribbean Basin (Sassen 1998, Kritz and Gurak 2004). The
continuation of these policies through the remaining part of the 20th century led to a
formalization of transnational economic policies demonstrated by the creation of a
variety of free trade agreements and larger supranational bodies of enforcement, where
labor continues to be separated from the transnational process, and regulated by
national actors (Sassen 1998).
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The contradiction between the formalization of a transnational economic system and
the existing migration policy frameworks is now recognized as problematic and was
made evident through the establishment of GATT, NAFTA, CAFTA and other free trade
agreements around the world (Sassen 1999; Massey et al. 2002). These treaties have
had to treat the flow of people as an integral part of free trade and investment across
international borders; however, they have disconnected the notion of migration from the
broader process of globalization by narrowly focusing on the circulation of specialized
service workers and business people as means to further internationalize trade and
investment services (Sassen 1998). In this sense, immigrant reforms and policy efforts
concentrate on the admittance of professionals, displaced refugees and their family
members on one side, and the rejection, detention, and deportation of unwanted “illegal”
migrants on the other (Kritz and Gurak 2004). Ultimately, the result is that while
business, trade and finance transcend national borders and loosen up to traditional
demands of state sovereignty, labor remains a space where states strongly exercise and
negotiate control, regulation, and policy implementation.
On a positive side, the formalization of free trade through the establishment of
enforcement bodies has brought about new enforcement regimes that legitimize the
processes under which states must respect and enforce international human rights
codes regardless of nationality or legal status (Sassen 1999). Formalization occurs
through the relocation of a range of components of state authority to supranational
organizations such as the European Union (EU), the World Trade Organization (WTO),
or international human rights courts in which legal regimes become positioned to enforce
cross-border business, financial transactions, and some forms of labor mobility (Sassen
1998). However, in terms of immigration policy and enforcement, deregulation has also
meant an increase in the actors and levels of enforcement that those actors have
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acquired within the state (Sassen 1998). At the state level, this has resulted in a
fragmentation of how enforcement of immigration policy should be conducted.
In recent decades, for instance, there has been an increase in the independent
efforts by U.S. member states (e.g., California, Arizona, Alabama) to regulate so-called
illegal immigration or to recover expenses from the federal government, under the
argument that undocumented immigrants are an economic burden to states’ budgets
(Glick Schiller 1994, Sassen 1998, Hayes 2001). These attempts have materialized in
the enactment of laws such as California's proposition 187, which sought to prevent
undocumented immigrants from receiving health services and education, or recent
lawsuits by several states against the federal government to collect money from the
imprisonment and the use of services attributed to undocumented immigrants (Glick
Schiller 1994, Sassen 1998). In many ways, the process is embedded in two distinct
frameworks created by the same contradictions present in the policy and economic
restructuring of the last three decades. First, U.S. states find justification to their
arguments by citing the notion that the federal government, while creating the migration
policy for the country does very little to enforce it, thus leaving them with the burden of
providing health services, infrastructure, and education to undocumented workers.
Second, the process is embedded in a “devolution” of power from the federal to the state
level, which is consistent with the same trends in deregulation necessary for the
establishment of a globalized economic system (Sassen 1998).
The biggest change in the implementation and enforcement of immigration policy,
however, was brought about by the attacks of September 11, 2001. These tragic events
have helped to sustain the current discourse and practice of US immigration policy and
regulation around the issue of national security (Kretsedemas and Brotherton 2008).
Although a shift toward more deportations and higher spending on immigration
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enforcement existed several years before 9/11, those tragic events served as a turning
point in the public discourse surrounding the immigration issue. This change reflects a
desire for power that is only superficially tied to national security and which justifies the
mistreatment of unfavorable groups by constructing judgmental labels around them. The
result has been a downgrade of immigrant rights in a way in which restrictions for the
rights of terrorist suspects become the same restrictions for the legal rights of immigrant
detainees as well as of asylum seekers (Dow 2008).
These issues have resulted in a variety of efforts at the local, state, and federal level
to curtail migration and include: (1) increased militarization of U.S. borders, specifically
on the Mexican-U.S. border, as well as the construction of a wall dividing both nations;
(2) the use of scare tactics to scare immigrants out of the United States through mass
deportations, family separation, the criminalization of undocumented workers, and the
use of local law enforcement agencies as immigration agents, and; (3) the proliferation
of grassroots, militant, anti-immigrant organizations, such as the Minuteman militia,
throughout the country (see Kretsedemas and Brotherton 2008; Massey et al. 2002).
Ironically, the intensification of the individual as the focus of migratory enforcement
has coincided with an era in which the United States has become increasingly reliant on
immigrant populations for workforce replenishment and population growth (Kretsedemas
and Brotherton 2008). Together, these conditions have created the current trends in
immigration enforcement that renders immigrants unprotected and vulnerable to unfair
labor practices as well as unprotected by the law and unqualified to receive basic human
services such as education and medical treatment.
Regardless of policies and propositions aimed at regulating the flow of “undesirable”
immigrants into the country, national legislature has continuously ensured formal
exceptions for the admission of temporary foreign workers (Hayes 2001). This
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demonstrates an ambivalent framework, where official immigration policy acts as a
mechanism that facilitates and regulates the supply of labor through border enforcement
while rendering undocumented immigrants, socially and politically powerless (Sassen
1998). In this sense, immigration policy acts as labor policy, benefiting businesses
interests with a steady supply of “cheap” labor, even when a large labor surplus exists,
while counteracting the organizational efforts of domestic workers (Portes and Walton
1981). As Portes and Walton (1981) explain, the price of migrant labor is not predicated
upon the process of migration or on personal attributes of the migrants, but rather it is
the result of deliberate political manipulation. In the U.S., such political manipulations
result from the collective and competitive power that capital has been able to achieve
through powerful and heavy representation in Congress.
There is a logical fit between the labor needs of US employers and the presence of
undocumented workers, which reveals a deliberate political manipulation to supply
important sectors of the employer class with a supply of cheap labor. U.S. immigration
policy explicitly bans the use of undocumented labor through a series of restrictions
embedded in a “historical bargain” between the state, capital, and labor; however, the
short supply of cheap labor places firms and industries at a disadvantage (Portes and
Walton 1981). In that case, the use of low-wage immigrant labor can be seen as a
supply system for employers that seek cheap labor that is necessary for the organization
of labor around shift work, hazardous conditions, and job insecurity (Sassen 1988). At
the policy level, firms and industries are able to maneuver the political machinery
through heavy representation in the U.S. Congress, securing a profitable supply of
disposable, vulnerable, powerless, exploitable, and disenfranchised class of workers
(Portes and Walton 1981; Sassen 1988).
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Portes and Walton (1981: 57) argue that intentional state manipulation for the use of
undocumented labor involves three conditions:
(a) that the criminality of illegal entry be maintained so that workers are kept in a
situation of vulnerability, but that their employers be made legally immune; (b) that
the credibility of the threat of deportation be maintained through the action of
repressive agencies, but that these agencies do not become so effective as to
interfere with the flow of illegal labor; and (c) that political authorities in the country
where immigrants originate are appeased, but that their efforts to give immigrants
legal protection and increase their wages (part of which are always repatriated) be
neutralized.
The relationship between deliberate political manipulation and the labor needs of
employers has been clearly visible through the history of U.S. agribusiness and its
dependence on low-wage, foreign born labor. I now turn to the case of agricultural labor
in the U.S., to demonstrate how some of the aforementioned structural and policy
implications have and continue to guarantee a steady supply of low-wage workers for
the agricultural elite class, while creating dangerous conditions for the exploitation,
exclusion, and marginalization of the immigrant labor force.
Guaranteeing the Supply of “Cheap” Labor: The Case of Agricultural Labor in the U.S.
The use of Mexican labor in California and the Northwest can be traced to the late
1800s, and resulted from agricultural improvements in the development of vast irrigation
systems and railroads, which linked agriculture to financial and banking institutions
(Gamboa 1990; Stephen 2007). The shift to intensive crop production created a need for
a flexible agricultural workforce that would be willing to work for low wages and that
could be easily manipulated to grower and industry demands (Stephen 2007). Worker
compliance was facilitated through the use of political threats of deportation to workers,
who were already weakened by their status in relation to the state (Portes and Walton
1981). This phenomenon became linked to immigration policy, creating the current
model, which is essentially labor policy masking as an immigration policy (Stephen
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2007). In this sense, immigration policy merely functions to control the amount of labor
available to businesses, relaxing enforcement according to industry needs and
strengthening in periods of economic downturn or public outcry about undocumented
immigration.
Despite strong opposition by organized labor, temporary worker programs were
enacted to continue the flow of “cheap” labor and particularly to provide agribusiness
with a constant supply of workers, mainly from Mexico (Hayes 2001). Early forms of
temporary worker programs were established beginning in 1917 to relieve labor
shortages during WWI. Thousands of Mexican immigrants continued to be imported
throughout the 1920s; however, during the great depression, massive deportations were
reported throughout the Southwest and Midwest. These were enforced by the
immigration service as well as by state and local authorities (Stephen 2007). The
situation changed again by the end of the Depression, and when harvests came around,
U.S. growers dispatched their emissaries to Mexico, recruiting and bringing thousands of
workers into the country (Stephen 2007). The 1917 program laid the foundations of the
Bracero Program established during WWII, which sought an agreement with Mexico to
alleviate agricultural labor shortages.
The bracero program was designed to fill labor shortages during WWII; however,
despite the program’s plan to bring a “regulated” labor force into the country, thousands
of undocumented workers continued crossing the border through the 1950s and the mid60s when the program was shut down (Stephen 2007). Ironically, the program was not
part of the overall U.S. immigration policy, falling instead under general congressional
legislation, and having been extended on a yearly basis under considerable pressure
from the Texas and California delegations (Hayes 2001; Massey et al. 2002). The bill
gave control of protections and programs such as wage regulation, health insurance,
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housing, and transportation to U.S. employers, and although the contracts were
originally carried out between the U.S. and Mexican governments, they were later
privatized, creating unintended consequences for the increase of undocumented
migrants in the country (Hayes 2001). As Stephen (2007:74) argues, growers often
“preferred indocumentados to bracero workers because they could be paid even less
than braceros, could be encouraged to remain for as long as necessary, and, like
braceros could not organize or pursue collective bargaining agreements.” In addition,
the program incurred no liability for employers under the US immigration law. For
instance, the “Texas Proviso,” written by the Texas Congressional delegation, prohibited
persecution to employers who hired undocumented workers; thus, creating a loophole
through which growers could simply spread the word among their braceros that jobs
were readily available to friends and relatives who choose to come (Massey et al. 2002).
Mexican migration commenced to decrease by the end of the bracero program,
fueled in part by deportations, the organizing of farmworkers in California, and by the
extension of labor laws that conceded farmworkers the right to organize and join unions
through the Agricultural Relations Act (ALRA) of 1975 (Stephen 2007). Despite such
advances in the working conditions of farmworkers, agricultural union membership
declined drastically into the 1980s, and growers again turned to labor contractors to
recruit directly from Mexico (Stephen 2007). Logically, U.S. growers could have drawn
native workers back into the agricultural labor force; however, such a move would have
entailed a significant rise in wages, a rise in prices, and induced structural inflation
(Massey et al. 2002). In addition, after a long period of monopoly by Mexican labor,
agricultural work in the United States had become severely racialized and defined
socially as “foreign,” particularly Mexican, and growingly unacceptable to US citizens
(Massey et al. 2002). In the aftermath of the bracero program and the 1965 changes in
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the immigration law, enough Mexican population had settled in the country, creating a
significant stock of migration-related social and human capital, which helped spark a
steady growth of Mexican migration into the country.
In 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) sought to prevent future
streams of undocumented migration into the country by legalizing millions of
undocumented workers and by sanctioning employers who hired undocumented workers
(Hayes 2001; Stephen 2007). With the passing of IRCA, legislators believed they had
put together a compassionate bill that would legalize much of the undocumented
population, while shutting the door on future undocumented migrations (Hayes 2001).
Although the legislature attempted to treat the problem from the source, that is targeting
businesses that were supplying jobs to undocumented immigrants for low labor costs, it
only resulted in the creation and intensification of a silent, vulnerable underclass
jeopardized by public policy (Hayes 2001). IRCA created several problems to those who
were not legalized since,
The undocumented who were not accepted for legalization were then deprived of the
right to work and therefore were deprived of the means to sustenance. In addition
they could be subjected to exploitation by unscrupulous employers since they have
no legal recourse, do not have full protection under the law, and under IRCA’s
stipulation, all federally funded social services require proof of legal status as a
prerequisite for obtaining services (Hayes 2001: 7).
In addition, the new policy had profound effects on the immigration patterns that
emerged after the reform.
Thus, since the country’s immigration policy gives priority to family reunification, the
status regularization of three million undocumented immigrants led to an increase of
applicants and migrants coming from the south. It is estimated that a great number of
undocumented immigrants also came into the country following some of the migrants
who were being claimed through legal resources, adding to the already large number of
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undocumented immigrants in the country (Stephen 2007). In addition, one of the most
important aspects of the growth of undocumented migration in the post-IRCA era was
the sanctioning imposed to employers who hired undocumented labor, which resulted in
an increase of labor subcontracting, where contractors hired undocumented workers and
charged companies for “services,” rather than having large companies hire the workers
themselves. With this practice also came increased abuse in the agriculture industry and
increased opportunities for undocumented workers to find work (Stephen 2007). As
Stephen (2007:76) argues, “While the reforms in IRCA were supposed to improve farm
labor conditions, the result was often the opposite, as undocumented first-time
immigrants are least likely to question the practices of labor contractors and are also
highly dependent on them for off-farm housing, rides to work, false work documents, and
food.”
The conditions that underlie the exploitation of Mexican migrants are clearly
embedded in a process of reproduction of capitalist relations with a general participation
of the state (Sassen 1988). However, the phenomenon is not limited to the agricultural
industry, as growing sectors participating in this process include goods-producing
industries such as meat packing, auto making, construction, and a growing number of
service jobs (Portes and Walton 1981). Together with the changes taking place at the
transnational level, the ambivalent current state of immigration policy continues to
contradict the process of neoliberal restructuring set in motion in the last decades of the
20th century. These policies are also at odds with labor regulations and policies that
guarantee the rights of workers, creating the right conditions for the exploitation of the
immigrant labor force. The following section, describes the nature and the extent of
wage theft across a variety of job sectors and industries, focusing on low-wage workers
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and their vulnerability to become victims of wage theft in a system that offers little legal
recourse or opportunity for remuneration.
Wage Theft
On July 15, 2008, the Committee on Education and Labor of the U.S. House of
Representatives held a hearing on the Department of Labor’s (DOL) enforcement of
wage and hour laws. At the meeting, Kim Bobo, director of Interfaith Worker Justice
(IWJ), an organization that engages the religious community around issues and
campaigns to improve the wages and working conditions of workers, testified about the
poor work performed by the DOL to stop the growing cases of wage theft around the
country. Bobo claimed that two million workers are not receiving at least the minimum
wage, while three million others are miss-classified as independent contractors, and
millions more are unlawfully denied overtime pay. The hearing prompted an editorial
from the New York Times, which cited the way in which the Wage and Hour Division of
the DOL had failed to adequately investigate and address worker complaints (July 18,
2008). Like the New York Times, a variety of newspapers and other independent news
sources throughout the country continue to address issues of wage theft throughout a
variety of mostly low-wage industries. Although several scholars have reported the
occurrence of wage violations in immigrant communities (see Mahler 1995; Stepick
1998, Pisani and Yoskowitz 2002; Ness 2005; Fine 2006; Stephen 2007, Bobo 2009), to
date, few authors have addressed the issue in depth with only one author treating the
issue from a structural perspective (See Bobo 2007). In this section, I begin to lay the
groundwork for how and where wage theft is prone to occur, using a variety of news
sources and reports as well as a growing, but limited, number of academic sources that
are beginning to analyze the problem.
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In many ways wage theft is a new term that defines an old phenomenon. Most of the
recent literature concerning economic exploitation of workers has dealt with the issue in
terms of wage and hour violations and in some very drastic cases included the
occurrence of modern forms of slavery. Wage theft refers to the lack of payment of a
worker’s partial or full salary through systematic or unintentional action. More
specifically, “wage theft occurs when workers are not paid all their wages, workers are
denied overtime when they should be paid it, or workers are not paid at all for work
they‘ve performed (Bobo 2009; 7).” Because wage theft often impacts low-wage,
immigrant workers, its effects contribute to worker poverty, their increased
marginalization, and an array of socio-economic pressures on their families in the U.S.
and abroad. In addition, wage theft undermines the integrity of business by creating an
unfair advantage for those employers that cut costs by squeezing their profits out of their
employee’s paychecks. Finally, by underpaying and underreporting employee earnings,
employers cheat federal and state taxation laws that contribute to public infrastructure.
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was enacted in 1938 to abolish child labor in
manufacturing, to guarantee a minimum wage, and to establish the 40-hour workweek
as the national norm. Although the FLSA has been amended on several occasions since
its conception, it has clearly not been able to keep up with the transformations that the
economy has undergone in its now 70 years of activity (Fine 2006). FLSA contains a
number of provisions through which the minimum wage requirement should be enforced.
First, a worker or a group of workers can sue their employer for unpaid back wages and
an equal amount to liquidate damages; second, the wage and hour division of the DOL
can inspect companies’ payroll records and sue the employer for unpaid back wages or
overtime; third, the DOL can fine an employer who willfully break minimum wage and
overtime requirements; fourth, the DOL can bring criminal charges against employers

76

who violate the law. Unfortunately, while the workforce and enforcement coverage have
grown, resources for enforcement have steadily declined (Fine 2006).
Throughout the country, wage theft has been known to affect workers in
predominantly low-wage, labor intensive, immigrant industries (see Greenhouse 2004,
Lee 2005, Margolies 2005, Hunsburger 2006, Miller 2004 and Pemberton 1998; Bobo
2009). In systematic cases of wage theft, time cards or time records are known to be
manipulated by management personnel in a procedure commonly known as “shaving
time,” where employees’ weekly hours are reduced through computerized payroll
systems. Other cases include pressuring employees not to record all their working times
or to performing chores “off the clock” (Greenhouse 2004, Lee 2005, Margolies 2005,
Miller 2004 and Pemberton 1998). Many of these practices include depriving workers of
overtime wages, paying them under the legal minimum wage or, in more voracious
cases, simply not paying workers for their labor (Hunsburger 2006 and Miller 2004).
Although many of the documented cases of wage theft occur through intentional action,
it has also been reported that ignorance of wage and labor standards by both workers
and employers is known to exacerbate the conditions for wage theft to occur (Brennan
Center for Justice 2006; Bobo2009).
One of the most significant problems faced by immigrant workers is lack of
awareness of their rights as well as lack of knowledge of where to seek help. For
undocumented workers, fear of “outing themselves,” arrest, or deportation often prevents
them from seeking the help they need to assert their rights. In fact, undocumented
immigrants are covered by the same labor rights given to US citizens, however, federally
funded services are required by law to turn them away if they come in seeking help (Fine
2006).
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In terms of industry, systematic unlawful patterns of wage theft have been exposed
by several class action lawsuits filed against retailers such as Wal-Mart, Toys “R” Us,
Pep Boys, Family Dollar and Taco Bell (Greenhouse 2004, Lee 2005, Margolies 2005
and Miller 2004). In the hospitality and service industries wage theft has been
documented in restaurants and hotels that pay wages below federal standards, or that
fail to pay for overtime hours. Around the country, waiters, waitresses, chefs, and maids
often find their tips retained by their employers or are paid below the legal standards for
tipped employees (Johnson 2005; Marks 2005; Hunsburger 2006; Bobo 2009). Some
reports account that up to 98 percent of restaurants in L.A.’s Koreatown were not paying
minimum wage (Fine 2006).
In construction, workers often find themselves receiving lower wages than promised
or not being paid time-and-a-half for overtime wages, a condition that undermines the
federal standards for wages (Egelko 2005). Similarly, in agricultural and forestry work in
the United States, where pay tends to be low and employers are not legally required to
pay additional compensation for overtime hours, workers are often paid under federal
minimum wage standards (Renford 2001; Bobo 2009). A great number of agricultural
and forestry workers are immigrants from Mexico and Guatemala, who find themselves
without legal resources and marginalized by their language and lack of “legal” migratory
status. As Fine (2006) explains, in California, Several cases of wage theft brought to the
DOL were rebuffed under the misguided premise that undocumented workers or workers
working under the table were not elegible to file claims. The situation has been
exacerbated by the unavailability of Spanish translators to aid in the cases, by
settlements with employers that allowed for only 50 percent of what was owned, and by
the DOL’s decision to go back only two years, when the statue of limitations provided up
to six years to investigate cases.
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Also vulnerable are those workers who participate in the informal economy. These
often include day laborers in construction and agriculture, and domestic workers. Day
laborers are mostly hired by contractors and individuals to perform small-to-medium jobs
in private homes or in industries that require additional short-term labor. After performing
their work, their employers often abandon them at sites or simply refuse to pay the
workers (Gonzalez 2006 and Walsh 2006). Domestic workers are usually maids and
caretakers of children or the elderly in private homes. Domestic work is mostly
unregulated and creates tempting conditions for employers to indulge in forms of wage
theft. Pisani and Yoskowitz (2002), for example, found that the average hourly rate for
maids working in a Texas border locality was $3.44 for day maids and $2.61 for live-in
maids – rates considerably below the U.S. national minimum wage of $5.15 at the time
of the study. Domestic workers are excluded from the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA); however, they are covered by state and federal regulations, including minimum
wage provisions under the FLSA. Unfortunately, many employers are unaware of their
legal obligations, leaving domestic workers unprotected and powerless against
unscrupulous practices (Fine 2006).
Wage theft is a complex issue, where several factors interact to create the conditions
that allow employers to take advantage of workers. As Ness (2005) argues, wage theft
has become one of the most severe forms of worker abuse in New York's apparel
industry, where over 40% of the immigrant driven workforce reports having suffered
some form of wage violation. The evidence already mentioned in this section, shows that
wage theft often targets segments of the workforce where new immigrants with low
skills, no documents or work permits, and no knowledge of agencies that could help,
abound. These often transient immigrants fall outside the state policies established to
control abuse as well as the labor institutions that traditionally help workers balance
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power with their employers (Ness 2005). This poses a difficult challenge for worker
organizing, since it requires the creation of new institutions as well as new strategies for
collective mobilization (Milkman 2000).
Organizing Immigrants
Several authors have argued about the importance of organized labor to combat
poor working conditions and substandard wages of immigrant workers in important labor
markets of the U.S. (see Nissen and Grenier 2002; Milkman 2002; Martin 2003; Ness
2005; Fine 2006; Bobo 2009). However, union efforts to organize immigrants have not
always been successful, particularly as a result of factors in the structure of unions and
their hostility to include immigrants in their organizations (Nissen and Grenier 2002;
Milkman 2002). In other cases, poor immigrant response to unions resulted from
corporate interests taking advantage of deregulatory economic policies and of unenforced migratory policies that allow them to bypass unions and union tactics in favor of
employing an undocumented, low-wage, vulnerable workforce (Martin 2003).
Undocumented workers are even more vulnerable, as they have fewer rights and
protections if fired because of organizing activities, while fear of losing their job is an
understandable barrier to join a union when as many as 52 percent report being
threatened with calls to immigration officials during organizing drives in which they are
included (Fine 2006).
Despite such conditions, a variety of organizing efforts have emerged throughout the
country, responding to the needs of immigrant workers through worker and community
organizations (Ness 2005). In this section I focus on the issue of immigrant organizing
by looking at the historical relationship between unions and immigrants; their increasing
efforts to organize the growing immigrant workforce of the country; and the emergence
of grassroots, worker, and community organizations, which concentrate immigrant
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collective action around a variety of issues including, but not limited to, worker rights,
worker solidarity, empowerment, and education.
Unions and Immigrants
Since the beginning of the 20th century, several unions tried, rather unsuccessfully,
to organize immigrants in the U.S. labor force. The lack of success in immigrant
organizing has been partly explained from two different perspectives. First, many
attributed the lack of immigrant participation in unions to issues relating particular
characteristics of the immigrants themselves, citing the way in which immigrant labor
was entrenched in unskilled occupations, and in tightly knit networks, which separated
immigrants from the mainstream American life (references). However, a look at the
historical relationship between American labor and immigration reveals a second
perspective, which is based on racial and ethnic exclusionary practices on behalf of the
US labor movement. At the heart of the issue are traditional structures, maintained by
groups of ethnic whites resisting change in union membership and organization (Nissen
and Grenier 2002). For Milkman (2002), the fact that immigrant workers rely heavily on
close knit networks makes them easier to recruit into the labor movement, a key
resource for building labor solidarity, particularly when unions identify and recruit key
leaders of the community. Although, the transnational nature of the current economy has
facilitated the implementation of anti-labor practices by making organizing difficult for
most of the existing unions (Milkman 2000), the growing immigrant nature of the
country's work force has forced unions to rethink their organizing strategies in order to
avoid extinction (Nissen and Grenier 2002).
Achieving the task of rebuilding the US labor movement demands an effort to reach
out to the extensive and growing immigrant working-class population (Milkman 2000).
Today, one out of eight workers in America are first-generation immigrants of which, one
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in four are low-wage workers (Fine 2006). At the national level, immigrants are
underrepresented among union members, suggesting that at the low end of the work
spectrum, unionization may provide little appeal to low-wage workers, especially if they
are part of circular migration streams as they may be the most exploited members of the
immigrant workforce (Waldinger and Der-Martrosian 2000). Waldinger and DerMartrosian (2000) found that immigrants who had been in the country for less than 10
years were less likely to be unionized, while those living in the country for over 20 years,
were four times more likely to join a union. However, the study's most significant finding
is that immigrants’ attitudes and propensities toward unions are not necessarily based
on individual feelings about the union, but rather on whether a worker is employed in a
workplace where a union exists. Such conditions pose important limitations to immigrant
organizing, as recent immigrants are effectively excluded – by language and citizenship
requirements – from public sector employment, which still provides high levels of
unionization, and by the fact that nine out of ten jobs in the private sector are nonunion
(Waldinger and Der-Martrosian 2000).
Beginning the 1990s, major efforts to organize the immigrant labor force have
emerged from the ranks of several key unions around the country (see Nissen 2002,
Milkman 2000, Ness 2005). Unions that think strategically about immigration and
migration issues and that put programs in place to improve education, leadership,
structural flexibility, and intercultural interaction are more likely to succeed in today's
growing immigrant environment (Nissen, and Grenier 2002). Similarly, since 1995
leadership of the AFL-CIO began pouring unprecedented resources into their immigrant
organizing efforts, announcing in 2000 a new policy initiative, which would give amnesty
to undocumented workers and would lift sanctions against them and those employers
that hire them (Milkman 2002). These efforts have also consistently emerged from the
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ranks and efforts of immigrant workers themselves which, once organized, established
unions see as an opportunity to include within their strategic plans (Ness 2005). These
forms of worker organization have responded to isolation and limited social networks
experienced by new immigrants working together under harsh conditions, and channeled
by color, ethnicity, language, religion, and nationality into the expression of solidarity and
militancy (Ness 2005). In many cases, workers in specific firms and industries have
carried out their own strikes and organizing drives, calling the attention of the labor
movement and the community and allowing specific unions to bring in their expertise to
successfully winning a first contract (Milkman 2000).
Farmwork and Unions
During the 20th century, farm labor reformers hoped to make their labor market more
like non-farm labor markets. This meant that farm employers could invest in personnel
departments to recruit the best workers, motivate them, and retain them with seniority
and fringe benefits. Union hiring halls could handle recruitment and wages could be
determined through collective bargaining (Martin 2003). These hopes began to
materialize in 1975, when California enacted the Agricultural Labor Relations Act
(ALRA), which granted farmworkers the right to organize and bargain with employers
(Martin 2003). The enactment came under pressure from Caesar Chavez and the
United Farm Workers (UFW) union, which was predicted to become one of the nation’s
largest unions; however, during the 1980s and 1990s, union membership dropped to
fewer than 35,000 workers in California, or just 5 percent of the persons employed for
wages in California's agriculture, ultimately reversing the effects of the original hopes,
with employers distancing themselves from workers and turning to labor contractors to
recruit workers (Martin 2003).
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Martin (2003) explains the decrease in union membership and thus, power, in the
context of larger changes in the political environment, farm employment practices, as
well as poor union leadership. First, political changes can be attributed to a dependency
that ALRA had on the Agricultural labor Relations Board (ALRB), which is controlled by
the governing administration. Thus, from the early years of the Reagan administration,
pro-grower governors appointed their political allies to the ALRB, and successfully
truncated the efforts achieved by labor during the democratic administration of the late
1970s. Second, large conglomerates such as Shell Oil, and Seven-Up sold their farming
operations to smaller ranchers and producers who did not have to worry about
unionization and who used contractors for a refreshed immigrant labor force. Finally,
poor union leadership may have contributed by not deploying enough seasonal workers,
paying pension plans and medical fees late, and thus garnering worker dissatisfaction
and reducing support.
Today, at least 75 percent of U.S. farm workers are immigrants, the majority of whom
are not authorized to work in the United States. The rate of immigrants among farm
workers contrasts greatly with the 12% of immigrant workers in the nonfarm economy, of
which only 3 to 4 percent are unauthorized to work in the country (Martin 2003). On
average, farmworkers earn a quarter of the average wages earned by nonfarm workers,
a discrepancy that occurs because farmworkers receive lower wages per hour and over
all work fewer hours than their nonfarm counterparts (Martin 2003). For farmworkers, the
desire to collect higher wages is often embedded in a notion that federal and state
governments could do more to help workers join unions and increase wages despite a
growing supply of immigrant labor. This is important because conventional economic
wisdom would argue that an extended supply of workers results in depressed earnings.
However, worker advocates as well as current leaders argue that the real factor
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depressing wages is the workers’ fears of joining unions and negotiating for higher
wages (Martin 2003). Unfortunately, as Martin (2003: 162) states,
Unions play small and declining roles in the U.S. and California farm labor markets,
yet low wages, poor working conditions, and unique features of the farm labor
market, including immigration and migrancy, keep farm labor issues in the news,
reminding Americans that farm labor is a “problem.” Most farm employers continue to
believe that unions are neither desirable nor inevitable, and most farm workers
continue to exit for nonfarm jobs rather than turn to unions for upward mobility in
agriculture.
These considerations are important because as an increasing number of rural
immigrants recur to nonfarm work for upward mobility, an endless supply of agricultural
immigrants will be needed to replace them as they exit to other forms of non-farm labor
jobs.
The Community and the Grassroots; Alternatives to Union Organizing
In the long run, deregulatory changes at the economic level responsible for
relocating protection and services away from the state-operated machinery have also
resulted in the growth of NGOs and other types of social organizations that fill the needs
left in the absence of the state (Sassen 1998). For the labor movement, deregulation has
signified the creation and proliferation of worker self-help organizations aimed to protect
the status of workers and their wages as well as developing a variety of programs and
initiatives concentrated at the local and at the transnational level (Ness 2005). There has
also been an emergence of worker centers and community organizations dedicated to
enforce the FLSA as well as state labor laws, to defend the labor rights of
undocumented immigrants in court rulings, and to defend immigrant rights in general, by
working together with government agencies and departments (Fine 2006).
The work of most community organizations revolves around a social justice frame,
which is often accompanied by service delivery to help exploited workers assert their
rights, while advocating for long-term policy changes in immigration and labor areas that
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could secure the well-being of the immigrant labor force (Fine 2006). As Jayaraman and
Ness (2005) argue, conventional forms of union organizing no longer work in a context
where immigrant workers are frightened to speak out for fear of deportation or detention,
giving rise to a variety of forms of community organizing based on language, ethnicity or
other forms of cultural currency. For Stephen (2007; 236),
These types of grassroots organizations are vehicles through which transborder
migrants can claim and then strive to obtain a variety of rights that may routinely be
denied to them formally through the law (as in the lack of the right of farmworkers in
many states in the United States to collective bargaining) or rights that can be legally
claimed that are often not respected, because the forms of intimidation
The aforementioned forms of organizations are often embedded in a wide range of
issues including “the relations of production and reproduction, the politics of immigration
and immigrant rights, culturally based issues such as language and local cultural
expression and maintenance, sexism in the workplace and at home, collective memory
and connection to communities of origin, and the creation of community across borders
and through networks (Stephen 2007; 270).”
As a more specific approach to labor issues, worker centers emerged in the late
1970s and early 1980s as a response to deteriorating changes in manufacturing that
were accompanied by factory closings, deteriorating working conditions, and the
increase of low-wage service sector jobs (Fine 2006). From 2000 to the present, worker
centers have multiplied in urban, suburban, and rural areas of the country, responding to
a growing concentration of immigrants from Mexico, Central and South America working
in the service, meatpacking, poultry, and agricultural sectors (Fine 2006). In general,
worker centers have emerged as a result of a declining presence of institutions that
historically provided workers with the tools for protection and collective action. Their
emergence has also responded to the fast growth of immigrant communities and their
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need to fill the void left by the absence of infrastructure that supports labor and collective
needs (Fine 2006).
Worker centers as well as many grassroots community organizations have a longterm social justice agenda, which includes short and midterm goals aimed at policy
modification and organizing campaigns (Fine 2006). For Fine (2006; 72-3) most
community organizations and worker centers today are engaging in service provisions
as a way to legitimize themselves with immigrant workers and the broader community,
where the growing number of these services include:
… legal support for pursuing unpaid wages, they do so with great trepidation,
because they want to promote collective and systemic approaches to change. They
want workers to see that the solution to their situation requires collective action to
alter the relations of power and win concrete victories, and worry that helping
workers individually cuts against that message and takes time and resources away
from that work. They seek to address this dilemma in two ways: by delivering
services in a way that empowers workers and by connecting service, as much as
possible, to organizing.
As Fine (2006) demonstrates, worker centers around the country consistently resolve
cases of wage theft, with success rates of up to 71 percent, while collecting full amounts
owed to workers.
The importance of grassroots organizing is to develop a presence that can lead to a
more organized political participation by concentrating people connected through preexisting kin or community in an effort to build critical mass for consistent organizing
(Stephen 2007). While some projects begin as income producing activities, community
organizations provide members with an opportunity to develop pride and solidarity as
well as new skills in public speaking, leadership, and education (Stephen 2007). In terms
of union relationships, worker centers and community organizations are mobilizing and
organizing agencies and individuals that the labor movement has been unwilling or
unable to organize; while on the other side, unions can provide community organizations
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with the expertise and knowledge of labor law, capacity for industry analysis, and
financial resources to support organizing drives (Fine 2006). For these reasons, working
together, community organizations and unions may help revitalize the country’s labor
movement, building density and creating new approaches that best fit the nature of the
economy within the current phase of neoliberal restructuring (Ness 2005, Fine 2006).
Conclusion
Today, millions of low-wage immigrant workers make up the backbone of the
American economy. From an economic stance, these workers represent a cheap supply
of labor that allows business and industry to remain competitive and consumers to
benefit from affordable food, clothing, and luxury items. For the immigrant workers, the
opportunity to earn dollars and provide their families with a steady source of income
often translates into offspring education, improved housing conditions, or investment
capital for a small business. Unfortunately, current economic and immigration policies
do not return the favor, rendering the heavily undocumented, labor force “illegal” and
criminalizing workers under a discourse of national security.
At the crossroads of the country's current models of economic, labor, and
immigration policy, businesses are provided with a variety of opportunities to bypass
labor laws and exploit immigrant labor. In this sense, unfair business practices thrive
amidst decreasing resources for investigation and enforcement of wage and hour
violations, breaking the law under the knowledge that they will not get caught. In
addition, businesses that knowingly hire undocumented workers can shield themselves
from accusations of exploitation by playing on the workers’ fears of prosecution and
deportation. Finally, by ignoring or failing to attract immigrant workers, unions have
contributed to the problem, since in the absence of governmental protection, immigrant
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workers also lack any collective bargaining abilities that would grant them the power to
assert their rights.
Widespread practice of wage theft raises many questions about the nature and
extent of the problem. For millions of low-wage, immigrant workers in the country, the
practice may represent falling behind in economic obligations at their home country as
well as poverty and marginality at the host country. In the absence of adept government
regulation, inclusive immigration policy, and union consideration, a variety of self-help
worker centers and community organizations have emerged as an invaluable resource
to claim workers’ stolen wages. These organizations have helped to disprove traditional
misconceptions about the so-called “unorganizability” of immigrants, garnering support
from unions and approaching police departments, city commissions, and business
organizations in the pursuit of fair labor standards for immigrant workers.
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IV. MAPPING OUT THE FLORIDA GREEN INDUSTRY
In this chapter I focus on the industry structure and economic characteristics of
Florida’s plant nursery industry. Although the analysis is rather economical and technical
in nature, it is important to provide the reader with as much background information on
the industry in order to better understand some of the interactions, relations, and
dependence among industry actors that I analyze in the following chapters. To this end, I
explain the national level categories or sectors of the industry and their economic status.
I then provide an overview of how the different sectors of Florida’s plant nursery industry
are categorized and their economic status. Following with a basic description of what is
known about the impacts of the industry to the state economy.
In the U.S. the Environmental Horticulture industry, also generally referred to as the
Green Industry is composed of various kinds of businesses. In the State of Florida the
Green Industry’s broad array of businesses include and range from small individuallyowned up to large wholesale nurseries, greenhouse producers, lawn and garden
suppliers, nursery and greenhouse equipment manufacturing, wholesale trade,
landscape design, installation and maintenance services, lawn and garden stores, and a
variety of retail enterprises that sell plants as well as lawn and garden supplies.
Analyses and reports on the Green or Environmental Horticulture Industry fold together
producers of nursery crops, turf grass sod, and floriculture crops, as well as those other
related segments mentioned above. The main focus of this chapter, however, is on the
basic data on the nursery crops and greenhouse producers, but because of the interrelatedness of the different sectors of the industry I also offer similar information on other
sectors of the Green Industry, such as landscaping and retail.
Nursery crops include finished ornamental plants and trees with woody stems,
including deciduous shade trees, deciduous flowering trees, deciduous shrubs and other
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ornamentals, fruit and nut plants intended for outdoor and landscape use, as well as cut
and live Christmas trees, and propagation material or lining-out stock (Jerardo 2007). 6
Although most crops classified under this category of “nursery crops” are grown
outdoors and in large containers, some production does take place in greenhouses or
shade houses. This second category of crops is often identified in the literature as
floriculture or greenhouse crops. Throughout the literature the terms floriculture and
greenhouse crops are used interchangeably and in this manuscript I also follow that
convention and use floriculture and greenhouse to mean the same sector of growers, but
not the same as nursery crops. To make the issue of nomenclature even more confusing
is the fact that while most floriculture or greenhouse production takes place in
greenhouses there is also production in out-of-doors fields in Florida.
Floriculture or greenhouse crops include foliage plants, potted flowering plants,
bedding plants, cut-cultivated greens, and cut flowers. Foliage plants are sold in pots
and hanging baskets for indoor and patio use, including larger varieties for offices,
hotels, and restaurant interiors. Potted flowering plants are mainly sold in pots for indoor
use and some of the largest crops among these include poinsettias, orchids, and
chrysanthemums. Bedding and garden plants consist mostly of young flowering plants
that are grown in flats, trays, pots, or hanging baskets, usually inside a controlled
greenhouse environment, and are largely used for gardens and landscaping. The largest
amount of cut flowers are sold in bunches or as bouquets with cut foliage. The most
popular cut flowers in the U.S. are roses, carnations, gladioli, and chrysanthemums
(Hall, Hodges, and Haydu 2005). For definitions and a view of the extraordinary diversity

6

Propagative material includes cuttings, liners, plug seedlings, prefinished plants, or tissue
cultured plantlets, and unfinished plants sold to other growers for further growing. Please see
Appendix A for a list of terms and definitions.
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of products generated by the Florida nursery crops and floriculture sectors please see
Appendix A.
U.S. Nursery and Greenhouse Crops
At the national level, environmental horticulture, and specifically the two sectors of
floriculture and nursery crops production have been among the fastest growing
segments of the agricultural economy over the past two decades, showing periods of
growth and expansion even during periods of recession. According to industry experts,
the slowing growth of recent years can be attributed to a maturing of the industry, that is,
the number of producers has increased to the point where demand is filled or saturated
(Hall, Hodges and Haydu 2005).
The number of nursery producers across the entire U.S., as estimated by the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Census of Agriculture for 2007, was 22,407.
The states with the largest number of producers were Florida, Oregon, North Carolina,
and California (Nursery Crops 2006 Summary), although it should be noted that Florida
has numerous small producers while California’s smaller number of producers tend to be
larger. Nationally, the total sales of nursery crops in 2006 was estimated at $17 billion,
where the leading three states as measured by value of sales were California with 24
percent, Oregon with 18 percent and Florida with 17 percent of total nursery crops sales
(Jerardo 2007). The number of hired workers in 2006 was 112,672 of which 54 percent
were paid for 150 days or more. The average number of workers per operation who
were paid for 150 days or more was 16 (Jerardo 2007) 7.
7

The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service publishes different reports at
different time intervals. The main publications for nursery and greenhouse/floriculture production
are Floriculture Crops, which is published annually and which Includes data on quantity sold,
percent of sales at wholesale, wholesale price and value of sales at wholesale for 15 selected
States and growers having $100,000 or more in sales, and; Nursery Crops, which was published
every 3 years until 2007 and Included data for 17 selected States, and growers having $100,000
or more in sales. In this chapter I have included the numbers from the 2006 (published in 2007)
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In terms of floriculture or greenhouse crops, the national 2011 wholesale industry
value was $4 billion. California was the leading state with crops valued at $1.1 billion and
Florida was the next largest producer at $835 million in wholesale value. The next three
top producing states were Michigan, Texas, and North Carolina, which account for 65
percent of the 15-State total value (Floriculture Crops 2011 Summary). In 2011 the
number of floriculture crop producers at the national level, as estimated by the USDA
Census of Agriculture for 2007 was 5,700. The average peak number of hired workers
employed on operations in the 15 leading states in 2006 was approximately 18 with a
total of 4,382 operations reporting hiring workers during 2011, and an estimated 76
percent of the operations using some hired labor during 2006 (Floriculture Crops 2011
Summary).
Florida. Nursery and Greenhouse Crops
Nursery plants are one of the largest and most important agricultural commodities in
the state of Florida, along with fruits, vegetables and forest products (Hodges and
Mulkey 2006). According to the Census of Agriculture for 2007, the state of Florida had
over 4,700 commercial nursery and greenhouse farms. Nursery operations reported
having 45,000 acres in the open and about 68 million Sq. feet under glass or other
protection, while floriculture or greenhouses operations reported 9,000 acres in the open
and about 256 million Sq. feet under glass or other protection (USDA-NASS, Census of
Agriculture, 2007).
Floriculture and nursery crops represented a substantial rate of growth between the
last years of the 1970s to the mid 1980s, when the rate of growth began to stabilize
Nursery Crops report and the most recent 2011 (published in 2012) Floriculture Crops report.
Some of the information for this chapter also comes from the Census of Agriculture, which is
conducted every five years and provides a detailed picture of U.S. farms and ranches and the
people who operate them. The last census conducted was in 2007, thus, whenever there are
actualized reports or data sets I will use newer data, but new full reports will not be made
available until after the 2012 census of agriculture is completed.
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(Hodges and Haydu 1992); the rate of growth increased again between the late 1990s
and 2005. According to official United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) data,
plant nursery sales in 2010 were estimated at about 1.7 billion in total sales or about
22% of the total agricultural production of the state. Figure 1 shows the grower cash
receipts for floriculture and nursery crops in the state of Florida between 2000 and 2010
(NASS 2011).

Figure 1. Florida Greenhouse and Nursery Crops: Value of sales 2000 to 2010 (USDA-NASS 2011)

Miami-Dade is the Florida County with the largest number of floriculture and nursery
crops producers and the leader in value of yearly sales with over 800 producers
reporting $286 million from floricultural production and close to $195 million from nursery
crops production. Orange, Palm Beach, and Lake Counties are also among the top
producers of nursery crops and floriculture (USDA-NASS Census of Agriculture, 2007).
Tables 1 and 2 show the characteristics of the top five producing counties in Florida
according to value of sales for the year 2007.
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Table 1. Characteristics of Florida’s Top Five Nursery Crops Producing Counties in 2007
Sq. ft. under
No. of
glass or other
Acres in
Value of sales
County
Farms
protection
the open
Dollars
Miami-Dade

587

43,182,682

10,279

194,627,381

Palm Beach

333

2,160,146

3,265

77,776,033

Lake

126

1,410,375

2,384

68,964,160

Hillsborough

211

2,840,968

2,520

57,497,269

Orange

93

4,479,114

524

29,026,419

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture - National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA-NASS). Census
of Agriculture, 2007. Florida State and County Data, vol. 1, Geographic Area Series, Part 51.
Washington, D.C., February 2009.

Table 2. Characteristics of Florida’s Top Five Floriculture Producing Counties in 2007
Sq. ft. under
No. of
glass or other
Acres in
Value of sales
County
Farms
protection
the open
Dollars
Miami-Dade

300

64,527,816

1,967

286,097,476

Orange

184

22,568,600

217

174,174,893

Volusia

234

90,514,590

2,851

84,359,288

Palm Beach

96

12,179,067

891

75,577,892

Lake

122

14,203,561

390

62,460,084

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture - National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA-NASS). Census
of Agriculture, 2007. Florida State and County Data, vol. 1, Geographic Area Series, Part 51.
Washington, D.C., February 2009.

Impacts and Characteristics of the Florida Nursery industry Labor Force
According to a 2010 report by the Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS)
at the University of Florida (UF), the estimated total employment impacts for the
nursery/greenhouse industry in Florida accounted for approximately 98,000 jobs 8.
County level employment impacts were greatest in Miami-Dade with about 25,000 jobs;
Orange with 13,000; Volusia with approximately 8,000; Hillsborough with over 6,500;
and Palm beach with approximately 5,800 (Hodges, Stevens, Rahmani, and
Khachatryan 2010).
8

The numbers of the report differ largely from the numbers reported by the Florida Department of
Economic Opportunity, which monitors and reports the state of employment in the State of
Florida, because the IFAS report relies on a series weighs and statistical calculations to account
for the impact of those numbers not reported to the state’s agencies.
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A review of the 2012 available data on wages from the State of Florida Department
of Economic Opportunity estimates the wages of Farmworkers and Laborers of Crop,
Nursery, and Greenhouse operations 9 at a median hourly wage of of $8.40 with entry
level wages of $8.14 and wages of $9.83 for expert workers. In terms of benefits, no
recent information is available for this particular group. However, a 2007 study on the
working conditions of nursery fieldworkers in Miami-Dade County revealed a widespread
lack of health benefits, no overtime wages, as well as a variety of wage, safety, and
varied harassment violations (Angee and Hernandez 2007). The study found that many
workers in the Miami-Dade plant nursery industry often receive hourly wages under the
minimum wage or a daily payment regardless of the number of hours that they work,
which may be over eight hours per day.
The study also looked into workers’ knowledge of and access to information
regarding laws and rights at their workplaces, revealing that a great number of the
research participants had no clear idea of what the state’s minimum hourly wage was.
Many nursery workers complained that there were no posters or other information telling
them of basic work standards or regulations at their job sites and that they would not be
able to extract such information from their employers. The workers also report that
reliable information is not available from co-workers. The Angee, Hernandez study
(2007) also highlights the accentuated vulnerability to abuses because of the workers’
lack of knowledge of organizations, agencies, or institutions that can help them in
situations of harassment and/or wage theft with the situation often aggravated by the
worker’s lack of legal immigration status. I address the issues faced by Florida Nursery

9

This category includes farm labor of nursery/greenhouse crops as well as those in other farming
and cropping industries.
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workers in detail in chapter six, including an analysis of the migration and incorporation
patterns of low wage immigrants to the state and to its plant nursery industry.
The closest approximation of the characteristics of the industry’s labor force is found
through the National Agricultural Workers Survey’s (NAWS) public data set, which
includes all agricultural workers of the Southeastern U.S. The survey estimates the
regional foreign-born agricultural population to be 63 percent with an average age of 35
and an estimated eight years residing in the U.S. The female labor force is estimated at
21 percent and the undocumented population is estimated at 49 percent, with only about
one percent having a (non-specified) type of work permit or authorization. Unfortunately,
the NAWS data is overly broad to determine more than an approximation of nursery crop
and floriculture workers, since it includes all types of agricultural workers within a
conglomeration of six Southeastern states and not just nursery crops and greenhouse
employees in the state of Florida. Unfortunately, there is no database or survey
specifically detailing the demographic characteristics of the Florida nursery crop and
floriculture workforce. However, I did extract anecdotal evidence from industry
professionals and local organizers involved in the industry to elucidate some of the
numbers, but these are approximations at best. Because such numbers do not originate
from systematic data gathering I make no generalizations, but rather understand that
they are best guesses by well-informed observers and stakeholders. For instance,
Jonathan Fried of WeCount! estimates that about 90 percent of the Miami-Dade County
nursery crops and greenhouse labor force is Hispanic (mostly Mexican and Guatemalan)
with about 40% female and 60% male. The remaining 10% of the labor force, he
believes is divided among African Americans, Haitians and other ethnicities. Researcher
Tim Steigenga of Florida Atlantic University estimates the demographic distribution of
Palm Beach county greenhouse and nursery crops workers at 75 percent Hispanic, with
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a ratio of 60 - 40 Guatemalan – Mexican workers and the other 25 percent being African
American, Haitian, and Anglo.
The plant nursery industry relies heavily on labor intensive work from an immigrant
work force. In addition, it became clear to me through employer and industry
professional interviews as well as through the documents and opinions of industry
organizations that a great deal of the industry’s workers are undocumented or not legally
permitted to work in the U.S. The legal status of industry workers poses clear difficulties
to both workers and employers. As the Florida Nursery Growers and Landscapers
Association (FNGLA) president explained to me, “growers don’t want to have the specter
of the federal government officials coming in and raiding their business operations,
penalizing them with fines, or taking in workers in whom you’ve invested time and
resources so that they’re trained.”
To exacerbate the issue, the use of guest worker visas is not a common practice in
the Florida nursery crops and greenhouse sectors of the industry. The FNGLA president
described the situation as one where employers avoid the use of H2A visas because it is
expensive and contains very stringent impositions on workers’ living arrangements. The
opinions of this industry professional reflect those of my employer and employee
interviews from this and previous studies in Miami-Dade County, where I found the use
of the H2A visa is virtually unknown in the nursery crops and floriculture sectors with the
majority of undocumented workers in these sectors having crossed illegally through the
U.S. – Mexico border and settling in Florida through pre-established social networks
(Angee and Hernandez 2007). In chapters five and six, I provide a in-depth analysis of
the attitudes and behaviors of plant nursery industry professionals and operators
regarding the recruitment, regulation, and employment of the immigrant labor force.

98

Size of Florida Firms
Plant nursery production in Florida is mostly handled by many small to medium sized
producers. In terms of size of land and firms for instance, the UF/IFAS report (Hodges et
al. 2010) estimates about 55 percent of Florida growers with greenhouses or shade
houses reported having small production areas of less than 10,000 sq. ft., while less
than 1 percent reported having large areas of more than 1 million square feet. More than
38 percent of operations reporting container or open field production have farms sized
10 acres or less. These percentages demonstrate the overrepresentation of small firms
within the nursery crops and floriculture sectors in Florida and the very small number of
large producers. Figure 2 shows the distribution of greenhouse or shade-house
production by square footage capacity and where the imbalance in numbers of small
producers relative to large ones is evident. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the
container and field nursery areas by size reported by producers 10.

Figure 2. Greenhouse use reported by respondents of the Economic Impacts of the Florida
Environmental and Horticulture Industry Study (Hodges et al. 2010).

10

Survey respondents in the IFAS nursery industry study were asked to report their production
areas separately for greenhouse/shadehouse facilities (as shown in Figure 2) and container or
field growing areas (shown in Figure 3). The large number of respondents who reported “none”
for container/field areas were strictly greenhouse/shadehouse operations.
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Figure 3. Container and field nursery area use reported by respondents of the Economic
Impacts of the Florida Environmental and Horticulture Industry Study (Hodges et al. 2010).

Sales Trends for Florida Floriculture and Nursery Crops
The largest selling crop for nursery producers in Florida are tropical foliage plants
with 2010 sales of approximately $1.8 billion or about 35 percent share of total
horticultural sales, followed by potted flowering or bedding plants at a combined $916 or
22 percent of total sales. Palms and Florida native plants are also major specialty crops
in the Florida industry (Hodges et al. 2010). Sales of most nursery crops are more
largely directed toward other states, while about 44 percent of production is sold to
costumers in local or regional markets (see figure 4). 11
Measured by sales volume in 2010 the most important customer within the
commodity chain of nursery products was to home improvement stores with about 37
percent of sales. Sales to landscaping contractors accounted for about 14 percent of
sales, while mass merchandise stores account for 12 percent of sales, and rewholesalers or brokers accounted for 11 percent of sales, while independent retail
garden centers accounted for about 9 percent of sales (see figure 5).
11

Sales of industry firms are organized by market region and categories include international,
national, state, and local areas. Local areas are defined as the city or county in which the
business is located, or within a 50 mile radius.
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Figure 4. Distribution of horticultural industry sales by market region reported by respondents of
Economic Impacts of the Florida Environmental and Horticulture Industry Study (Hodges et al.
2010).

Figure 5. Distribution of nursery and greenhouse product sales by type of customer reported by
respondents of the Economic Impacts of the Florida Environmental and Horticulture Industry Study
(Hodges et al. 2010).

Plants often go through several firms within the industry before arriving at their final
destination. This is because some businesses within the industry only produce liners or
starters, or small potted trees, which are sold to other firms to grow to maturity. In
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addition, many businesses that sell to large buyers, such as big box stores, often buy
plants from other nurseries to complete large orders. This practice is often referred to as
brokering, where nurseries often buy large quantities from other local producers in order
to fill large orders.
A closer look at the nature of sales and marketing strategies of nursery crops and
greenhouse growers highlights some of the issues associated with the un-concentrated
nature of the industry. Such un-concentration results in part because many nursery
crops and greenhouse firms have wholesale, landscaping and/or brokering operations in
addition to the plant production aspect of their business. My interviews with industry
operators demonstrate that plants often change firms several times before reaching a
final destination. As one employer explained,
If we have to fill a large order [of plants], we often have to call other nurseries to
complete what the buyer is searching for. We do not want to lose the order so we
buy from others in order to facilitate the client’s shopping experience… This is
often done to supply another broker who is selling to one of his clients, so by the
time the plants get to the retailer or landscaper, some of them will have been sold
and resold two or three times.
Wholesale sales of nursery products are often handled by salespersons with
established relationships to buyers in specific markets. Marketing channels often include
trade shows, advertising in trade publications, and catalog sales. Close planning with
large buyers is often required to secure long-term markets and to ensure that the buyer’s
desired product mix is produced and available. However, demand for different products
varies substantially from year to year as items that are in demand change from year to
year (Hall, Hodges and Haydu, 2005). These trends were also articulated by several of
my employer informants, who also report doing the sales themselves as opposed to
having salespersons in their operations.
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As the analysis reveals, the nursery crops and floriculture sectors of the Green
Industry in the state of Florida is composed of a significant conglomeration of small and
medium sized independent firms; and while some firms have grown to achieve large
operations in terms of land and value, these tend to remain independently owned. In this
sense, I found no solid evidence that publicly traded firms are parent companies to
smaller nurseries or groups of nurseries in the state as is the case with other forms of
agriculture of fruits and vegetables.
My analysis demonstrates that the structure of the industry is complex, inter-reliant
and highly un-consolidated. A relatively high proportion of small and medium sized firms
account for a significant share of industry production and value, while a highly diverse
array of commodities produced and multiple market channels exacerbate the
unconsolidated nature of the industry; often preventing a variety of organizational efforts
such as cooperatives and collective marketing strategies (Hodges and Haydu 1992).
Despite this highly un-concentrated and fragmented industry structure, entrepreneurs of
the plant nursery and landscape industry are well organized and represented in the state
and national political process through professional business associations such as the
Florida Nursery Growers and Landscape Association (FNGLA), the American Nursery
and Landscape Association (ANLA), and the Florida Farm Bureau.
The highly un-consolidated organizational structure extends to other sectors of the
Green Industry as well. With landscape services and home garden retail providing
important sources of jobs, income, taxes and added value to the production and sales of
horticultural products in the state. In the following section I look at these other sectors of
the “green industry” to clarify the extent and depth of the exchange of horticultural or
nursery production. This step provides a preliminary look necessary for a power analysis
of the industry. In the next section I provide an overview of the total industry structure. I
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believe that an understanding of this structure is necessary to an understanding of the
commodity chain and how some producers play multiple roles in that chain.
Industry Structure and the Commodity Chain in Florida
The environmental horticulture or “Green” industry consists of a variety of businesses
involved in production, distribution, and sales and services associated with ornamental
plants, landscape and garden supplies and equipment. The industry is comprised of
wholesale nurseries, field and container and greenhouse production, and sod growers,
landscapers, landscape architects and landscaping, maintenance firms, retail garden
centers, home centers and mass merchandisers with lawn and garden departments, as
well as marketing intermediaries such as brokers, horticultural distribution centers, and
re-wholesalers (Hall, Hodges and Haydu 2005). Total Florida industry sales in 2010
were estimated at $16 Billion, including $8.12 12 Billion by nursery and greenhouse
operations, $6.24 Billion by landscape service firms, and $1.6 Billionn by horticultural
retailers, while the impact on indirect business taxes paid to state and local governments
was estimated at $668 Million (Hodges et al. 2010). 13
I start the industry description with the “Green Industry” box labeled “Nursery &
Greenhouse Production” located in the top left of Figure 6, which includes firms engaged
in greenhouse and nursery crops production. I then move on to describe other boxes or
sectors of the Green Industry that represent the interdependent relationship of these

12

This number contrast greatly with the numbers available from the USDA and its related
research services detailed in footnote 2 above. This is due to the methodology used in the
UF/IFAS economic industry report which uses a complex system of economic multipliers based
on a representative sample of surveyed nursery firms in the State of Florida.
13

A major source of research and information on the Green Industry is the Institute of Food and
Agricultural Science (IFAS) at the University of Florida (UF). Consequently this section relies
heavily on IFAS publications to provide the background for the industry structure and commodity
chain analysis.
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sectors to the growers of greenhouse and nursery crop growers. First in this list are the
boxes labeled “Landscaping Services Sector” and the retail part of the box labeled
“Wholesale and Retail Trade.” From there I move to the box labeled “Input & Service
Suppliers” in the lower center of Figure 6. I conclude this section with a consideration of
sectors that I believe should have been included in the structure and linkages schematic,
viz, “Transportation and Distribution,” “End-Users,” “Research and Extension Services,”
and “Professional Organizations.”

Figure 6. Market Structure and Economic Linkages of the Green Industry (Hall et al. 2005)

The sectors of the “Green Industry” are highly related, yet un-concentrated and
diverse, particularly because firms may be producers of nursery and floriculture crops
and also offer retail, wholesale, and/or landscaping services. As an interview with a
Central Florida Farm Credit professional revealed, “many nurseries perform landscape
services as well, while many garden centers have small crop production facilities
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integrated to their operation. 14 In addition, a complex system of brokering and rewholesaling further complicates the task of classifying firms and their roles within the
industry. Some companies specialize in consolidating products from numerous
producers for large shipments to big box stores or to garden centers inside and outside
of the state, while sometimes this same function is performed by growers themselves.
Brokers and re-wholesalers buy different quantities and plant varieties from a number of
nursery firms throughout the state and re-sell them as a consolidated package to large
buyers. 15 One consequence of this diversity within individual firms is that any individual
grower may not be dependent only on crop production for his income.
Nursery and Greenhouse production
Location sites for nursery crops production are largely determined by factors such as
soil, climate, availability of water, accessibility and distance to markets, and cost of land,
since plant species have a hardiness zone determined by the northern geographic
latitude for in-ground growth. As a result, trees and shrubs start out as "liners" (rooted
trees and plants in undeveloped states and arranged in pots or trays). These are usually
protected from severe weather by a shade or temporary cover and then transplanted into
larger containers or the field for additional growth. Sales occur at any stage of
development depending on the plants' commercial purpose (Hall, Hodges, and Haydu
2005). The diversity of crops produced in Florida is large and adds to the complexity of
the commodity chain.
Sales of most nursery crops in Florida are more local or regional than floriculture
crops, which are less delicate and costly to ship to farther markets. Market outlets for
floriculture crops often include florists, garden centers, mass merchandisers,
14

Interview with Regina Thomas, farm Credit of Central Florida’s Senior Vice President and Chief
Business Development Officer. December 2009
15

Interview with nursery owner in Miami Dade County. October 2009.
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supermarkets, chain stores, discount stores, home improvement centers, hardware
stores, landscape contractors, and re-wholesalers. In addition, other retail outlets may
include farmers markets, flea markets, and street vendors. Homeowners are the typical
consumers of trees, shrubs, and woody ornamental plants; however, other end users
often include construction contractors and developers, golf courses, resorts, parks,
malls, and government agencies in charge of parks, street and highway vegetation, and
forests (Hall, Hodges, and Haydu 2005).
Most firms surveyed by the UF/IFAS economic impact study were mature
businesses, with firms reporting having been in business for an average of 18 years
(Hodges et al. 2010). In 2010, the majority of sales in the nursery/greenhouse sector
was to home improvement stores and representing about 37 percent of total sales. This
number was followed by sales to landscapers and interiorscapers at about 14 percent,
while sales to mass merchandise stores accounted for 13 percent. Interestingly, the
combined percentage of sales to other growers and to re-wholesalers was about 20
percent, again indicating the extent through which plants circulate within industry firms
before reaching retailers and final users (Hodges et al. 2010).
Plant brokerage (i.e., buying and reselling finished plants) has been estimated to
include 47 percent of growers, with the activity representing about 20 percent of total
sales in 2010. This market still represents large sales volumes for a relatively small
number of sellers, which indicates very concentrated market channels that are held
mostly by large producers. This phenomenon was supported by the president of the
Miami-Dade County FNGLA in an interview. This industry professional explained that
sales of nursery products to large retail chains are very specific to large firms or broker
operations which consolidate products for companies such as Home Depot, Lowes, or
Wal-Mart. Production contracted with a buyer in advance is also a common activity
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reported by 45 percent of firms, but representing less than 1 percent of sales. Sales to
repeat customers represent about 74 percent of total sales in 2005 (Hodges and Haydu
2006)
Landscaping Services
Landscaping services are another important segment of Florida’s Green Industry and
a major consumer of floriculture and nursery crops products. Nationally, the landscape
services sector has grown rapidly over the last 30 years due to expansion in residential
housing and commercial development, greater investment in re-landscaping of existing
properties, and increasing use of professional lawn and garden maintenance services
(Hall et al 2005). Industry growth has been particularly strong in Florida, where sales
grew from an estimated $3.2 billion in 1997 to $5.3 billion in 2005 (inflation-adjusted),
thus representing an average annual growth of 6.5 percent. (Hodges and Haydu 2006).
In 2005, the most important customers for landscape firms were governments at 29
percent; however, by 2010 this number had decreased drastically to about five percent.
Although there is no analysis of why this number decreased so drastically in about five
years, it could be related to fiscal austerity measures adopted by state and local
governments as a result of the economic resection of recent years. Government
contracts often include highway beautification projects, for which the Florida Department
of Transportation allocates an important portion of its yearly budget, 16 or remodeling
projects of public facilities such as museums, zoos, and other public sites. In 2010, thus,
the largest customer for landscape firms were homeowners, representing 36 percent of
sales, followed by apartments and condominiums at 22 percent and builders and
developers at 16 percent of sales (Hodges et al. 2010).
16

Florida Department of Transportation, Highway Beautification Program.
http://www.dot.state.fl.us/emo/beauty/beauty.shtm.
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An estimated 44 percent of Florida landscaping firms report maintenance as their
main activity, followed by 23 percent doing landscape installation as their main activity,
and 12 percent from the sale of live plants 9Hodges et al. 2010). The Hodges et al.
(2010) report, estimates the total number of state landscape workers In 2010 at 111,000,
with an estimated 78 percent of full time workers in surveyed firms. In 2005, about 26
percent of firms had 10 or more employees, and 2 percent had over 100. Laborers
represent over 51 percent of all employees, followed by equipment operators at 10
percent, foreman/supervisors at 8 percent, and horticultural/irrigation technicians at 7
percent (Hodges and Haydu 2006).
Landscape work is labor-intensive, and employee compensation and benefits
represent a significant cost for business owners. Some of the problematic issues faced
by landscape workers include a lack of private health insurance, decreasing worker
protection standards regarding safety equipment and pesticide handling; while for
employers it is becoming increasingly difficult to find qualified employees. Anecdotal
accounts and reports indicate that a large share of employees in the landscaping sector
is undocumented, similar to what is reported for greenhouse and nursery crops workers.
In some firms that produce crops and run landscaping businesses, the same workers
may work in both activities. According to official data from the Florida Department of
Economic Opportunity, in 2011, there were nearly 66,000 jobs in specific landscape
service occupations, with a median hourly wage of $10.45 and ranging from $8.24 to
over $12.53. However, I am skeptical about the accuracy of these figures, which are
reported by employers and which exclude a variety of individual contractors and self
employed individuals that are not required to report employment and payroll to the
government.
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Retail Sales
In terms of sales the second largest segment of the Florida Green Industry is retail
sales. In 2010, this segment accounted for 38 percent of total sale generated by the
horticultural industry in the State of Florida. Total sales for 2010 were estimated at over
$1.4 billion sales and included the sale of plants, lawn garden supplies such as fertilizers
and chemicals, horticultural hard goods such as tools and equipment, and miscellaneous
other horticultural goods. For horticultural retailers the dominant market or end user was
homeowners, representing 51 percent of total sales, followed by commercial
establishments at 19 Percent, and apartments and condominiums at 10 Percent
(Hodges et al. 2010).
Garden centers are establishments primarily engaged in selling trees, shrubs, other
plants, seeds, bulbs, mulches, soil conditioners, fertilizers, pesticides, garden tools, and
other garden supplies to the general public. For the most part, these establishments sell
products purchased from producers, but may sell some plants they grow themselves.
The demand for floral crops is often seasonal, with Poinsettia plants sold mostly from
Thanksgiving to Christmas and cut flowers and foliage plants, popular throughout the
year as indoor home and workplace decorations (Hall et al 2005).
At the national level there has been considerable consolidation among large growers
in recent years, a condition occurring largely in response to consolidation occurring at
the retail level. The rise of large, nationwide plant retailers like home centers and mass
merchandisers has created a marketing opportunity for growers who can supply the
volume these customers require. Some greenhouse and nursery crop producers have
“expanded” their operations through acquisitions during the past decade, mainly to
service these big customers (Hall et al). In Florida, where there is slight evidence of
consolidation, my interviews with nursery operators and owners, revealed a common
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complaint that large retail stores make the rules of the trade and impose prices for
products, reducing the profitability for the nursery operations.
In 2010 the retail segment in Florida accounted for an estimated employment of
about 28,000 (Hodges et al. 2010). Reporting specific information about wages and
benefits for this sector presents difficulties that require more research. Stores like WalMart, Home Depot, or Lowes do not report specific working wages and benefits for
workers in their garden operations. In addition, although some of the big box retail
companies report sales of garden centers, it is extremely difficult to know exactly how
much of their plant merchandise is coming from Florida producers. A look at Home
Depot’s yearly sales reports, for example, does not report specific sales of garden
centers. 17 According to Professor Alan W. Hodges from the University of Florida’s IFAS,
The largest retailers of nursery and garden products are the home improvement
chain stores, such as Home Depot and Lowes, along with the national full line
retailers like Wal Mart, K Mart, and Target. Although these companies do not release
sales data for specific merchandise lines, I happen to know that the garden
department represents about 25% of total sales for Home Depot. It is probably a
lower percentage for the other large retailers.
It has by now become clear to many, that the growth of big box retail stores has been
a double-edged sword for producers. During my interviews, owners often complained
about the “bullying power” of these retailers. As one owner told us, “it is the big box
stores that set the price of a lot our products; they tell us how much they want and how
much they are willing to pay for it.” The current president of the state FNGLA
acknowledges this paradox by explaining how “the big box stores have also created new
opportunities and markets for nurseries to sell their products.” He also acknowledges
that dealing with the box stores may be difficult, especially for operations that are set up
to sell a large part of their inventory directly to stores or through re-wholesalers.
17

Supermarkets and large “big box” stores are not included in this list because they are not
exclusively classified in financial documents and other literature as retail garden centers
according to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
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Input and Service Suppliers
Input supply firms are businesses that provide various inputs for nursery crops and
floriculture production, landscape services, and retail sales. Such inputs include
agrichemicals, fertilizers, containers, packaging, farm machinery, tools and equipment,
and propagative materials such as cuttings, liners, plug seedlings, pre-finished plants, or
tissue cultured plantlets, and unfinished plants sold to other growers for further growing.
These propagative materials are often produced by nurseries, which explains the large
percentage of nursery sales to other nursery operations.
A review of publications containing specific information about suppliers of raw
materials for nursery production yields very few reports. The U/IFAS 2006 study
estimates the impacts that the nursery crops and greenhouse sectors have on the
purchases of supplies for production from allied vendors. The study estimates the total
inputs purchased (excluding labor) at $821 million. The largest expense item was for
plants and seeds ($292 million), which is most often purchased from other nursery
growers. In other words, over one-third of the input of goods into the nursery crops and
floriculture sectors of the Green Industry in Florida as measured by purchases comes
from the sale of plants and seeds mostly purchased from other growers. Other expenses
included $147 million in growing containers, $101 million in growing media, $82 million in
packaging materials, $81 million in fertilizer/lime, and $65 million in chemicals
(pesticides, growth regulators, etc.) (Hodges and Haydu 2006).
My interviews with greenhouse and nursery crops operators (managers/owners)
revealed that most of the suppliers of raw materials and machinery are local firms.
However, some of the suppliers of containers, fertilizers and other chemicals are
national and multinational companies.
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Table 3. Purchases of Supplies by the Nursery and Greenhouse Sector in Florida, 2005
___________________________________

Source: Hodges and Haydu 2006.

Transportation and Distribution
Figures about transportation in the industry are not available in reports or surveys
and the reader will not find a box for it in Figure 6. I include what is known about
transportation because it is logically critical for getting product to market and appears to
represent a bottleneck in the supply chain for many producers. It is speculated that large
producers have developed in-house, large-volume delivery systems in order to service
big-box retailers. But, even for these large producers, cross-country shipments are
difficult because of the long time that plants are in trucks, and the extreme handling that
takes place in many small orders (Hall et al 2005). My interviews with operators reveal
an un-concentrated and unstructured transportation system for getting plants to
consumers in Florida. In some cases, large nurseries are able to afford a fleet of trucks
which facilitates product delivery – mostly within the state. Some of the operators I
interviewed run small nurseries and often depend on brokers or buyers to transport the
plants that they sell. According to one mid-sized nursery owner’s account:
having a truck may often make the difference of whether you make a big sale or not.
If you have the product the buyer wants, but no transportation, you may need to cut
your profits in order to make the sale, since the buyer will have to pay for
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transportation or send his own driver. Companies with trucks are thus, better poised
to negotiate with buyers, since they can include transportation in the final price.
End Users
End User is the name given to final buyers and consumers of nursery crops and
floriculture products. The list of end users generally includes airports, cemeteries,
churches, commercial general business areas, golf courses and driving ranges,
homeowners, municipalities, private recreation areas, public state and county roadways,
schools and universities, and utilities (Hall et. al 2005).
Among these end users an important source of revenue for the industry comes from
the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT), which has a highway beautification
project that relies heavily on products and services from nurseries and landscape firms
in the state. By law the Florida DOT allocates at least 1.5% of the budget of any
construction/remodeling of any highway project for esthetic improvements. According to
the state FNGLA president, this law was the initiative of the FNGLA and was intended
not only to expand the market for nursery producers and landscapers – which must
provide continued services to projects – but to improve the quality of tourism as
highways and important roads become scenic and colorful routes. This type of indirect
subsidy via public funding has a secondary impact on greenhouse and nursery crop
producers. Contracts go to landscape services, developers and contractors who in turn
buy plants because plants are not necessarily purchased directly from nursery
operations by the DOT.
Research and Extension Services
Extension research and services play a crucial role in the dissemination of
information to plant nursery producers. My interview with Miami-Dade County’s
commercial horticulture extension officer revealed that Extension links nursery operators
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to industry professionals in a variety of areas such as pest control, environmental and
trade regulation, as well as government programs or industry initiatives. Extension
services are available in all 67 Florida Counties, and managed by cooperation between
UF/IFAS with County and State governments. Funding for extension programs comes
from the counties and the state (Appendix C lists all the extension office locations and
contact information in the State of Florida).
Professional Organizations
As I mentioned in the previous section, despite a highly un-concentrated and
fragmented industry structure, entrepreneurs of the plant nursery and landscape industry
are well organized and represented in the state and national political process. This
organization is highly related to the existence of a variety of organizations formed to
represent the interests of industry-wide operators in the political process. Florida’s most
important organization is the Florida Nursery Growers and Landscapers Association
(FNGLA). According to that organization’s president, they now have over 2000 members
and 7 divisions, 4 of which are growers of distinct crops, as well as landscapers, and
allied suppliers. The organization, based in Orlando also has a satellite office in
Tallahassee “to deal with the legislative and regulatory challenges and opportunities” 18
The FNGLA has an elaborate organizational structure with offices throughout the state,
and with a rotation system of local chapter presidents which are themselves nursery
operators. In addition, the Florida Farm Bureau also represents operators’ needs in
lobbying and public relations. The Farm Bureau is inclusive of all agricultural operations,
and often rallies behind the nursery industry for a variety of environmental, trade, and
labor regulations.

18

Interview with Mark Sadek, FNGLA president. November 2009.
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Discussion
By understanding the structure of the industry we can see how products move along
players of the industry and eventually make their way to end users. This is important
because there is a highly complex and seemingly fragmented system of selling and rewholesaling before plants make their way to final consumers. In addition, this broader
structural analysis demonstrates the interdependency of nursery/greenhouse firms with
the other sectors of the “green” industry. These players include wholesale nurseries,
field and container and greenhouse production, and sod growers, landscapers,
landscape architects and landscaping, maintenance firms, retail garden centers, home
centers and mass merchandisers with lawn and garden departments, as well as
marketing intermediaries such as brokers, horticultural distribution centers, and rewholesalers (Hall, Hodges and Haydu 2005).
To fully appreciate the commodity chain and find potential pressure points within the
plant nursery industry I believe it is essential to understand the place of nursery and
greenhouse producers within the “Green Industry” (an appellation promoted by the
professional business associations to denote nurseries and interdependent businesses).
Nursery and floriculture production, which when taken together are usually classified as
environmental horticulture within the Green Industry, are the focus of this dissertation
because this is where the employers and workers of concern to me are concentrated.
They are two sectors of a complexly inter-reliant structure of the Green Industry, which
although they may produce some food crops (like herbs and vegetables for home
gardens) are distinct from the larger agricultural industry that in Florida includes for
example tomatoes, sugar cane and citrus. Besides nurseries, other important sectors of
the Green Industry typically included in industry analyses include retail (like garden
centers and big box stores), landscaping (from large commercial to small residential
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firms), wholesalers and re-wholesalers and brokers, and a variety of suppliers of seeds
and raw materials for the production and installation of Green Industry products.
As this section on the Florida “Green Industry” highlights, crops tend to be highly
varied and location greatly matters. For example, only in the far north of the state do
Christmas trees tend to be produced, while in the central parts of Florida where ambient
temperatures may drop to freezing part of the year there is a concentration of production
in greenhouses, and In the far sub-tropical south one finds perhaps the greatest variety
of crops because the climate allows more outdoor production while greenhouses are still
used.
Many nurseries are involved in various other sectors of the Green Industry in addition
to plant production. Some, for example, are also landscapers, many do direct retail
sales, others are also wholesalers, many garden centers maintain greenhouse and/or
field production, and some growers become suppliers particularly of seeds, liners
(seedling plants) and cuttings. My interviews with producers also revealed an
unconsolidated and unstructured transportation system. I draw attention to this issue
since transportation emerges as a major bottle-neck for the majority of producers and
demonstrates another way that the industry is largely unconsolidated. Figures about
transportation in the industry are not available in reports or surveys. It is claimed by
some of my interviewees that large producers have developed in-house, large-volume
delivery systems in order to service big box retailers. But even for these large producers,
cross-country shipments are difficult. Indeed, as one owner explained, “having a truck
may make the difference of whether you make a big sale or not.” Thus, the issue of
transportation often puts smaller firms at a disadvantage while often poising others in
better position to sell and market their products. This is also important, because those
truck drivers do not belong to trucking companies, but rather tend to be on the payroll of
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nurseries and adding the number of potential workers reachable in an organizing
campaign.
In the past decade some nursery firms have expanded their operations at the
national level through acquisitions of other nurseries mainly to service these big
customers. In Florida I found only allusions to a consolidation trend among nurseries in
reports and interviews. According to the president of the Miami-Dade County FNGLA
chapter, occasionally larger nursery operations have attempted to purchase other plant
producers and gain a larger share of the market; however, he maintains that this does
not represent the norm.
In terms of the relationship between growers and retailers, I did find a common
complaint that large retail stores make the rules of the trade by imposing prices for
products and reducing the profitability for nursery businesses. No data or estimates exist
in the public domain about the value or volume of Florida nursery sales by retailers such
as Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Lowes, or supermarket chains such as Publix and Winn
Dixie. Certainly, these companies have taken a large portion of the retail sector which
was traditionally in the hands of independent garden centers; yet, numbers are not
available anywhere and it is difficult to quantify their real importance to the plant nursery
industry. A thorough economic impact study could potentially reveal the importance of
these operations within the industry and their strategic role for a campaign to improve
working conditions and workers’ rights.
My analysis also found important sources of government subsidies and protection.
First, the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) has a highway beautification
program that relies heavily on products and services from state nursery and landscape
firms. By law the FDOT allocates at least 1.5% of its annual budget to esthetic
improvements to highway construction and remodeling. The FNGLA takes credit for
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lobbying for this law and claims it is intended to expand the market for nursery producers
and landscapers, which also provide ongoing services to completed projects, and to
improve the quality of tourism by making highways and important roads scenic and
colorful routes.
Second, plant nursery and greenhouse production are highly protected from
international competition through a set of plant health (phytosanitary) restrictions. These
measures prohibit the importation of any potted plant or soil into the U.S., and have been
enacted to prevent the introduction and spread of foreign organisms and pests into
domestic or native crops. These measures have important implications for plant nursery
production in the State of Florida because: Unlike industries that can be transplanted to
foreign countries in search of lower wages, weakened environmental restrictions, or
feeble labor laws, nursery and greenhouse production has shown no signs of “withering
away” because of outsourcing as has happened in a variety of other food, agricultural,
and manufacturing industries in recent decades. For cut flowers and ferns (which are
traded without roots) and for some species of orchids (which may be transported in
sterile flasks) some phytosanitary exemptions do apply. This makes these industry
sectors somewhat vulnerable to international competition and to any external pressure
that may increase labor costs. In chapter five, I describe in detail the relationship
between industry professionals, owners, and scientists and their discourses regarding
regulation.
The plant nursery industry relies heavily on a labor intensive, immigrant labor force. It
has become clear to me, through employer interviews as well as through the documents
and opinions of industry organizations that a significant number of industry workers are
undocumented and not legally permitted to work in the country. This has important
ramifications for both the labor force and for employers, since: (1) for undocumented
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plant nursery and greenhouse workers, being undocumented constitutes a real fear of
arrest and deportation, as well as increased vulnerability to harassment and exploitation
at the hand of unscrupulous employers; (2) the undocumented status of many industry
workers often decreases willingness and ability to organize, particularly since many
workers are unaware or unfamiliar with U.S. models of organizing. Those who have a
greater knowledge of U.S. organizing purpose and strategy are often afraid that their
migratory status can represent an obstacle to joining such groups; and, (3) for
employers, the undocumented status of much of the industry’s labor force represents a
precondition to breaking immigration laws through hiring undocumented workers in order
to maintain a steady supply of labor. This is the theme of chapter 6, where I use data
from worker and employer interviews to better understand the interactions of producers
and workers in the industry.
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V. DEREGULATION IN FLORIDA’S PLANT NURSERY PRODUCTION
On a warm Florida morning I had the opportunity to meet Mr. Craig Meyer, a Florida
fernery entrepreneur who has had a successful business in Pierson since the mid1980s. Mr. Meyer comes from a family with a long history of agricultural
entrepreneurship, and as he implicitly described it, has witnessed major changes in the
agricultural industry in the State of Florida. Some of the changes that this entrepreneur
often referred to were related to specific models of production that have withered in the
state because of international competition. As he explained, “there used to be a lot of
gladiolas grown in the state of Florida, but almost all those farms are closed down now,
and that's because of foreign flowers coming' in to the U.S. There used to be a lot of
flower farms scattered all across the United States, and pretty much they've been all...
um... put out of business by South American flowers.” Unlike ornamental plants
produced in the State of Florida, cut flowers and cut ferns do not fit within agricultural
quarantine regulations for U.S. imports because having been cut, they do not require soil
for sustenance. The town of Pierson prides itself as the “fern capital of the World” and for
Mr. Meyer and other fernery owners in the area, international competition has had a
powerful detrimental impact on their industry. This has forced fernery operators to
develop new business strategies and marketing channels to maintain the industry amidst
a growing demand for internationally grown, less expensive ferns in the United States.
There is, however, another side to the story of fern production in the State of Florida
where plant nursery production remains an important staple of the state's economic
landscape. This industry creates revenue for state coffers through taxation, provides
local entrepreneurs an opportunity to profit from the existing infrastructure, and creates
jobs for thousands of administrative and low-wage agricultural workers. Because the
production of ornamental plants is protected by agricultural regulations that prohibit the
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import of potted plants and soil, plant nursery production in the state of Florida might be
seen as a process that is removed from the growing interconnectedness of the
transnational economies of today. But can this industry be considered truly local? And if
so, how has it been able to resist global trends, and what are the major implications –
real life and theoretical – that emerge from this seemingly localized island of antiglobalization?
In this chapter I explore the conditions that have contributed to the localized nature of
plant nursery production in the United States in terms of production, distribution,
consumption, and operation, despite increasing global trends to produce commodities
where they are deemed more efficient and less expensive to produce. To this end I
discuss my interviews with 20 professionals from Florida’s plant nursery industry,
including nursery managers and owners, high-ranking members of business groups and
associations, and plant health regulators of the US Department of Agriculture (figure 7
shows the professional elite of the plant Florida plant nursery industry from which my
sample of informants was selected). Whenever possible, I focus on the relationships that
are forged between these three important sets of actors and conceptualize these
relationships within a framework of discourses and professional practices that revolve
around land production, market participation, economic development, and agricultural
regulation. I begin the discussion with an analysis of the role that regulation plays on the
attitudes and practices of industry professionals in a variety of local contexts, including
an analysis of the role of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations in agriculture in
protecting the industry from international competition. I also analyze the values and
discourses of plant nursery elites and the social interactions taking place between them
to better understand their respective roles in strengthening their economic advantage for
the survival of the industry.
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Figure 7. Configuration of Florida’s Plant Nursery Industry Elite

A Maze of Regulation
When I first started conceptualizing this dissertation, I knew that agricultural trade
regulation would play a key role in the framing of some of my research questions as well
as my data analysis and subsequent discussion. But as I exited the field and began to
re-conceptualize and analyze some of my original premises, I began to notice that a
broader pattern of regulatory discourses had begun to emerge. In my interviews with
industry elites, themes regarding competition with irregular or unregistered firms,
interstate and international trade, scientific justifications for regulation, and the status of
undocumented migrant workers who tend to dominate the labor force of this industry
often emerged. These themes became important for my analysis because they helped
me understand that the regulatory processes that support local production are not the
only ones of concern to industry elites. This body of regulation is extensive and often
arbitrary, as industry elites often take contradictory positions in favor of or opposition to a
variety of regulatory practices. Still, they are an important aspect of the structure of the
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industry and shed light on the ways that values and discourses impact the institutional
practices of industry actors. To this end, I discuss some of my findings in these four
critical areas, before delving deeper into the processes which, I argue, create and
maintain the conditions for the continued local nature and success of the plant nursery
industry in the United States and particularly in the state of Florida.
Competition
The longevity of the operations provides ample proof of the stability of the industry at
the state level. Within my sample of operators, the median number of years worked in
the industry was 26, with most producers’ years of experience ranging from 12 to 35,
with a single exception of a new entrepreneur with two years of experience. Most of the
producers in my sample run small- to medium-sized operations ranging from two to six
acres and employing anywhere from one to 25 fieldworkers. However, two of the
operators interviewed managed large cooperatives which include up to six operations of
up to 60 acres and up to 150 employees.
As in most business environments, competition among plant nursery producers is
fierce and plays an important role in the conceptualization of the industry according to
most producers. This should not come as a surprise in a business environment of any
magnitude; however, the tone of the discourse of competitiveness among producers in
Florida Nurseries is significant because it quite often gravitates around the issue of
regulation, particularly that of firms and business practices. In my sample, operators
often complained about the costs of production and profit margins as these seem to
have a direct relation to the existence of small irregular operations that arguably bring
down product prices in the marketplace.
Many industry operators in my sample argued that competition from irregular firms
depresses the price of their products and makes it difficult to compete in the
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marketplace. Essentially, operators argue that irregular firms are able to bring down
plant prices because they are saving a lot of money on the taxes, permits, and insurance
costs that they avoid. George Gonzalez, a small farm operator in Miami Dade County
told me that enforcement is one area where legitimate operators need some help. As he
put it, “We need people to target these small backyard operations that are not doing
things according to standard practice and don’t have licenses and permits, and either
make them comply or put them out of business.” According to some of the operators,
only a handful of code inspectors exist and they are thinly stretched investigating
complaints and other kinds of violations.
To this end, Peter Smith, a 25 year veteran of the industry who owns a small
operation in Miami Dade County explained to me that a lot of nurseries in the area lack
insurance and are thus able to save a lot money that otherwise would need to be
compensated through plant sales. Mr. Smith who has two full time, year round
agricultural workers on his 5 acre farm described these irregular firms as “mom and pop
operations where their kids come home from school and do all the weeding;” adding that
having to pay over 20,000 dollars a year in insurance makes it very difficult to compete
against them, “this is an industry where you can get your inventory for free if you go out
and pick seeds and plant them and low cost competition is really big because it lowers
everybody’s prices.” Similarly, Neil Rogers a business owner of 12 years who runs his
operation on a 60 acre land complained about competition from irregular operations that
do not follow procedures such as being licensed or insured, and thus avoid paying all the
required permitting fees. This was particularly important for Mr. Rogers who employs
anywhere from 12 to 15 workers a year and spends a considerable amount of money on
worker compensation insurance.
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Lee Stan, a farm owner who has been in business for over two decades and at the
time of our interview presided over the local Miami Dade chapter of the Florida Nursery
Growers and Landscapers Association (FNGLA) argued in favor of a more normative
system based on honor or value-enforceable practices around which producers could
“unite” to maintain prices controlled. This prescription seems difficult in a competitive
environment plagued by mistrust and jealousy. For instance, on several occasions I met
with Jim Paterson, a recent nursery entrepreneur, to discuss a variety of issues
regarding the industry. At the time I conducted the research Jim had been in operation
for close to two years. Thus, he offered a prime view of some of the issues associated
with nursery farming operations since he was beginning to navigate through the legal,
political, labor, marketing, and technical requirements associated with the operation of
his new business. On one occasion Jim explained that getting information from his
neighbors was quite difficult, since these did not want to disclose prices, sources, or any
information which could place them in a competitive disadvantage. This view was
supported by many operators of the industry who often told me that their neighbors were
jealous or cautious in regards to giving out information. In this sense, Jim’s experience
helps to illustrate the difficulty that operators like Lee Stan would have in producing a
strong consensus that would maintain prices steady through an value-based normative
or honor based system.
Regulation of the labor force
In an interview with Mark Sadek, CEO of the FNGLA, Mr. Sadek told me about his
belief that “the reason why there are so many illegal workers in the country is because
there really isn’t a legal way to come in and work.” The spectrum of regulation in the
discourse of plant nursery elites was evident in their preoccupation with immigration and
labor. Nursery farm production is labor intensive and depends on a large contingency of

126

immigrant and low-wage workers. A large percent of the Florida farm worker population
is immigrant and overwhelmingly undocumented. According to Mark Sadek, the need for
an immigrant labor force responds to “Americans’ unavailability or unwillingness to work
in such a labor intensive environment, even when there is 10, 11, 12 percent
unemployment.” In the view of this professional and many other operators, the problem
of undocumented workers lies in the policy itself, since having regularized workers would
eliminate some of the problems associated with the status of workers and their control or
regulation.
This theme constantly resonated with operators and industry elites, many of whom
show distress in regards to some of the regulatory policies being established by the
federal government to deter the hiring of undocumented workers. The Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) established a verification
system to ensure that the information given by new hires matched the records of the
Social Security Administration and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
(USCIS). This program later evolved into the E-Verify program which is administered by
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in conjunction with USCIS, Verification
Division, and the Social Security Administration. The system’s application throughout the
country is rather inconsistent, since some states and industries mandate its use, while
others require voluntary participation by employers. However, for many in the nursery
plant business, the program creates levels of enforcement that adversely affect the
functioning of the industry. As Mr. Sadek explained to me, “Growers and businesses
don’t want to be penalized or fined. They don’t want to be turned into police officials to
determine whether documents are legitimate, which the law says right now, that
documents must, on their face, appear to be genuine and related to the person who’s
applying.”
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Other operators disclosed that the verification system only implicitly makes them
accomplices of workers with fake documents, as they are constantly telling those
workers that come up as non-matching to get a new Social Security or residency card.
As one operator told me,
Every year the government sends a list of no-good social security numbers, and
every year I have to go to my guys, who have been working here for more than five
years, to tell them that you can’t work here anymore, you haven’t got a good social
security number, goodbye, or give me another social security number, that one’s no
good. That has become my responsibility: to get a good social security number. And
I do it every year. As far as I know, it should not be my responsibility to check, it
should be the government’s.
This operator’s statement is representative of the opinions of other employers that I
spoke with. All of the operators I interviewed were aware that a great deal of their
employees are undocumented, and many explicitly confirmed that they look the other
way or ask for new sets of documents when their names come up on the verification
systems.
For Mr. Sadek, as for many industry operators, the only real solution would be to
enact comprehensive immigration reform that provided a legal mechanism for hiring the
immigrant workers they need. Specially, since current policies, they argue, only penalize
operators who are trying to run successful business operations:
Growers don’t want to have the specter of the federal government officials coming in
and raiding their business operations, you know, penalizing them fines. And
penalizing fines is one thing, but taking in workers in whom you’ve invested time and
resources so that they’re trained, you know, and their doing jobs that need to be
done, that’s the worse penalty. And the workers don’t want to have the specter of
federal officials hanging around. So for all those reasons, there needs to be some
comprehensive reform to the immigration laws.
I probed Mr. Sadek in this regard, asking if having a comprehensive immigration
reform could potentially affect employers because they would then be required to pay
higher wages and provide benefits to certain workers who currently do not have them.
Mr. Sadek acknowledged my point and added that after IRCA, many agricultural workers
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left to other industries after they became legal; however, he argued that nursery work is
already better remunerated than other forms of low wage work , which should suffice to
maintain workers in the industry.
Most operators oppose the U.S. government’s current efforts to regulate the hiring of
undocumented workers, the employers advocate for a reform that would regularize the
status of millions of workers. This seems clear, because it would prevent operators from
having to enforce immigration laws themselves, and from having to operate with the
feeling that the U.S. government is breathing down their necks. Supporting this scenario
is of particular interest, since most elite actors feel that it is the government that should
implement and enforce regulations to deal with the issues of immigration. Ironically, in
this area industry elites advocate for larger federal involvement and policies that would
free them from localized, fragmented, and semi-privatized ways of dealing with the
situation of hiring undocumented workers that are in place today.
Agricultural trade regulation
From a regulatory standpoint, agricultural trade is one of the most important areas of
concern for employers in the plant nursery industry. Agricultural regulations are said to
have been enacted to protect local environments from exotic and invasive plant and
animal species by restricting the types and amounts of live species (plant and animal)
that can come into the country. These regulations are known as Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) restrictions and have been used by a growing group of nations in
conjunction with the establishment of a variety of global free trade agreements. SPS
measures are intended to protect living beings such as humans, animals, and plants,
from the dissemination of foreign, invasive, or exotic pests or disease that may come
into a country through the import of agricultural goods (Burnquist, Barrs, Miranda, and
Filho 2004). These measures have been sought to facilitate production and exchange,
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reduce transaction costs, and improve the quality of products; however, a variety of
conflicts arise between domestic regulations and international trade policies, as the
protective measures are often said to restrain international competition (Burnquist et al.
2004).
International SPS agreements are dictated by the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and emerged after a large number of trade disputes between developed and developing
countries. Many disagreements could not be resolved under the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) Standards Code or through the existing dispute settlement
process. Such disagreements often emerge from conditions in the SPS agreement itself,
which asserts the rights of states to protect themselves from risks associated with SPS
conditions. The agreement gives nation states ample room for interpreting what kind of
risks threaten their biological wellbeing when foreign live products come into their
borders, but distinguishes between protection and protectionism, which is defined as
trade regulations that go beyond reasonable protection from biological infestation or
disease. These measures, according to the Agreement, shall not discriminate against
trading partners of identical or similar quality conditions and cannot be maintained
without sufficient scientific evidence that ensures their adequate level of protection
(Burnquis et al. 2004).
These definitions, however, create contradictory implementations within the SPS
agreement since hardiness zones as well as pest or disease free-areas are mostly
determined by geographic conditions and not by political borders. Thus, they may be
part of a single or several countries which share common borders, dictating that “import
protocols should be based on a risk assessment that evaluates claims by exporting
countries that certain regions are free of quarantine diseases or pests, or that
prevalence of quarantine pests and diseases is low” (Burnquist et al 2004:168). It is still
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left to the importing country to decide which geographical areas and products are
considered safe for import into the country; but, as developing nations often argue, this
creates uneven and artificial market conditions, since powerful nations are still able to
mandate which products may enter their territory for sale and distribution.
To illustrate this imbalance in the trade policy, we could look at the way in which
plants grown along the southern part of the U.S.-Mexico border could safely be sold,
traded, and grown in the northern side of that border because political demarcation does
not interrupt the environmental conditions of that geographical area. Plant pests and
disease are contingent to those geographic regions and no form of geo-political
demarcation would be able to constrain their dissemination across international borders.
Yet, in the U.S. a well-organized system of regulation has been established, organized,
and enforced through a variety of governmental agencies such as the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the Division of Plant Industry (DPI), or the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA), and validated by the scientific, political and economic discourses
that are reproduced and maintained by employers, business elites, and scientists of the
industry as well.
As an example, we can look at the way in which these regulatory practices have
taken on a new meaning in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
which produced a discourse of "National Security" by political elites and in effect created
another layer of control and regulation in many activities surrounding agricultural trade.
Prior to the attacks of 9/11, the Plant Quarantine Act of 1912 banned any individual from
importing or bringing nursery stock into the U.S. or receiving any nursery stock moving
from a foreign country into or through the U.S. (Musgrave and Flynn-O’Brien 1988). The
act had several amendments, until 2000, when The Plant Protection Act (PPA) was
established as part of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act. This law consolidated all
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existing USDA plant health regulations into one inclusive law, including the authority to
regulate plants, plant products, certain biological control organisms, noxious weeds, and
plant pests (www.aphis.usda.gov 2000). Then, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
9/11, the Bush Administration placed portions of the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) under the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) in its efforts to increase federal protection from terrorist threats.
Recent changes in policy and control were described to me by Paul Roth, Director of
the Division of Plant Industry (DPI) in the state of Florida, who describes his organization
as the plant protection and quarantine arm of the Florida Department of Agriculture, and
which “was established to protect the state’s native and commercially grown plants, as
well as the honeybee industry, from injurious pests and disease.” According to Mr. Roth,
“Customs and border-protection, which is a branch of Homeland Security, now do all the
agricultural quarantine inspection on incoming cargo, and incoming passengers.” Before
9/11 the department of agriculture enforced the agricultural quarantine regulation at
ports of entry, but their focus after 9/11 was terrorism and drug interdiction;
consequently, as Mr. Roth explains, agricultural pest and disease concerns became a
distant third. This sentiment resonated with some of the operators and regulators in the
industry who feel that the USDA should be in control of the agricultural regulation. For
Daniel Richardson, a 40 year veteran of the industry, the move of agricultural regulation
to DHS is problematic because the larger law enforcement agency “does not necessarily
have expertise in identifying pests and diseases on plants.” In this operator’s view, the
move is political and overextends the role of government on business activity. Similarly,
Lee Stan, the former chapter president of the Miami-Dade FNGLA expressed that the
DHS should “go after the stuff that they need to go after to keep our country safe and let
USDA go after the pests and diseases to keep American agriculture safe.”
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The discourses of industry elites in regards to the enforcement of SPS regulation
again serves to demonstrate the ambiguity embedded in the regulatory views of industry
elites. Clearly, industry actors are not dissatisfied with the federal government’s
enforcement of the policy, but with having the DHS as the enforcement body of the
regulation. In addition, the permanence and enforcement of the law at the federal level
allows producers the peace of mind that they will not have to negotiate with fragmented
or contradictory state systems to enforce the regulation. This also demonstrates the
degree to which SPS regulation responds to larger sociopolitical conditions, since SPS
regulations provide an ideal competitive advantage to plant nursery producers in the
U.S., and more specifically to those in U.S. states which share hardiness and ecological
zones with developing countries, which would be more at risk of losing their production
to nearby foreign regions.
The conditions that facilitate the creation and enforcement of SPS regulations are
thus socio-cultural and political, as they respond to a combination of political challenges
and the socio-cultural processes established to mitigate their impact. But how have
these geo-political agreements been able to withstand global trends toward trade
liberalization? And more specifically, how have they been able resist the move toward
outsourcing production to peripheral and semi-peripheral centers where labor and
environmental costs are cheaper, as well as the complaints of developing countries who
feel that the use of SPS regulations in the U.S. undermines the free trade agreements in
which they have entered?
The Science and Values of Regulation
Industry producers and scientists overwhelmingly support the existence of regulation
that protects the industry and the Florida ecology from risks associated with the import of
plants and foliage from international sites of production. While many plant nursery
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operators acknowledge the role that the Plant Protection Act plays in the survival and
economic success of the industry, for industry scientists, regulation is justified from what
to them represents a scientific and means tested approach. Despite the fact that there
are several layers of regulation, which range from local issues to state and international
trade and political conditions, for the most part, elite actors advocate for an environment
of strict regulation as a means of maintaining the economic and environmental health of
the industry. In the discourse and attitudes of operators, scientists and business elites,
these justifications correspond to the language on the SPS agreements which advocate
for a scientific justification for the policies established in trade protocols.
For operators like Peter Smith, SPS regulations make sense for industry survival. As
he explained, “right now we are protected as far as NAFTA goes because soil is not
allowed to be brought into the United States. If and when soil comes into the United
States we would… you know there’d be plants coming from South America and we just
won’t be able to compete at all.” Operator Jim Scott, emphatically agreed: “[I do] not
want to see soil come in, and not for the economic issue alone, but for the fact that it will
literally wipe out our industry”. These owners’ conceptualization of the need and value of
SPS regulations is twofold. First, both operators acknowledge the economic implications
that having a regulation of imports entails to the economic success of the industry;
however, Mr. Scott’s perspective also highlights the ecological implications associated
with the impact that foreign pests and organisms would have on the health of plant life in
the state, basically arguing that plant life could be decimated by the entrance of invasive
plants or of pests and pathogens that could destroy the plant varieties that keep the
industry alive.
In a conversation about regulation, Mr. Scott further explained his perspective about
SPS restrictions as follows:
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Jim: there is something called quarantine 37. Are you familiar with it?
Alejandro: uh, somewhat….
Jim: ok, quarantine 37 prohibits material coming from offshore that has any native
soil; prohibits material larger than 24 inches; it can come here with roots but it
cannot be larger than 24 inches; if it’s larger than 24 inches, it cannot have any
roots and it cannot have any foliage.
Alejandro: so, they should be cut already.
Jim: correct, so that’s how is typically done. The reason for the quarantine 37 is very
simple, I don’t know the exact numbers, but the numbers are pretty extensive;
see, the number of pests that come into this country from foreign countries is
massive and most of them are coming through the port of Miami, because that’s
where the bulk of cut flowers are coming through. So it was a conscious
decision to try and limit the number of incoming pests, and that, for the most
part has done its job.
For this owner, the relationship between regulation at the ports and the contention of
foreign pests and organisms is clear. However as he later admitted, some pests come in
to the state “more than likely through hurricanes or debris that happen to blow in, I mean
this is more of rarity, but, you know, bugs do get in.” In this sense, Mr. Scott’s
understanding of the regulatory conditions conveys an admission that the expansion of
pests across geographical areas is affected by larger environmental factors such as
winds, hurricanes, and sea currents; and, thus, concedes that using and enforcing SPS
regulations is a conscious decision only to limit the number of pests already coming in
through trade of cut foliage or fruits.
In this sense, regulation not only has an economic value in terms of protectionism,
but also because for producers, lax restrictions could mean an increase in the costs
associated with pest control at the farm sites themselves. As Mr. Scott explained, “if you
see the number of additional pests that we are having to spray, you know all we are
doing is spraying every day and you don’t want to necessarily do that.” This statement
demonstrates yet another layer of consideration in regards to the liberalization of market
activity, since for this operator having plant imports and the pathogens that they may
bring in with them would also signify an increase in time and materials required for pest
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control. This point, although economic in nature, also fits with the conditions that allow
nation-states to decide the level of enforcement within the international SPS
agreements. In addition, this also raises the question of who shall be left with the tasks
and costs associated with increased fumigation, as control of pests and insects outside
nurseries and farms could result in increased costs for the regulatory agencies at the
state level as well.
Scientists and industry regulators are also well aware of issues surrounding
regulation. However, unlike the owners, the regulators more directly emphasize the role
of science as the mechanism through which SPS regulation is informed while
downplaying the role of political arrangements in the decision making process of trade
regulation. Paul Roth, the director of the Florida Department of Plant Industry (DPI),
explained how trade regulation is primarily a federal requirement, “The way the federal
government sets their standards is based upon sound science or risk, but it all comes
down to justification, and scientific validity has to back up what you're doing.” Similarly,
Troy Miller, Florida director of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS),
explained that scientists in charge of regulation make their decisions on sound science
and previous empirical experience of what has worked before. Mr. Miller, however, was
more open about the problematic nature of regulating from a scientific stance amidst a
political establishment. Mr. Miller’s agency is responsible for the protection and
promotion of U.S. agricultural health, regulation of genetically engineered organisms, the
administration of the Animal Welfare Act and other broad wildlife damage management
activities. As the state’s main regulator, Mr. Miller explained that although states cannot
go above and beyond federal requirements, regulatory decisions need to be inclusive
and hear from the other producing states and their industries, which, as he
acknowledges, lobby and pressure legislators on behalf of their interests.
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I probed Mr. Miller in this regard, and although he showed a clear understanding of
the multiplicity of layers involved in the decision making process, he continued to
emphasize science as the principal mechanism to institute regulation, while downplaying
the power of economic and political motives. Mr. Miller continued speaking about this
multiplicity of layers:
I can't really cite anything specific where the political winds have sort of guided or
changed what we wanted to do; that's not to say that that hasn't happened or there's
been a nudging of policy, but it's not a daily thing that we see you know. I don't know
everything that goes on behind the scenes obviously, but I mean the things that I've
been directly engaged in have been pretty solid with science, with regulatory
procedures, with history, so I really can't, can't say that we're unduly influenced by
the political whim, so to speak.
Mr. Miller admitted that there are political factions at play to promote regulation
through lobbying; however, his sentiment is that it is ultimately science that informs the
regulatory process. This was the view accepted by most of the industry elites with whom
I spoke during my fieldwork, and in this sense, the state elite actors seem fully aware of
the relationship between the political and geographic contradictions that the issues of
regulation present, but their answers tend to de-emphasize the process of socio-political
interaction and emphasize what they claim to be a scientific basis of regulation.
The scientific rationale was only sporadically challenged by the industry operators
that I interviewed. The topic, however, was the center of conversation in several
operators, including Daniel Richardson in Miami Dade County. Mr. Richardson has been
in the ornamental nursery business since 1970, and now leads a cooperative of
operations with other investors in over 250 acres of land across South Florida. In many
ways, Mr. Richardson fits a stereotypical philosophical and political conservative
businessman profile and is quite supportive of free trade –or at least trade that is
unrestricted by governmental institutions. Because of the size of his operation, Mr.
Richardson is well positioned to supply the Home Depot, Lowes, and other large garden
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center and plant retailers across the country. In addition, he is well versed on, and
critical of, international trade regulation of fauna and flora.
Mr. Richardson criticizes the way in which the federal government has stepped into
trade regulation based on science. The issue, he argues is that because of new
technologies scientists are finding new funguses and diseases on a regular basis and
thus facilitating the process for political actors to regulate products coming into the
country and even from state to state within the U.S. As he explained,
The government is actually controlling the free trade. Nowadays in order to ship, it
depends on what [U.S.] state the product is going to. You a need snail certificate to
ship to some states, you need a phytosanitary certificate to ship to California, you
can’t send Queen Palm trees to Texas because lethal yellowing disease wiped out
all our coconuts. This is ridiculous, Texas had Queen Palms on their list and I was
livid about it, so I got ahold of the director of the Department of AG in Texas and
explained to him that this palm tree does not get this [disease]. They were restricting
free trade and, you know, they took it off.
Mr. Richardson also told me about his suspicion that the whole Queen Palm incident
in Texas was the result of Senator Lloyd Bentsen who owned large tree operations in
Texas and did not want out of state products there to compete; as a result, Richardson
argued, the politician used his power to justify regulation based on misconstrued
scientific foundations.
Jeff Brown, chief of the Bureau of Plant and Apiary Inspection (BPAI) also brought up
the issue of trade regulation. BPAI can be described as the inspection arm of the DPI
and is responsible for protecting Florida’s agricultural industry and the public from the
introduction and spread of serious plant and apiary pests through the enforcement of
Florida statutes and departmental rules pertaining to the movement of plants, plant
products, honey bees and beekeeping equipment. In sharp contrast with Mr.
Richardson, Mr. Brown believes that the industry is not sufficiently regulated and
explained to me that “new stuff [pathogens and pests] is coming in all the time, you got
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all this fruit fly issues, and we are finding new kinds of pests all the time, all coming in
from other countries. So what happens when it gets to Miami? It spreads. It happens all
the time.” When I probed about the opinions of certain farm operators who believe the
government is over regulating, Mr. Brown justified his line of work by expressing that
“Nobody likes rules and requirements, there is a lot of nurseries out there, that don't
want to follow the specific guidelines, and you know, our regulations are guidelines,
really basic. We are not here to over regulate, not even close.”
In my interviews with the state’s regulators, I often inquired about the seeming
arbitrariness that exists in the decision-making process, bringing up the notion that a
political line between Mexico and the U.S. could not fully justify the cutting point for risky
or healthy production of plants. At the end, for elite actors there exists a consensus that
the infrastructure, science, and quality of the industries in developing countries should
somehow account for the quality of their products as well. As DPI’s Paul Roth explained,
“there are some better developed nations that have very good phytosanitary systems.
The United Kingdom and Australia are at the top of the list, and New Zealand has a very
good program. You can contrast these with some of the poor African nations whose
department of agriculture would fit in this room; they just don't have the infrastructure.”
This scientist’s view seems to indicate a hierarchy of valuation embedded in what he
perceives to be the development of a nation and their ability to enforce a variety of SPS
codes. This again seemed arbitrary to me because it is the geography of an area that
contains a series of native pathogens; thus, moving products from the areas south of the
U.S. border into California or Texas, should not pose any real environmental threat. In
addition, the belief in scientific evidence should also indicate that a well developed
certified program abroad could account for good controls of the products coming into the
country.
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In an interview with Paul Roth, the State’s DPI chief, the issue of arbitrariness in
regulation emerged implicitly as he tried to further convey the idea that science and
empiricism should inform the process of regulation:
Well, again, an example is bringing in a new plant from offshore into the nursery
industry. The university has a group of scientists that look at invasiveness of plants,
and they say, well you don't wanna bring that in because it's potentially invasive.
Well, what does ‘potentially’ mean? You know, it might be invasive in Sri Lanka, but
it's not going to be invasive here because our climate is different or, or whatever. So
I, I get a little bit disturbed when people want to over regulate based upon the
unknown or because unknown potentials that could occur. I'd rather have some
sound scientific documentation. An example is biomass. Nowadays everybody wants
to bring in new plants to grow for energy. Well, Lykes Brothers, which is a big agro
business company, has been growing eucalyptus for about thirty years down around
Seabring [Florida] and they have fifteen thousand acres of it for forestry use and it's
not invasive, it's been there for thirty years and it's just not invasive. But, now they
want to add biofuel use to require a permit from my department. And the
environmentalists are saying, we don't want you to permit this because it's potentially
invasive. And I say, wait a minute now, they've had it for thirty years, and they've got
fifteen thousand acres and it's not invasive. So, you got to have real-world
experience versus other things and, and make a judgment call.
As a scientist and regulator, Mr. Roth seems well aware that even foliage that is exotic to
the state could be safely grown in local farms, as long as the evidence is there to
substantiate its safety. He further admits that regulating on grounds of “the unknown” 19 is
problematic because it can lead to overregulation of trade activity. However, most of the
regulation on imports from developing countries is based on this premise and ignores
the prescriptions of scientists and regulators toward protectionist policies that benefit
national growers. Most importantly, Mr. Roth’s statement presents a series of new actors
that contest the decisions and practices of the process of regulation. He acknowledges
the motives of university researchers and local environmentalists who advocate for
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Regulating based on the unknown refers to the practice of creating barriers to the trade of
plants and foliage with little or no evidence that they will be destructive to local ecosystems. This
premise is often used by developed nations to prohibit the import of foliage from developing
nations, arguing that the lack of evidence of the invasiveness of the plant is sufficient to prohibit
its importation.
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different courses of action, while criticizing them for what he understands to be a lack of
empirical experience.
This example further demonstrates the scientists’ view in regards to what they
consider to be proven science and experience to regulate imports. Mr. Roth was often
hesitant concerning the science of regulation and its political implications. He sometimes
stuttered or seemed anxious when I pointed to the arbitrariness of some of the
regulations, but his answers nonetheless justified the existence of regulation from a
scientific stance. As Jeff Brown, chief of the Bureau of Plant and Apiary Inspection
(BPAI) told me, “the idea is not to over regulate, but to ensure that scientific guidelines
are what inform the decisions that lead to regulation.” The scientists reinforced this view
even when talking about the influence of politics and economics on the regulatory
process and in turn legitimized the protection of the industry from international
competition through what they understand to be a strictly scientific point of view.
The discourse of regulation is central to the maintenance of the plant nursery
industry in the U.S. and in those states that benefit greatly from this type of agricultural
production. As my interviews with industry professionals indicate, while powerful industry
actors advocate for an environment of strict regulation as means to maintaining the
economic and environmental health of the industry, such justifications are based on a
discourse of science and what they consider proven empirical methodologies. In this
sense, industry elites do not have to justify the protection of the industry from a political
stance, since the scientific data justifies local production based on the protection of
native ecosystems, which should be kept protected from pests and invasive species
coming from abroad.
The scenario I have outlined in this section demonstrates a rather unified discourse
that shapes the professional practices of nursery operations and the power structure of
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the industry, as the goals of producers and regulators often coincide under a series of
values and norms about industry and environment. Through their discourse, the
scientists portray themselves as unaffected by political involvement in industry decisions,
which to them are dictated by scientific data. In this sense, the scientists promote an
atmosphere of regulation that prohibits international competition, stimulates a level of
economic protectionism, and aligns the values, economic goals, and professional
practices of producers under a rather homogenous code of regulation.
The questions of why and how Florida has remained one of the most important sites
of nursery plant production for the US market, despite the widespread neoliberal
economic restructuring of the last three decades that moved many similar industries out
of the country, hinges largely upon regulatory frameworks that are shaped by local
actors. Part of the problem in broad, structural globalization analyses lies in the
conceptualization of the regulatory process as one of exclusively geo-political or of
economic implications. Those macro level approaches, however, ignore the ground
conditions that encourage the resistance to specific neoliberal economic trends at
particular localities. Specifically, they disregard institutional arrangements which are
embedded in socio-cultural interactions and which unify social agency around a variety
of common norms, values, and goals.
Within this expanded framework, the structural implications of SPS regulation for the
plant nursery industry of the state Florida are multiple; specifically, since they affect and
are affected by a variety of actors within the industry’s institutional framework. For
scientists, regulators, producers, lobbyists, and even workers, the nature of regulation
takes on a variety of meanings, which, are justified and embedded within a variety of
discourses and result in very specific professional practices. In the following section, I
address those institutional arrangements, demonstrating how the discourse and
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interactions of the Industry’s elite shapes and legitimizes those macro-structural
arrangements that keep the industry local and protected from international competition.
Political Arrangements, Interest Groups and Resistance of Traditional Firms
Nursery plant production in the state of Florida is largely composed of small and
medium sized independent firms; and while some firms have grown to achieve large
operations in terms of land and value, these tend to remain independently owned.
During my research I found no evidence that publicly traded firms are parent companies
to smaller nurseries or groups of nurseries; in contrast, the structure of the industry is
complex, inter-reliant and without significant consolidation. In Florida, a relatively high
proportion of small and medium sized firms account for a significant share of industry
production and value with a diverse array of commodities and market channels
exacerbating the unconsolidated nature of the industry. This scenario often prevents a
variety of organizational efforts such as cooperatives and collective marketing strategies
(Hodges and Haydu 1992). This seemingly fragmented structure is a key element in the
institutionalization of industry policies, for it conceals the process through which such an
unconsolidated industry is able to resist global trends in production.
More importantly, the process of industrial permanence and success can be said to
respond to the embodiment of SPS regulations into quarantine 37, which is widely cited
by operators and regulators to explain the stability of the industry in the U.S. However,
the issue with quarantine 37 is that it responds to a variety of transnational polices,
enforcement bodies, and levels of operation that undermine many of its environmental
premises and which are adjusted politically to fit within the economic aspirations of those
who benefit from its enforcement. In this sense, the maintenance and ratification of
quarantine 37 responds to political actions at the state and federal level, which require a
large organization of sponsors and supporters to navigate the governmental
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policymaking process. As it has been demonstrated by a variety of observers, policy
making in the U.S. often responds to the pressures of large conglomerates through the
lobbying of public representatives. But nursery plant production in the state of Florida
does not fit such an institutional model, and thousands of small operators must find
strategies of resistance to participate and influence the political model instituted by
powerful industrial actors.
Despite its fragmented industry structure, entrepreneurs of the plant nursery and
landscape industry are well organized and represented in the state and national political
process through professional business associations such as the Florida Nursery,
Growers and Landscape Association (FNGLA), the American Nursery and Landscape
Association (ANLA), and the Florida Farm Bureau. The most significant of these
associations is the FNGLA, which according to its CEO, Mark Sadek “is the trade
association that represents Florida’s nursery and landscaping industry.” Founded in
1952, the FNGLA is based in Orlando with a satellite office in Tallahassee and deals
with “legislative and regulatory challenges and opportunities.” The FNGLA has more
than 2000 members distributed in 7 divisions, which include: the Allied Division, Citrus
Nursery Division, Foliage Division, Floriculture Division, Garden Center Division,
Landscape Division, and Woody Division. In addition, the organization has 16 regional
chapters, which provide a large presence throughout the state.
The presence and visibility of the FNGLA through the entire state of Florida is easily
perceived, as its set of divisions responds to what Mr. Sadek argues to be a wide range
of needs, including, “small business issues, tax issues, labor issues, land issues, water,
pests and diseases; everything from land use to the tax assessment of lands.” In
repeated occasions, my snowball samples led me to the organization and its local
chapters, as most operators and elite actors from my sample referred me to them as a
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valid source of information regarding nursery issues. The FNGLA amplifies its state
presence through the use of industry shows, educational events, annual conventions,
certifications, community programs, and research. These strategies are also key for the
development of networks and the formation of elite groups that are able to influence
policy on behalf of thousands of small operators. As Jim Paterson, the newest
entrepreneur within my sample told me,
There is a network through the FNGLA, there are people that are somewhat active in
the organization and I think to be a part of that and to be seen as part of this group
you know this family of nurseries I think helps, helps me to feel like I’m part of a subgroup within the nursery business and I feel like the big business, the more legitimate
business, I mean all the big successful people are members.
Like Jim, many other operators felt that the FNGLA provided them with information
and support necessary to succeed in the industry, even highlighting the role that the
organization plays at the political and regulatory levels. This was articulated by MiamiDade operator Daniel Richardson who told me that he was a member of the Farm
Bureau and FNGLA because of the power they have been able to achieve through
lobbying in Tallahassee.
Although Florida is the third largest nursery producing state in the country, after
California and Texas, the FNGLA is the largest national nursery and landscape
association. The FNGLA has a strong political center and a variety of programs
designed to influence policy and inform public opinion. This is done through the support
and establishment of a variety of blogs, policy papers, information hotlines, and member
newsletters; a Political Action Committee, which funds political candidates that are
sympathetic to the industry; and the Green Industry Coalition, which brings together a
group of representatives from a variety related groups, including the Florida Chapter of
the American Society of Landscape Architects, Florida Turfgrass Association, Florida
Landscape Maintenance Association, Florida Irrigation Society, Florida Sod Growers

145

Cooperative; Florida Golf Course Superintendents Association, and the Irrigation
Association.
At the political level, the FNGLA spends valuable resources in lobbying and
supporting candidates. A look at the organization’s website reveals that for the 2010
governor’s race, they supported both the Democratic and Republican Party candidates.
In terms of lobbying, Mr. Sadek indicated that they have opened up a permanent office
in Tallahassee and retained lobbyists up there for several years, particularly since “the
industry has matured and the stakes are high.” In addition, Mr. Sadek told me that the
FNGLA works as part of the AG coalition, which is composed by the “the lobbying
representatives of the various AG associations in Florida, some of the bigger companies
in Florida get together on a weekly basis, leading up to the legislative sessions each
year and during the legislative sessions.” This is important according to Mr. Sadek
because Nursery production presents different challenges and opportunities compared
to agriculture, and the nursery industry must “stand shoulder to shoulder” with this other
influential industry group,
In terms of state regulation and policy, the work of the FNGLA is often acknowledged
by its industry operators. Lee Stan argued that the FNGLA has been influential in areas
related to easing water restrictions for commercial nurseries, and restructuring harsh
crop insurance regulations which were hard to comply with because of excessive
demands and controls on nursery operations. But the role of the FNGLA does not stop at
the state borders. A look at Mr. Sadek’s personal blog reveals the extent and influence
that the organization has been looking to achieve at the federal level. The following is an
excerpt from Mr. Sadek’s blog in 2007:
It isn’t a stretch to say FNGLA is profoundly influencing the State of Florida and its
view of our industry. Yet, FNGLA’s political advocacy does not stop at the state
border. Just last month, FNGLA’s president Paul Polomsky, president-elect Dave
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Self and I were in Washington seeing and meeting with no less than 14 Members of
Florida’s congressional delegation -- including our two U.S. Senators: Bill Nelson and
Mel Martinez. The focus of our discussions was two-fold: (1) our nursery &
landscape industry’s compelling need for comprehensive immigration reform; and,
(2) our industry’s priorities for the every-five-year federal Farm Bill -- the operational
framework for all of USDA’s programs.
Traditionally, the Farm Bill focuses on: (1) crop subsidy payments for the big
Midwestern program crops; and, (2) the multi-billion dollar food stamp program. The
Farm Bill typically ignores so-called specialty crops -- nursery, fruits and vegetables.
Our industry proudly does not want any subsidies. Period. Yet, FNGLA does want to
see more attention paid to the threats posed by foreign pests and diseases, as well
as more research to address agricultural and landscape challenges. Research is a
very appropriate role of our federal government. With this squarely in mind, we met
last month in Washington with both the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Agriculture and the
Chief-of-Staff to the U.S. Secretary. FNGLA’s meetings were very productive in
positioning our industry’s issues as the Farm Bill debate begins.
What are FNGLA’s priorities for the Farm Bill? Topping the list is maintaining a
strong Quarantine-37 as our industry’s first line of defense against the introduction of
business-disrupting foreign pests and diseases. Another priority is USDA investing
dollars in research. In fact, the Bush Administration’s Farm Bill proposal has just
proposed investing $1 billion in specialty crop research. FNGLA is also pushing
resolution of several risk management issues: make nursery eligibility permanent for
two of USDA’s disaster assistance programs -- ECP debris clean-up and TAP
assistance for tree growers.
Mr. Sadek’s point of view is emphatic in that the industry is not seeking any type of
Federal Farm Bill aid. However, the CEO underscores the discourse of Homeland
Security enforcement of quarantine 37 to justify the continuation of the policy as a
mechanism of prevention to the introduction of pests and diseases that could adversely
affect it. In addition, Mr. Sadek, calls for a continued flow of cash for research conducive
to the strengthening of the regulatory policy and highlights his organization’s efforts to
include the nursery industry in a variety of disaster assistance programs that would
directly benefit industry producers. In his blog and other public comments, Mr. Sadek
explicitly brags about the industry’s economic value, and rationalizes it as an influential
point to lure policymakers into protecting the industry and its players.
With its multifaceted approach, which includes, research, networking, education,
community engagement, and a well delineated political agenda, the FNGLA has been
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able to position itself as a pervasive and imposing force within the state’s political
machinery. They have conveniently and successfully situated themselves as the unifying
mechanism for local producers to achieve collective goals in policymaking and
regulation. In part, they have achieved this by further aligning their values and
discourses about regulation with the professional practices of industry operators and
scientists under a message that encompasses proven science, economic prosperity, and
national security.
The FNGLA commands a faithful group of members that see in it a defense against
structural forces that endanger their economic survival. Several operators and industry
elites often expressed their concern for economic policies that respond to international
pressures, and in this sense they argue, the representation that the FNGLA provides is
essential in keeping the industry safe from policies that may weaken it or disintegrate it.
It is still to be seen how the industry is able to align such values, discourses, and
professional practices. In the following section I analyze the close relationships and
interactions that are forged between elite industry actors, emphasizing in the process
through which they have come to depend and rely on one and other for policymaking,
regulatory enforcement, and the industry’s own “institutional survival.”
Bonds of Dependency and the Formation of Regulatory Regimes
Most of the scientists and operators in my sample expressed great respect for the
process through which policy making in the industry takes place. Although they readily
admit to glitches on the system, they overwhelmingly think of the process as inclusive,
transparent and democratic. As I argued earlier in this chapter, scientists firmly believe
that their science and research gives the foundation for the enactment and enforcement
of policy and regulation. Similarly the operators and industry professionals I spoke with
trust that they, as the people that grow the goods, “know best” and that they have a
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voice in the policy making process through their professional and lobbying organizations.
But how is it that these actors are able to work together through the layers of local, state,
and federal regulation that span from labor and trade to environment and taxes? And are
the values of transparency and democracy expressed by industry elites to account for
this seemingly harmonious process of decision-making?
From my interviews with industry elites, I was able to observe that a strong and
stable regulatory regime has been cemented in the industry, as many of the industry’s
main regulatory and professional actors create strong bonds of dependency through a
series of social networks. From the local to the national levels and in a variety of areas of
concern, most industry elite actors participate in what could be described as a web of
networks of influence. The majority of operators and all of the higher ranking elite actors
whom I interviewed actively participate in a variety of formal boards and associations,
which directly and indirectly shape industry policy and regulation. In this way, elite actors
are able to command consensus and authority and facilitate the formation of a regulatory
regime that mostly serves the interests of the business class. Through this system,
Industry elites are able to disseminate information, convey resistance to policies enacted
from above, and to align their discourses under a unified code of professional practices.
To this extent, Mr. Sadek, the FNGLA CEO maintain that generally “there is a good ebb
and flow between growers and the inspectors and the regulators” in the industry, who
must work together in identifying things of quarantine significance.
As a part of their primary responsibilities as regulators, many industry scientists also
perform tasks associated with consulting and advising for political, educational, and
business interests. This takes place through a well-established system of chapters,
boards, meetings, and even internships, in which elite actors participate and remain
connected with other industry actors. For instance, Paul Roth, the state’s DPI director

149

explained that he represents the state in the National Plant Board, which is an umbrella
organization for state plant protection officials. Mr. Roth adds that this is the platform
where the principles of plant quarantine are adopted and become the “guiding
documents that all the states try to follow for consistency purposes.” In addition, other
scientists and professional elites cooperate in a variety of plant boards that are regional
while others spoke about specific state plant boards.
Because states can regulate their own industry as long as regulations do not surpass
federal policy, a process of decision making must also be established at the state level.
When I asked Mr. Brown at the BPAI about how this process is handled by the state’s
regulatory officials, he explained that as in a balancing act, he must cooperate with
entomologists, pathologists, and a support team to respond to changes being studied by
the USDA. This participation with other scientists keeps Mr. Brown informed and
connected to other industry insiders; however, as he and other industry regulators
explained, they often sit in boards of industry organizations that have non-scientific
objectives. Mr. Brown for instance, told me that he sits on the board of the Farm Bureau,
providing scientific support for legislative decisions and or issues that may emerge. The
BPAI director also told me that he sits on the Native Plant Board, and although he is not
a botanist, he is able to ask critical questions to legislators about regulation that is not
based on scientific research. In this sense, Mr. Brown sees his work on these
committees as of support and not necessarily as places of political influence. Yet, as
Paul Roth the DPI chief told me, some meetings organized by the USDA at the state and
federal level also have representation of major growers who are able to weigh in
program overviews and budgets, adding that this type of dialogue is becoming more
common in the regulatory process.
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Many of these associations have well-structured hierarchies and positions which
operators use to meet other people in the trade and to serve in positions of decisionmaking. Roger Smith, a fernery owner in the northern region of the state, told me about
how impressive the FNGLA’s political system was. As he described it the FNGLA and its
chapters require local chapter presidents, local boards of directors, and other positions
that are rotating and which ensure that a large group of people are involved in the
functioning and decision-making of the organization. Similarly, other operators
participate in a variety of plant boards that range from state to federal in function, and
which represent a variety of commodities and regulatory practices. As one owner told
me, “I’m involved in the national Landscape Germ Plasm committee. The federal
government’s got like 12 committees for different agricultural commodities. I’m on one of
them and I stay abreast of the situation.” Another operator told me that he sits on the
board of the Farm Bureau because “that helps set policy for ornamental horticulture. Uh,
I know they work on it every year to, for different concerns that the industry has, and
they meet with the people from the different regulatory agencies within the state to try to
help.”
Another way in which industry actors are able extend their networks is through links
with university researchers and students. The APHIS director explained to me that in
conjunction with University of Florida and Florida A&M Professors, many students and
graduates are able to intern or work for the regulatory agencies, specifically in areas of
science, regulation, and pest awareness. Mr. Miller also sits on a board of advisors
created to mentor students, and while he acknowledge the importance of such practices
that respond to industry needs, he does acknowledge the danger of stretching too thinly
through a variety of extra official activities. When I followed up with Mr. Miller regarding
the dangers of too much cooperation with other industry stakeholders, he explained that
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although contact with private interests was not necessarily influential at his agency, he
did have a lot of personal contact with other industry actors and he could see how their
lobbying of politicians and elected officials often starts subsequent dialogues at the
USDA level of policy making.
This strongly woven network helps to keep a well-connected group of individuals of
the plant nursery industry informed of any policy changes taking place in the industry.
The network allows for fast and unified responses to any type of regulation being
imposed from above or from other U.S. states and which may adversely affect the
economic goals of Florida nursery industry elites. This process, according to industry
elites is inclusive and democratic, especially since according to several of them, allows
for an open and transparent system of professional opinions, science, and business
practices that make sense for the health of the industry. Certainly, for industry insiders
this model of consensus building and autonomous regulation seems inclusive and
democratic, but it clearly links individuals from business, science, and politics fairly close
to one another and facilitating those bonds of dependency through a well-established
regulatory regime.
Neoliberal Winds: Inconsistency and Opportunism
From a theoretical perspective, elite actors within the plant nursery industry do
represent traditional views about neoliberalism as an ethic through which the social good
can be maximized by liberating the flow of goods, services, and capital from government
regulation. Persistent in the discourses of Florida plan nursery operators is the idea the
federal government is unfriendly to the interests of business practices, as Neil Simon, a
north Florida Fern grower put it, “government has not been our friend.” Other elite
players were more specific in condemning the federal government’s handling of labor,
trade, and migratory policies and often employed the analogy of the government
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“breathing down people’s necks” as way of describing what they consider excessive
government intrusion in their professional practices. In addition, and in tune with a
variety neoliberal scholars (see MacEwan 1999, Harvey 2005, and Shaikh 2005), the
values and discourses of industry elites are often adjusted to achieve ends that are
contradictory to neoliberal foundations and which have clear implications to the
restructuring of a variety of social structures.
Such contradictions are obvious in a variety of discourses as well as in specific
regulatory policies on which industry elites must rely to survive economically. Take for
instance, quarantine 37 which is known to all industry elites as the most powerful
mechanism protecting the environmental and economic interests of nursery producing
states. The policy requires a large contingency of researchers, regulators, field
investigators and code enforcers which must work together through a variety of federal
and state agencies to control the dissemination of pests and invasive plants and in a
very direct way protect the economic health of the industry. Although industry
professionals from my sample were eager to defend its merits and often touted the
economic support given to political candidates and the lobbying body, they never
condemned the use of economic resources required by the federal government to
enforce the policy at ports of entry and farms or in research and scientific regulation.
When they did complain, they often did so because they thought that DHS is not
necessarily qualified to do such job, but not because the federal government was using
too many resources or too much power in its enforcement. This pattern of inconsistent
application is also visible in the justification of the FNGLA’s CEO for seeking federal aid
in the 2007 drafting of the Farm Bill. In his statement, Mr. Sadek claimed that he was not
seeking special entitlements, but rather supporting the Bush administration’s proposal to
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invest $1 billion in research of nursery crops, as well as a participation in a couple of risk
management programs.
Another area of contradiction between theoretical and practical implications can be
seen in the close relationship that exists between industry professionals and the state
regulatory agencies of the federal government. From my interviews with the industry
elites, it was clear that these actors see themselves as players on the same side of
issues that affect business and industry. Mr. Sadek explained that “the Florida
Department of Agriculture has an outstanding track record and a reputation of working
with the industry. And they have a good sense of the challenges that the growers have.”
Similarly, Paul Roth, the states DPI director told me that the relationship between
regulators and business elites is not an adversarial, but rather “a cordial relationship
where we try to help them stay in business” and added that the regulators see the
business elites as stakeholders or customers, and as such, “try to enhance their
business, not tell them what they can’t do.” Similarly, during a conversation about
regulatory practices in the industry, Jeff Brown, the BPAI chief told me that regulators
“are here to help them, and most regulations help them. We help the industry bill, ship
and move the product”
This trend is consistent with the perspectives of neoliberal scholars who argue that,
to be pragmatic, neoliberal policymakers have had to shift from theoretical foundations
toward an application characterized by inconsistency and opportunism (Clarcke 2005).
In the Florida plant nursery industry the values of regulation expressed by industry elites
are negotiated and applied in rather ambiguous ways. For one, nursery elite actors often
condemn and reject government intervention, but know that it is precisely because of
governmental enforcement of quarantine 37 that they can remain successful in the U.S.
since the law prohibits any import of nursery material and outright prevents international
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competition in plant nursery production. In addition, while many industry elites defend a
system of policy and regulation that is inclusive to all actors within the industry, they tend
to deny the degree to which private interests affect the regulatory policies. The State’s
DPI director's answer to one of my policy questions clearly exemplifies this issue,
If it's an enhancement to our plant protection laws at the state level, um, many times
that comes to us from an industry group, we would like for you to, um this is a recent
example, we'd like for you to have a law that says, the division of plant industry will
have preemptive authority on where honeybee colonies can be located, so local
governments can't ban honeybees in their jurisdiction. So we take that and develop it
into a legislative proposal, and then work with a legislator to get it sponsored into a
bill. But the first thing, if you get a legislator to sponsor a bill, the first thing he asks
you is, who's for this? Who's against this? And then you have to get letters of support
from the various stakeholders and feed them to that member of the legislature to
show that he's not, um, stepping into something that would be political suicide.
What ends up happening in the plant nursery industry, thus, is a deregulation of the
regulatory bodies instead of the ideal non-governmental deregulation to which elite
actors (claim to) aspire. In other words, the level of decision-making takes place on a
deregulated and semi-privatized environment in which business representatives are able
to manipulate the political process by freely navigating through the scientific and political
arenas. This is done openly and labeled transparent since it is not taking place behind
closed doors. But in agreement with the formulations of Rapley (2004) and other
globalization scholars, a regime has succeeded in consolidating a position of power and
accumulation through the establishment of distributional networks, in which both the
political and economic elites are related in mutual bonds of dependency that allows them
a high degree of political leverage and the ability to exclude the masses from the political
process.
Conclusion
I began this chapter with a preliminary discussion of the beliefs and values of Florida
plant nursery employers in regards to regulation in four critical areas. Specifically I
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discussed how employers in the industry regard regulation in terms of labor migration,
competition from unregistered or uninsured farms, agricultural trade, and the scientific
justifications attributed to this last one. I used this preliminary analysis to highlight the
way in which policy implementation and regulation play a vital role on the discourses and
practices of operators of the plant nursery industry and to contrast these values and
practices about regulation with a variety of neoliberal tenets associated with economic
reforms of the last three decades.
In many ways my findings in this area were not surprising and are well supported by
the critiques of neoliberalism and globalization highlighted in chapter 2, particularly since
the values of plant nursery operators about regulation tend to have ambiguities and
contradictions which are not often perceived by those operators advocating for them.
This was clearly seen as the overwhelming majority of operators with whom I spoke
support heavy governmental regulation in areas of immigration, business competition
and international trade, but seem to support a de-regulated environment for the creation
of policy making in regards to the international competition and trade policy. These ideas
were often spoken by operators who, at least ideologically, regard regulation as a
mechanism of intrusion by the federal government in their everyday economic practices.
However, when the conversation turned to real life practicalities, the operators had no
problem asking the federal government for larger oversight and control.
These early discussions about regulation opened the road to deeper understanding
of the question of why and how has plant nursery production in the state of Florida
remained one of the most important sites of nursery plant production for the US market
amidst neoliberal economic restructuring of the last three decades? Clearly, plant
production in the state of Florida has not followed recent trends in commodity
production, where multinational corporations have sought areas of production in the
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developing world where labor and environmental costs are cheaper. This is in great part
the result of a combination of factors that include regulation as well as the collective
efforts of plant nursery elites.
At first, it seemed clear to me that part of the success and permanence of the
industry in the state could be attributed to SPS regulations imposed by the federal
government and which prevent the import of nursery products from other areas of the
world. In this sense, all of the elite members I interviewed saw SPS regulation as an
essential requirement to protect Florida ecosystems from invasive plants, insects, and
pests and only saw economic protectionism as an indirect benefit of the regulation. But
something that became clear to me during my fieldwork was that SPS regulation did not
come about free from intervention from elite actors who rally collectively to maintain and
enforce the policy at the federal level. Industry elites are highly aware of the role that
SPS regulations play on industry survival. As a result they spend invaluable resources
on political lobbying, research, and control in order to maintain a strong body of
regulation active through the legislative body.
In many ways, the overwhelming support for SPS regulation in the nursery industry is
founded on a socially constructed ideology about the unknown effects and dangers that
invasive plants and organisms could have on local ecosystems. Certainly, by arguing
that the beliefs and ideas of industry elites regarding SPS regulation are socially
constructed I do not mean that some of their fears are unfounded, but rather that in
many ways the discourses and market-place behaviors of industry elites have been
greatly influenced by the claims of powerful actors in the scientific and political
communities, and thus have been widely accepted as ultimately true and immovable by
a variety of industry operators and professionals.
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The socially constructed nature of the regulation ideology was made clear to me
through many levels of the industry professional structure. In my interviews with
scientists of the USDA the defense of a strong SPS regulation was consistently
presented to me as a necessary protection to our state’s ecology, but when I probed
deeper, the scientists conceded that political lines do not adequately represent
geographical areas or hardiness zones and most importantly that a large amount of
invasive organisms make their way into our state through the millions of travelers and
imports that come into the country through Miami on a yearly basis. Still, the scientists
discourses were embed on the idea that science serves as the ultimate arbitrator and
guide to determine the course of regulation and that it is their research which supports
the policy both at the state and federal level and not political actors as many
international trade analysts argue.
For industry professionals the science-based claims of regulators justify their own
discourses about regulation and in turn use the claims to lobby political legislative bodies
in support for strong protectionist measures. This is also true for operators, who organize
together through the existing professional organizations in efforts to maintain their
market position in a clear opposition to international competitors or national competitors
who may seek to produce nursery plants abroad. In this sense, scientific claims become
part of a strong and well-unified body of regulation that is supported by a widespread
ideology and discourse of ecological and economic protection and which have real
implications for the success and permanence of the industry in the U.S.
A second important factor in the permanence and success of the industry in the state
of Florida lies in the interaction of industry and the strong social networks that they have
managed to create. As my analysis of interviews demonstrates, lobbyists, trade
representatives, organizational leaders, academic researchers, and many of the
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prominent operators of the industry have close working and personal relationships with
one another and these connections often stretch to the regulators of the industry. These
relationships are forged through a variety of committees, boards, and initiatives that
bring a variety of actors together and which create the necessary conditions for them to
work with one another. In this sense, the many boards and committees in which
members of the plant nursery elite sit help to craft and reshape a variety of messages,
discourses, and policies which effectively shape the course of the industry.
Lastly, as Berger and Piore (1979) argued, the role of the traditional industry should
not be ignored when analyzing trends in new configurations of commodity production.
As my analysis indicates, small traditional firms can create sufficient control to carve
their own collective paths despite global trends that would suggest a very different
market behavior. It is possible that this market behavior is driven by small businesses
because low capital costs allow for a large conglomeration of small individually and
family owned business to operate without the competition and constrains provided by
large multinational corporations. As a result, plant nursery producers in the state of
Florida have been able to overcome a significant organizational gap despite of the fierce
competition that exists among producers and despite the fragmented nature of
production itself, where a variety of products are produced under the umbrella of plant
nursery production.
In many ways the success, permanence and durability of the plant nursery industry
in the state of Florida can be attributed to a combination of factors embedded in the
beliefs and interactions of industry elites and the de-regulatory policies that they have
been able to institutionalize. First, because regulation is in great part driven by the
ideologies of powerful actors within the industry and supported by the collective efforts of
thousands of small and medium sized producers, it has become part of a greater
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collective effort to maintain a strong market presence, despite recent trends to outsource
production in a variety of industrial sectors of the US. Second, the relationships among
industry elites – including regulators, operators, and professional representatives –
allows for a very unified system of policy creation that is consistent with many of the
neoliberal trends and theories of recent decades. In this sense trade regulation is the
result of a de-regulation in the process of policy making as decisions are made in an
overt agreement between the industry insiders and later proposed and lobbied to the
appropriate legislative bodies at the state and federal level.
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VI. PLANT NURSERY WORK IN FLORIDA: LIFE IN THE MARGINS
On a warm Florida night, Edilberto and Juan, two Maya-speaking Florida farm
workers, attended a workers’ rights forum hosted by WeCount!, an immigrant social
justice organization in the municipality of Homestead in South Florida. The farm workers
hoped that the organization would help them recuperate unpaid wages owed to them by
their previous employer. In halting Spanish, the indigenous Guatemalan workers
explained that several months before, their bosses started to fall behind in paying
salaries, giving the workers only part of their weekly wages under the promise to pay in
full the following week. However, these promises failed to materialize and in a matter of
months the workers were owed several weeks of pay. For some time the men remained
patient, but the situation intensified when the workers, pressured to send money back
home and falling behind in their rent payments, complained about their back wages. The
immigrant workers were fired; their employers threatened to call immigration authorities
if they showed up again or took any further action to get paid. Stories like that of Juan
and Edilberto abound in Florida’s Farm nursery industry. In fact, it was these kinds of
stories that led me to do research in this industry that has received little attention from
social scientists in the United States, except for a variety of economic studies and
analyses. 20
Until now, I have focused this manuscript on a variety of theoretical prescriptions
about globalization which propose that within the larger neoliberal frameworks of the last
three decades, industrial production has tended to move to peripheral areas in the
developing world in search of deregulation, efficiency and lower production costs.
However, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2, resistance and shifts within specific industrial
20

The Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) at the University of Florida (UF) has
close links to a variety of agricultural sectors in the State of Florida. They do research for Florida’s
agricultural industries and produce economic impact reports to a variety of industry sectors in the
state (http://ifas.ufl.edu).
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sectors of the developed world can also correspond to a series of arrangements that are
forged and enforced by regimes of economic and political elites who can exert sufficient
power in policymaking to create discontinuous spaces in current modes of globalization.
What this means for plant nursery production in the state of Florida is that while a variety
of powerful actors have been greatly successful at resisting global trends by keeping
nursery plant production localized, they have come to rely on a large supply of foreignborn and low-wage workers in order to remain competitive in an increasingly global and
deregulated marketplace. But what exactly are the implications for the large, immigrant
labor force of the plant nursery industry in terms of working conditions, rights, and
benefits? And how are labor-migration trends in the plant nursery industry consistent
with current theories of globalization?
As several scholars of immigration and labor migration contend, there is a logical fit
between the labor needs of US employers and the presence of undocumented workers
in the country, which reveals a deliberate political manipulation to supply important
sectors of the employer class with a supply of cheap labor, specifically in occupations
characterized by shift work, hazardous conditions, and job insecurity (Sassen 1988,
Portes and Walton 1981). These workers are particularly desirable to employers
because they are seen as diligent and motivated employees, yet are compliant and
readily accept positions with low wages and no benefits (cite BBD). Such workers are
found in a wide range of economic activities including agriculture, manufacturing, and in
a variety of service occupations (Portes and Rumbaut 2006); among these is Florida’s
plant nursery industry.
The gravitation of labor migrants toward labor-intensive industries that offer low
wages and no benefits has been explained within the context of a segmented labor
market, where particular types of jobs are associated with distinctive types of workers
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(Piore 1979; Wldinger 2003). Those jobs at the “bottom” end of the segmented market
tend to be labor intensive and are often occupied by immigrants or women based on
racialization and arbitrary conceptualizations of who is “best” fit for a type of Job
(Waldinger 2003). This division of the labor market is said to create ideal conditions for
an immigrant labor force entrenched in the production of dead-end jobs and precluded
from accessing jobs in high end sectors, while also institutionalizing two classes of
workers (Mahler 1995). This segmentation is also paradoxical since it continues to
allocate labor migrants to those marginal sectors of the economy despite increases in
unemployment and de-industrialization in the developed world. This de-industrialization
came accompanied by increased levels of overseas outsourcing, and a measurable loss
of middle income jobs in manufacture in the United States (Sassen 1990; Mahler 1995;
Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Shelley 2007). But in plant nursery production, where
outsourcing production is not allowed by governmental regulation, the allocation of
workers to the low end of the labor market too often seems like the most clear and
acceptable condition for market players.
In this chapter I consider compelling forms of exclusion, exploitation and
marginalization of the immigrant labor force of the Florida plant nursery industry,
focusing on the complex interaction of structural processes associated with the workers’
process of social and economic incorporation, from their migratory status, and from
some of the institutional arrangements forged within the plant nursery industry in the
state of Florida. Specifically, I contend that workers of the Florida plant nursery industry
find themselves entrenched in a variety of institutional disadvantages that emerge from
(1) an uneven system of economic and emotional investments that migrant workers must
make and which are associated with their migration and settlement into the state’s plant
nursery industry, and; (2) labor vulnerabilities associated with wages, benefits, and
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working conditions that arise from their immigration status and from a series of
institutional labor practices that often produce constant fear of firing, detention and
deportation. I begin my analysis with a description of the journey that workers must
make to find work there. In addition I provide an in-depth look at the characteristics of
nursery farm workers within my sample to make a more compelling argument about their
living and working conditions.
Characteristics of Plant Nursery Workers
The plant nursery industry in Florida relies heavily on labor intensive work from a
predominantly immigrant work force. This was clear from my early research in MiamiDade County and then later ratified through my observations and discussions with
industry entrepreneurs and organizers throughout the state. I was also able to establish
that an overwhelming majority of nursery work in Florida is performed by immigrants
from rural areas of Mexico; however, in the state of Florida, and particularly in its
southern regions, a large number of indigenous Guatemalan immigrants have become
the predominant group of workers in plant nursery production. Unfortunately, there are
no numbers to account for the ethnicity, gender and longevity of workers in the nursery
industry, and although the National Agricultural Worker Survey (NAWS) does provide
some demographic estimates of the national farm worker population, it does not
distinguish between the kinds of agricultural work performed by the workers or the
specific states were they reside and work.
According to the NAWS, 78 percent of the agricultural workforce in the U.S is foreign
born, with about 75 percent coming from Mexico and two percent from other Central
American nations. The NAWS also report that about 53 percent of the foreign born
agricultural workers are in the country without legal work authorization, while 21 percent
are legal residents and about 25 percent are legal U.S. citizens. Figures 1 and 2 show
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the place of birth of the agricultural labor force and the employment eligibility the foreign
born in the U.S. In the State of Florida’s plant nursery industry, However, one thing that
has become clear in recent years, due to an increase in ethnographic work related to
Maya migration is the fact that large Guatemalan communities have been established in
the Florida rural areas of Indiantown, Homestead, Immokalee, and Okeechobee (see
Burns 1993).

Figure 8. Place of birth of the U.S. agricultural workforce (USDOL-NAWS 2012)

Figure 9. U.S. Employment eligibility of the foreign born agricultural population
(USDOL-NAWS 2012)
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My own field work with the workers of the plant nursery industry focused on the
southern areas of Homestead and Florida City and to some extent reflects the previously
noted demographic characteristics. My sample of workers consisted of 40 face-to-face,
in-depth, open-ended interviews which were conducted between 2007 and 2009. Of
these workers 25 had come from the Guatemalan highlands northwest of the country's
capital, while 11 Mexican, three El Salvadorian, and two Haitian immigrants completed
the sample. The median age of the group was 37, with ages ranging from 20 to 58
years. The median number of years in the country was eight and ranged from just a few
months to 36 years in the country. In terms of gender, the sample contained 29 males
and 11 females (see table 1). It is important to note that only a handful of those
interviewed resided legally in the US at the time of the interviews, while the majority of
those workers in my sample were undocumented and possessed no legal permit to stay
or work in the country. This was also made clear through my interviews with industry
elites and community organizers, but knowing the real extent of undocumented workers
in the industry is difficult to assess because to this writers knowledge there is no census
or reports on the workers of the plant nursery industry. Map 1, shows the sending areas
of the workers interviewed during my fieldwork.
Table 4. Characteristics of Plant Nursery Worker in Sample
Country of
Male(N) Female(N)
Median Years in the
Birth
Age
US(Median)
Guatemala
21
4
37
2
Mexico
5
6
41
17
El Salvador
2
0
42
15
Haiti
1
1
40
14
Column
Totals
29
11
37
8
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Authorized
to work(N)
1
1
0
2
4

Map1. Sending Areas of South Florida Plant Nursery workers interviewed

Camino al Norte; Uneven Investments and Returns
Before arriving to the state of Florida and working in the plant nursery industry, many
industry workers are required to embark on a long and risky journey through parts of
Central and North America. Many of these risks are associated with unscrupulous
smugglers and law enforcement officials along the journey, while others are the result of
dangerous geographical conditions that must be tackled and include river and dessert
crossings or dark boat rides in the middle of the night (see for example Mahler 1995,
Ramos 2005). Once settled, many of the migrants find jobs in low wage industries such
as the plant nursery industry, which is highly dependent on low-wage immigrant workers
and on a continuous supply of workers to sustain their operations, thus relying on an
informal, yet well-established system of recruiting where investments and expenses fall
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almost exclusively on the workers (see Cameron, Lippard and Gallagher 2010). These
are important aspects of the institutional arrangements that shape plant production in the
state of Florida. In this section I describe how some of these uneven risks, difficulties
and investments are visible in the State’s plant nursery industry and what some of the
consequences are for the workers, their employers and their communities.
From the beginning of my sample collection, I made it a point to collect workers’
information about their journey and about how they ended up working in the plant
nursery industry. At first, this was important to me because at a personal level I believe
that these stories are rich expressions of the inequalities that our current global
economic systems reproduce, but at the same time because they are examples of the
dedication and tenacity of human beings looking for opportunities in what seems to be a
highly unequal world. I later understood that these stories also demonstrate those
structural and institutional implications that affect relations and conditions in the sending
and receiving towns as well as on the industries that receive low wage workers from the
developing world. In this section I use that data collected from the workers regarding
their journey and I supplement some of those structural and institutional implications
from my own field observations and from conversations with a variety of actors of the
plant nursery industry and of the organizing community.
Making the Journey
Most of the workers I interviewed fit within the ethnographic record detailing the
journey that rural workers from Central America must often make when traveling
northbound to the United States (see Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Their journeys
through Mexico, particularly for those who come from Guatemala and El Salvador, are
filled with vivid descriptions of hunger, fear, abuse from smugglers and police, and the
bittersweet sensation of making the journey safely while being separated from their
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families and friends. This is what Cristina, a 27 year old female from Guatemala told me
about the dangers and risks associated with her journey:
About 22 people started the journey in Guatemala; they [the smugglers] put us all on
a boat, so we were crossing from Guatemala to Mexico. We traveled all day, until
about one in the morning. We arrived in a place called Huatulco and they said “we’re
here.” So I jumped but I couldn’t reach the bottom. I know how to swim a little, but
there were some that could not and they never made it. Out of the 22 people who
started, only 15 of us made it. Once I reached the shore I started running, but then a
police patrol arrived and we had to pay them 500 pesos to take us somewhere else.
They took us to Queretaro. The coyote then bought us a bus ticket to Matamoros
from where we had to walk for 8 hours to get to Houston. From there, they sent me
the money that I needed to pay off the coyote. It took me three more days from there
to Homestead where my mom was waiting for me.
Fermin, a worker from Michoacán also described the risks and dangers of his trip
from Mexico as a journey filled with unknown dangers. As he explained, “I came from
Michoacan to Miguel Aleman, where I contacted a coyote who crossed us across the
river at night and then a walk across the dessert for about two days. We ran out of water
after day one, and then we had to drink water from a pig sty in a ranch we found along
the way. We arrived to a town where other coyotes where expecting us, completely
dehydrated with blisters on our feet and with very bad sunburns.” In that journey, Fermin
told me that of the 20 people who embarked on his journey through northern Mexico on
his way to the U.S. several were arrested and deported while others were separated
from the group. He was able to avoid the Mexican authorities, and contact his coyotes to
smuggle him across the border.
Another Guatemalan worker, named Luis described his journey as the result of the
violence that his country was experiencing in the last decades of the 20th century. As he
explained, “I was never persecuted, but finding work was becoming harder and harder.”
At the time when I met Luis, he had already been in the country for close to fifteen years.
He was a short Mayan man with large and rough hands. Although never formally
educated, he was well-trained in advanced agricultural skills such as working with heavy
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industrial and farm-related machinery such as tractors, drills, forklifts, and saws, which
gave him an advantage when seeking work in the plant nursery industry of the State.
Luis’ journey carried heavy emotional and economic expenses for which he had to make
alternative decisions to travel. In sharp contrast to the experience of other workers with
whom I spoke, Luis’ trip to south Florida was long and particularly tedious. As he told
me, he left Guatemala with three friends on a bus trip through Mexico. Since they had
little money and no property to get a loan in Guatemala, they planned to work at
plantations and farms along the way in order to make money for the each leg of the trip.
Once in the U.S.-Mexico border region, Luis and his friends worked extensively for over
a month cutting chile and cotton; “once there we met other people who were waiting to
cross [the border], we made friends and then some people that had already crossed and
knew the terrain and asked us to go with them.” In that journey, Luis met some people
that offered him a ride to Indiantown, Florida in return for payment once he got a job. He
accepted and ended up in South Florida without friends or pre-established support
networks to help him along the way. His journey to Indiantown lasted more than three
months.
Investments and Returns
The emotional and economic investments made by the immigrant workers of the
Florida plant nursery industry are consistent with recent modes of globalized production
where employers externalize costs to the labor force by transferring environmental and
health costs to the workers (see Greider 1997; Harvey 2005). In the case of Florida plant
nursery employment, the workers assume 100% of the transportation, recruitment,
resettling costs, and health costs in addition to those hard to measure emotional and
psychological investments that they must also make. Many of the stories that the
workers shared with me are emblematic of the experiences of thousands of agricultural

170

workers who often risk their lives in order to secure what they see as a better opportunity
for themselves and their families.
Many of the individuals who shared their stories with me contend that they had to
leave their spouses and children behind in order to secure a better future for them. As
Ricardo, a Guatemalan worker from Quiche and father of four in his native country
explained, he sends a considerable portion of his salary back home for his children’s
education and to invest on a small lot to build a home. His decision to come to the U.S.
was according to him “a family decision because in Guatemala there were no jobs to pay
for his kids’ education.” He had to borrow some money from friends and family to secure
US$4,500 for the trip through Mexico. Ricardo had not seen his family in over 5 years
while working in the State of Florida. He told me that he would like to return home, but
that he had no clear plan or idea of when he would be returning.
Similarly, Francisco, A 46 year old Mexican worker who at the time of my field work
had been in the country for 6 years described his journey as stemming from a desire to
bring economic stability to his wife and children. Francisco told me that he did not want
to stay in the U.S. for a long period of time, but fears for his children’s security and
stability. He expressed a deep concern for his children’s development and describes his
move to the U.S. as a sacrifice so that his children “do not have to go through the things
that I have had to experience.” He told me that, he wants his children to do better than
him, and that despite living in the U.S. in tight economic conditions there is always more
opportunity to help them.
In the case of plant nursery production in Florida, the recruitment process is quite
informal since there are no government visa programs or private companies which do
recruitment for plant nurseries abroad, as it is often the case in other forms of
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agricultural work such as foresting and food agriculture. As the FNGLA CEO explained
to me,
There are some other segments of agriculture, vegetable growers I guess, that do
use the H2A program. Very few, if any, in Florida nurseries use H2A. There are
some in other parts of the country, some nursery growers I know in the Midwest and
some in the Northwest. But, you know, my experience in talking with growers who
have either considered it, or in other parts of the country who have used it, H2A is
very expensive, more, you got to pay for housing. You have to construct housing is
what it is. But most importantly, what happens as soon as an operation uses H2A, it
becomes a magnet for all these legal service harassment. So most, a lot of growers
will stay away from it.
As a result, industry employers rely on their workers through word of mouth to bring
friends and relatives to work for them during times expansion or peak seasons. This
scenario means that workers must invest heavily on their mobilization to Florida and
their settlement while they find a job; a process that fits well within the literature and
theoretical arguments which postulate that U.S. employers benefit largely from an
unregulated and substantial low wage labor force to secure an endless supply of cheap
and flexible labor (Portes and Rumbaut 2006).
From my interviews and observations I was able to corroborate that the workers rely
on an unofficial, yet well-established system of recruitment that largely benefits industry
employers. As I explained through the FNGLA’s CEO comments above, there is no
guest worker or recruitment system in the State of Florida, and the employers simply put
a word out to their workers when they need extra hands at the farms. This was
consistent throughout my time on the field as all of the employers I interviewed readily
accept the system and rarely rely on picking workers up from corners, worker centers or
placing ads in order to select their workforce. As one south Florida operator explained to
me, placing ads or recruiting from a corner where workers stand waiting for jobs “has
proven very unreliable and since you are never certain what kind of worker you are
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going to get.” Instead, having a worker recommend a family member, friend, or
acquaintance reduces the amount of uncertainty about that worker’s qualities.
The same was true for the workers I met during my field work. Although some of the
workers journeyed to the U.S. haphazardly, that is not knowing where exactly they were
going and relying on other migrant workers whom they met on the road for information
and advice on where to go, the majority came to the state of Florida and to its plant
nursery industry with the complicit economic and moral support of an already
established friend of family member. Juan a Guatemalan worker from the region of
Quiche explained that he had helped his brother and two cousins make the journey after
having settled in the state and the industry by helping them raise the money for the trip,
giving them housing upon their arrival, and recommending them from jobs in the area.
There is no way to calculate the non-material investments that these workers have
had to make in order to get a job in the plant nursery industry. Such adverse conditions
for the workers continue to mount as they settle into their new communities, where they
often live their lives in social and political marginality and where the pressures to send
money back home have a strong effect in the types of jobs and wages they are willing to
accept. In addition, as I will discuss on the Working conditions and Vulnerabilities section
later in this chapter, the workers must also carry the costs of healthcare and often deal
with a series irregularities associated to wages and other forms of harassment and
abuse. These conditions are all part of a system where the employers externalize a
significant amount of the costs associated with their labor force to their workers and
where the benefits received by the workers rarely match the economic and emotional
investments that they must make.
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Expectations to Assimilate and the Myth of Stable Communities
During my fieldwork, part of my focus also concentrated on the community life and
incorporation of the workers to some of the social structures at their new home. To this
end, I often inquired of workers, employers and community organizers about the life in
those cities and towns where the workers had settled. Part of my interest emerged from
what I first perceived as a clear difference between the “settling” experiences of nursery
workers versus those of other agricultural migrant workers who live –sometimes
temporarily – in more rural geographical areas. As the leading member of the state
Florida Nursery Growers and Landscapers Association (FNGLA) explained,
Throughout the State, nurseries are mostly close to urban areas. If you took a map of
Florida and said, “Alright, here are the ten biggest cities in Florida” and then took a
map and overlaid it with “here are the big nursery crop production concentrations,”
they’d be right around all those big cities, whereas a lot of other types of agriculture
are really rural. But nursery is very much, almost urban agriculture. It’s much closer
to the markets they serve.
I tested FNGLA leader’s hypothesis about the urban nature of nursery agriculture by
overlaying the largest centers of plant nursery production with the highest urban
concentrations in the state in a map of Florida. As Map 2 demonstrates, there is a high
concentration of nursery production sites around important urban centers in the state. I
also confirmed this notion during my fieldwork, as most of those nursery production sites
that I visited were usually located in the outskirts of cities such as Miami, West Palm
Beach, Orlando, and Tampa.
This geographical distribution has important ramifications for the settling and
incorporation patterns of those immigrants that work in the plant nursery industry.
Specifically as a north Florida nursery operator explained, this helps to “create more
stable communities around those important centers of production in the state.” The
distinction that this employer makes stresses the availability of work in nursery versus
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that of other types of agricultural crops that are seasonal and which require the workers
to move during the year in search of other sources of seasonal work.
Map 2. Florida’s Top Five Nursery Production Sites by Urban Concentration

In the minds of these and other employers with whom I spoke, plant nursery
production has created stable communities in those geographic areas of the state where
production is taking place. To support this notion, Mike Smith, a large fernery operator
near Daytona Beach drove me to a housing development a few miles away from his
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operation. The development, as he explained was the result of some public and private
funding provided to build and manage housing for low income farm workers in the area.
Unlike many of the many public “housing camps” that I visited throughout the state, this
one was particularly well maintained, with the exteriors of the houses and the grasses
and gardens around them groomed to excellent conditions. The operator then introduced
me to Fermin, the premises’ manager, a 40 year old Mexican immigrant who had worked
for him since arriving to the US in 1993, and who now runs the housing facility with his
wife.
The discourse of plant nursery elites regarding the stability of communities around
the plant nursery industry often focused on the notion that that such communities could
work to serve as places for assimilation of the immigrant labor force. For the North
Florida operator involved in the housing camp in his community, the success of the
housing camp and the “assimilation” of Fermin, the camp’s manager who spoke English
at all times demonstrated the success that the plant nursery industry could have on the
lives of the immigrants that work in it. He was proud to point out that Fermin and his wife
learned English and as a result had been able to grow out of the tediousness of nursery
work, while remaining productive and stable members of the community. This case is
particularly representative of the expectations that many industry employers have
regarding the assimilation of the labor force. One Homestead operator told me that he
thought it was necessary “to teach immigrant workers how to behave in public” and
according to the standards of the US, and used examples of how throwing trash on the
ground or drinking in public were behaviors that should be curtailed among the
immigrant workers. This latter point was also made by a local police officer who seemed
angry about sporadic displays of public drunkenness by nursery workers in the area.
Another employer emphasized his dedication to the assimilation of the workers that he
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took on the responsibility of paying for English classes for his employees at the local
community college.
Regarding these expectations, it often seemed to me that the entrepreneurs used
these discourses of work ethic and assimilation as an excuse not to provide better
wages or benefits to their workers, under the premise that those benefits would be
eventually achieved by those workers who performed above the rest and moved up the
socioeconomic latter. Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of workers that I
interviewed spoke no English and as result, proving the relationship between language
acquisition social mobility would be difficult with my available data. However, whenever I
saw some form of improvement for those workers who were deemed trustworthy or who
stood among the rest, as in the case of Fermin, the benefits came at the hand of a closer
relationship among the parties. In the case of Fermin and his family, such benefits were
transformed in an opportunity to work outside the heat and strenuous physical conditions
of the plant nursery fields, an added status as a manager of the housing facility, and
better wages.
As I began my field work in the summer of 2007, the U.S. was entering into a deep
economic recession that severely affected many industries around the country. The
plant nursery industry in Florida was no exception as many of the companies and
workers were strongly feeling its effects. The plant nursery industry is highly dependent
on construction because a large percentage of its production is destined for landscaping
of new homes and roads. In addition, the recession resulted in decreased household
consumption, including the home beautification projects that boost plant nursery sales at
garden centers and improvement chains. The effects of the recession on plant nursery
workers became obvious as I observed an exodus of people away from those
communities that plant nursery entrepreneurs regarded as stable products of the plant
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nursery industry. During this time, I visited several apartment buildings that seemed
eerily ghostly, with “for rent” signs in the majority of the windows. To me this had
important significance because in many ways it demonstrated that these communities
where at best “semi-stable” and depended greatly on the health of the economy and the
industry for their stability. This was specifically harsh for these immigrant communities,
since the mostly undocumented immigrant workers have no benefits of unemployment
and are not protected against market fluctuations in the same way that native workers
can be.
The expectations to “assimilate” and to settle into what industry elites perceive to be
stable communities also provides other unintended layers of adversities for those
immigrant workers of the plant nursery industry. As I mentioned earlier in this section,
many of the nursery operators whom I interviewed have strong expectations for their
workers to “assimilate” to American cultural values and often cited things like developing
a strong work ethic, learning English, and behaving “properly” in public as ways to
accomplish this process of “assimilation.” However, with few exceptions, most of the
operators I interviewed did not actively participate in the social or cultural incorporation
process of their workers and only the operator who enrolled his workers in English
courses and the North Florida grower who helped finance the housing camp seemed to
invest on their expectations about their workers’ “assimilation.”
It is my impression, however, that in many other ways, those cultural expectations of
employers toward their immigrant workforce resulted in very uneven investments and
returns on the part of the workers, whose behavior is constantly scrutinized and
evaluated in rather ethnocentric and demeaning ways by their employees. This scrutiny
is often used as justification not to provide certain benefits and to penalize their workers
for certain behaviors. During a long conversation with an operator in which the
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discussion of why no one in the industry pays health benefits to workers on the fields, he
contended “they have to learn to work and to achieve their success through hard work.”
According to this owner, nobody gave him anything for free and if the workers want to
achieve the American dream then, they too must prove themselves worthy through hard
work.
Worker Conditions and Vulnerabilities
The behavioral expectations that industry employers place on their workers were
also accompanied by a variety of institutional practices and beliefs that often had the
opposite effect of the desired “assimilation” and community stability of immigrant
workers. Many of these practices were embedded in the social and labor interactions of
workers and employers and often facilitate the marginalization of industry workers, both
inside and outside their places of employment and spilling into their personal and
communal life. In this sense, working at or below minimum wages, experiencing wage
theft, having no health benefits, absence of unions and a state labor department, and
other adverse conditions have helped to create an underclass of voiceless and
powerless workers. In this section I look at some of these common practices by nursery
employers and their effects on the immigrant labor force, returning later to how these
practices create marginal spaces for individuals and communities that provide the labor
for the industry.
While I conducted my interviews, the majority of workers reported not knowing what
the minimum wage was in the State of Florida. At the time of this research, the state’s
hourly minimum wage was $6.67. A good example of this lack of information is shown by
Mario, a nursery worker who has been living in Florida since 1992. When asked if he
knew what the minimum wage in the state was, he told me, “I think it is around six, six
something I believe.” Similarly, Marta from Puerto Rico stated, “The truth is I do not
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know, I do not think anyone at work would provide me with this (information) and there
are no posters or information available to us.” For Miguel who had been a victim of wage
theft on two distinct occasions, the answer was similar, “I do not know. I’ve never been
given such information.”
One common form of wage theft in the south Florida nursery industry is failure to pay
minimum wage. As Jose from Mexico explained, “I left my previous nursery job two
weeks ago; they were paying me just $6.40.” Jose was one of a few workers who
actually knew what the newly legislated state minimum wage was $6.67 at the time. I
asked Jose how he had gotten this information. He said “[We] always listen to the news,
but we are not really sure if that is true. So I told my boss to pay us at least the minimum
(wage), but he said ‘no.’ He told us his company was struggling. After that, he started to
get mad at me; he changed with me and did not even want to talk to me.” Having
complained about his sub-standard hourly rate, Jose was forced to leave his job
because of the harassment he received from his employer.
Similarly, Teofilo, another plant nursery worker from Guatemala, explained the way
in which wage theft occurred at his work place.
At a nursery in which I worked before, they would take away our hours. We would
complain and we would still not get paid. There, the foreman would write down the
hours we worked; when we complained, the foreman would then get upset and say
we were lying and that we were too slow. This lasted more than a year, until they
installed a ‘punch in’ machine for the workers. We never talked to the owners about
the issue because we were afraid to lose our jobs.
For these informants, the discovery and complaint about irregularities on their
paychecks brought harassment and contempt from their supervisors. However, Teofilo’s
case shows how workers are often willing to put up with wage theft and harassment
because of fear of losing their jobs.

180

In another example, Miguel, a Guatemalan worker, explained how he was a victim of
wage theft at two separate Nurseries.
This one time a gentleman asked us to work on December the first, he told us that he
would pay us $100 dollars each for a full day of work, and when we finished at 7 pm,
he only gave us $50. We complained and he responded that he had lost a saw. We
later heard that this was a common practice by this gentleman to have a reason of
accusing us unjustly; that was his way. He started telling us that he would call
immigration and harassed us.
On the second occasion, Miguel explained that after being owed several weeks of
pay checks, he confronted his employers.
I talked to them because my backed up salary started accumulating for several
weeks, I even tried to negotiate with them, I told them that if they had no money they
could pay me only half. They then began giving me a hard time, trying to intimidate
me and told me that I could go to whoever I wanted to, that they were not scared.
Having been a victim of wage theft on a couple of occasions, Miguel’s experiences
serves to illustrate the relation that exists between complaining to supervisors and the
harassment practices that employers in turn develop toward their employees.
Jose’s, Teofilo’s and Miguel’s experiences are consistent with the documented cases
of wage theft from the literature and media reports, and show how “shaving” hours, late
payments that drag on for weeks, not paying amounts agreed upon, and paying below
the minimum wage are practices that affect workers’ salaries in an industry which yearly
and steadily reports multi-billion dollar earnings.
These examples not only show some of the workers’ lack of information regarding
the state’s hourly minimum wage, but also highlight the lack of information available to
them at their workplace. Many of us may be familiar with guidelines, posters and
information displayed in lunch rooms or in areas accessible to workers. Unfortunately,
this does not occur regularly in plant nurseries and farms where many employees work,
eat, are paid, and rest in the fields, and seldom enter offices and other management
spaces of the companies that employ them. Many workers also expressed an
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unwillingness to share wage information with their fellow co-workers; thus, an informal
network where information could be shared among workers was absent. The lack of
such networks among workers creates advantages for unscrupulous employers because
it maintains workers uninformed of payment standards or unaware of unfair labor
practices.
The issue of information is further exacerbated by the worker’s language skills. Many
workers in this industry are illiterate or completed very few years of education. For
instance, Martin a Guatemalan worker told me that he had never been to school, “Not
one day. Let me tell you, my parents were very poor and they couldn’t give me an
education, that’s how I grew up, and as I got older I just started working.” Like Martin,
several workers told me that they had never been to school. As a result, the existence of
posters, even in worker accessible areas would not be useful unless someone took the
time to explain their contents to the workers. Aggravating the situation is the fact that
many workers, mostly of Guatemalan origin, are native speakers of indigenous
languages, such as K’iche and Mam, and have a difficult time communicating in
Spanish. These workers come from indigenous parts of their homeland, and even their
Spanish is fragmented and limited. Antonio, who is Mexican, told us, “I keep myself
informed, and for them (indigenous Guatemalan workers) this is hard because they
speak their own language, some of them even have a hard time finding a job because
they are shy and are afraid that they will not be understood.” Again, even in places
where standard, bilingual (English and Spanish) posters are available, many indigenous
workers would be left in ignorance of their labor rights and their employer’s
responsibilities.
For many of the workers, education, language skills, and harassment are some of
the issues they have to face in an environment that places emphasis on capital
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accumulation and productivity. Many of the workers in my sample show concern for the
conditions of other workers working along them. Alberto from Mexico told me that,
“There are other workers that get paid less than the minimum (wage), they are getting
about $5.15, a gentleman told me at the nursery. Some of these guys are learning to
spray, so the bosses say that they first need to learn in order to get a raise.” Another
worker, Jonathan, also from Mexico, explained that, “I often hear other workers complain
because they get paid very little, and sometimes they give them a lot of work, it is not fair
that some get paid more than others, there are some that just started working and they
get paid better than some that have been there for longer periods of time.” Both of these
statements demonstrate a level of frustration regarding the ambiguity of pay structures in
the industry. Many workers did not know how payment rates were determined, and often
expressed concern about this seemingly unfair situation.
Many of the issues that the nursery workers face are further accentuated by their
lack of knowledge of organizations, agencies, or institutions that can help them in
situations like harassment and/or wage theft. The situation is further aggravated by a
worker’s lack of legal immigration status. As Jorge, who is from Guatemala, described, “I
would not know where to go, I believe I would report them (negligent employers), but we
do not know anything. In the first place since we have no papers we get very scared, we
are always very scared because we have no papers, we are not safe.” Tito, another
Guatemalan, described the situation stating that, “The only thing that I know, someone
told me, that there is a house in Washington where they would help you, but I really do
not know where it is.”
In addition to issues of unpaid wages and misinformation, the field-workers of the
plan nursery industry are provided very few benefits by the employers of the industry.
None of the workers with whom I spoke receive health insurance or overtime pay for
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work performed after the 40 hour limit. The only benefit that workers receive according to
both employers and employees is a week of paid vacation during the year. In the area of
health benefits, the employers argue that they insure their workers through worker’s
comp in case of an accident on their grounds, but that providing health benefits would
significantly increase their costs of production and render them uncompetitive to firms
that did not provide health benefits.
During a large conversation with Mr. Smith, the large co-op manager in north Florida,
the issue of health benefits for workers was discussed in depth. Our conversation took
place after the healthcare reform approved by the U.S. Congress in 2010 and which
included an individual mandate to those individuals not covered by their employers as
well as penalties for employers who did not provide health benefits to their employers.
This mandate by the federal government angered Mr. Smith as well as other elite
members with whom I spoke, since they perceived the measure as a form of strong
governmental intrusion on private entrepreneurs and one which could have detrimental
repercussions on the profits of plant nursery producers. At the end, all of the producers
and trade representatives expressed that they basically cannot afford to provide health
insurance while remaining competitive. But this market behavior again has negative
repercussions for industry workers who must assume the hidden costs of healthcare
when they become ill. For the most part, the workers expressed to me that they just wait
for any illness to go away and rarely use any health services.
Some of these issues are exacerbated by the fact that structural farming and
agricultural conditions often prevent farm workers from joining unions and bargain
collectively. In early parts of the 20th century the nature of farm labor, where small familyowned farms had traditionally been responsible of farming production, and the seasonal
and temporary nature of the work made organizing farm workers incredibly difficult for
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unions in the U.S. (Marshall Jamieson 1946). But even with the expansion of commercial
agriculture over the last three decades, sporadic efforts to organize agricultural workers
have only fostered occasional success in organizing the country’s rural workers (cite
exceptions). It has been extremely difficult for plant nursery workers to organize and fight
for better wages or any kind of benefits. While there are several organizations in Florida
that tend to the needs of workers, their work suffers from limited funding and is
complicated by the legal status and language issues that plague immigrant workers.
During time in the field, I volunteered some of my time at WeCount! and at La
Asociacion Campesina (The Farmworker Association) of Homestead and Florida City.
Both of these community organizations are dedicated to empower the area’s day
laborers as well as the farm and plant nursery working populations though leadership,
education, training, and a variety of services that range from helping them collect unpaid
wages to solving legal disputes and other labor issues. At We Count! I helped to develop
an intake form and a process to determine the extent of wage theft and other kinds of
abuse that workers in the area were experiencing and, which, was later used to recover
wages on behalf of the workers. At The Farmworker Association I helped to organize
community events and every December since I did participant observation with them, I
do a toy drive for the children of the organization’s members.
Through my participant observation at these organizations, I was able to understand
that these are organizing models that emerge in what seems like a complete absence of
unionism in the state’s farming industry. There are definitely bridges and communication
between some unions and the homestead organizers, but for the most part I sensed a
large deal of frustration within the organizations toward the unions and particularly their
absence in the area. It was often my sense that the work performed at these two
organizations, although incredibly valuable, was slow and often failed to address some
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of the structural labor issues that exist in these industries. To be clear, however, I think
the speed of the work often had to do with budgets and money rather that with the
abilities of those organizers who run the organizations.
This was clear for instance in a couple of programs in which I had the opportunity to
do participant observation. First, when WeCount! launched its wage theft campaign,
designed to address the pressing issue of unpaid salaries and other kinds of wage and
hour violations in the nursery industry, the organization developed an intake protocol and
assigned a pro-bono lawyer to help those workers collect their owned wages. This was
an excellent service that WeCount! had been able to create, as hordes of workers were
able to get legal representation and collect their money. However, the system did little to
stop operators in the area from continuing such practices. Second, during my time at
The Farmworker Association, I used to frequent the many safety training sessions that
the organization arranged for plant nursery workers. During these sessions, members
were given training on safety and precautions when fumigating at their workplace, as
well as tips on what to do when using and lifting heavy objects. In addition the
organization provided the workers with long sleeve shirts, boots, hats, and other
garments necessary to withstand the sun, pesticides and other dangers that they will
encounter while on the field. Again, although these training sessions where incredibly
valuable, especially in creating awareness and solidarity among workers, to me they did
little to stop what seemed a widespread lack of training and safety precautions on the
part of industry operators.
Clearly, the work that these organizations do to organize and empower workers is
incalculable, but overall they show the limitations that workers and organizations have in
order to address structural issues on the industry. The clear absence of unions and the
limitations of these community organizations add another layer of marginalization and
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isolation to industry workers. For those workers who are lucky enough to belong to
organizations such as WeCount! or The Farmworker Association, adverse conditions at
the labor place seem to have some degree of security at least in the sense that there will
be people willing to train you and help you in case something illegal takes place.
However, for thousands of workers who – as I indicated earlier on this chapter – have no
knowledge of those state organizations that could help or for those who fear even
leaving their house on weekends because of the thought of deportation, conditions are
still dire.
Discussion
A first issue I set out to explore in this chapter was related to variety of institutional
disadvantages that emerge from an uneven system of economic and emotional
investments that migrant workers must make and which are associated with their
migration and settlement into the state’s plant nursery industry. Specifically, I explored
the investments that the workers must make once they make the decision to travel
abroad and settle in the Florida communities that provide employment to the plant
nursery industry. As I demonstrate in this chapter, there is a severe imbalance in the
investments that workers must make vis-à-vis their employers. Some of these
investments include the emotional and economic commitments that the trip entails,
including transportation, rents, smugglers, nutrition, and separation from family and
friends which can last for several years. In addition, once settled and employed, nursery
operators transfer the costs of healthcare to their employees who must run with the
medical bills when sick, even when their illness comes from prolonged exposure to
agricultural chemicals or to lower-back issues related to the work associated with their
trade.
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The second question I sought to answer in this chapter asked about the implications
for the large, immigrant labor force of the Florida plant nursery industry in terms of
working conditions, rights, and benefits. In this area, I found that within my sample of
workers of plant nursery production in Florida, benefits are scarce as none of the
workers I interviewed receives any form of healthcare, unemployment insurance,
overtime pay, or contracts in this multimillion dollar industry. This was corroborated to
me by all of the operators with whom I spoke, who often argue that the price of
insurance and other benefits is too high and would take away the profitability of the
industry if it were to be mandated.
In terms of wages, through my research I uncovered forms of employers’ wage and
hour violations who cheat their workers of their wages by paying below minimum wage
and sometimes not paying them for days or weeks of pay. Although none of the
operators with whom I spoke supported the idea that this kind of behavior was taking
place in their industry, the stories of the workers did seem to indicate that the issue was
pervasive particularly among unregistered and uninsured operations and often by other
Hispanic nursery owners in the southern region of the State. The issues of wages were
often associated with harassment when workers complained, or with intimidation and
blackmail associated with the immigrant status of the workers.
Finally, the absence of unions and the relative diminished capacity of labor oriented
community organizations to help the workers make it particularly difficult for workers to
complain to bodies that could intercede for them in recuperating lost wages. In addition,
the opportunity that workers have of complaining to the federal DOL is often suppressed
by the workers’ fears of deportation. As a result they often remain quiet and fail to report
abuse from unscrupulous employers.
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Grouped together, the conditions that the immigrant workers must face create
marginal spaces for their livelihood in industries and areas of the developed world. For
those workers of the plant nursery industry whom I interviewed and to so many like
them, the investments and risks they must take to come and work in the United States
continue years after their arrival in the country. In the state of Florida thousands of
workers must continue to negotiate with unfair wage systems, lack of healthcare, and
lack of unemployment benefits while often living lives of fear and isolation due to their
migratory status. These conditions coupled with lack of unions and with limited
organizational support also add to the vulnerability of a labor force, which, despite their
sacrifices – human and economic – continues to get scrutinized and marginalized by
those who benefit most from their presence in the country.
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VII. GLOBAL DISCONTINUITIES
I first got involved with the plant nursery industry in 2007 when as a graduate student
at Florida International University the opportunity arouse to study the frequency and
extent of wage and hour abuses taking place in a variety of towns in the state of Florida.
My early involvement with plant nursery production in Florida took place as I spent time
in the offices of WeCount!, a community organization that actively sought to help their
members collect unpaid wages from their employers as part of their overall organizing
strategy. WeCount! Operates in the Florida town of Homestead, which is the epicenter
for most of south Florida’s food and ornamental agriculture and which is home to large
immigrant communities of Mexican and Guatemalan agricultural workers. As part of my
original research of wage and hour violations and wage theft, I documented the cases
that many of the area’s nursery workers were seeking to resolve through the help of
WeCount! I also attended commission meetings that had agendas that pertained to
worker issues, and I met many political and organizing figures who were in one way or
another related to the plight of the workers.
My involvement with industry groups also led me to meet a variety of industry players
who ranged from workers to community organizers and public officials, many of whom
were in one way or another victims or investigators of the kinds of abuses that were
allegedly taking place within the industry. During this time, I also met a variety of
individuals whose lives I thought were embedded in very marginal spaces of class, labor,
and migration. Many of these men and women were immigrants from the global south,
specifically Mexico and Guatemala, who had come to the U.S. in search of a piece of the
“American Dream,” but who seemed to me to be living in the geographical and cultural
margins of a society that knew little about them and which did not acknowledge the
reasons of their presence there.
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As I delved deeper into the fabric of plant nursery production and of the community
dynamics taking place on its surrounding areas I discovered that many of the
assumptions about globalization and labor migration that I had learned in graduate
school did not match the kinds of processes taking place at the ground level. This led me
to question the process by which immigrants come to the state of Florida in search of
jobs in the plant nursery industry and the ways in which regulation and process work to
influence their migration, their economic and labor integration, their fragile permanence
and their marginality. Ultimately my questioning led me to “look up” at the industry with
an institutional focus on how structural processes are actually formulated and
institutionalized. I knew that the focus of my work needed to be the workers, their strife,
and what I perceived to be their marginalization, but began to consider the idea that
institutional arrangements associated with the industry’s elites held the answer to many
of the questions I had formulated.
An important observation that I made in early stages of my study of wage and hour
violations concerned the way in which agricultural regulation protects the status of plant
nursery production in the U.S. Plant nursery production largely produces ornamentals
and is different form food agriculture in that the goods produced are not highly
perishable and thus – at least in theory – can be produced in other areas of the world.
However, a strongly maintained regulatory system ensures that no planted organisms or
soil are imported into the U.S. This makes the plant nursery industry dependent on low
wage labor, which in the U.S. is significantly immigrant labor. This type of regulation
holds the key for a system that in many ways defies the notions about globalization that
have become embedded in public and academic discourses while also serving as the
justification for a system that enforces old and new marginalization and alienation of
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immigrant laborers who are often rendered voiceless by those political and economic
structures that benefit from their labor.
One of the objectives of this dissertation was then to understand how the plant
nursery industry in the state of Florida has been able to remain competitive amidst a
globalizing economic environment where industries of the developed world have
consistently sought to outsource production to less developed areas of the world where
labor is cheaper and where labor and environmental regulation are more flexible. This
process has been analyzed and presented by a variety of scholars as one of broad
structural characteristics in which, multinational corporations in search of higher
profitability and efficiency have been able to move operations abroad under the explicit
support of their nations’ governing bodies. However, as plant nursery production in the
state of Florida demonstrates, the conditions for producers in the developed world are
not homogeneous and can vary greatly according to the products being made, the
conditions and interests of producers, and the political arrangements that are forged
among powerful actors within specific industries. The success and permanence of plant
nursery production in the state of Florida, thus, responds to a variety of factors, which I
sought to better understand and to contextualize within current frameworks of global
economic development.
Research Questions
Permanence and Success of Plant nursery Production
My first research question for this dissertation was why and how has Florida
remained one of the most important sites of nursery plant production for the U.S. market
amidst neoliberal economic restructuring of the last 3 decades? Nursery plants are
among the largest and most important agricultural commodities in the state of Florida,
along with fruits, vegetables and forest products. In the state there are more than 4,700
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commercial nursery and greenhouse farms with industry sales in 2010 estimated at
about 1.7 billion in total sales. The University of Florida estimated that employment
impacts for the nursery/greenhouse industry in Florida accounted for approximately
98,000 jobs. In addition, the Industry ranks second nationally in sales and production of
nursery plants.
At first, it seemed clear to me that part of the success and permanence of the
industry in the state could be attributed to sanitary and phytosanitary regulations
imposed by the federal government. Some of these regulations date to the early part of
the 20th century and have been enacted to protect native organic life such as plants and
animals from invasive organisms that could come into the country in potted plants and
soil. The existence of SPS regulations, however, is often contested by trade groups and
nation states who feel that these are used by economically powerful countries to protect
specific industrial sectors as opposed to protecting organic life. The use of SPS
regulations has created many debates amidst the establishment of free trade
agreements between the U.S. and a variety of neighboring countries who argue that the
regulations ignore the geographic and ecological conditions which have no connection
with political lines. In this sense, those who oppose the use of regulation argue that
nursery plants for U.S. markets could be grown as efficiently in northern areas of Mexico
or Caribbean Islands near Florida since these share climate zones that are not defined
by political borders. Those who oppose SPS regulation argue that the conditions give
powerful nations a disproportionate economic advantage by protecting certain
agricultural sectors from international competition.
The nature of SPS regulation was often the topic of my conversations and interviews
with members of the Florida plant nursery industry elite. This group ranged from owners
and operators of the industry to professional business representatives and federal
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regulators. Without exception, all of the elite members I interviewed saw SPS regulation
as an essential requirement to protect Florida ecosystems from invasive plants, insects,
and pests and only saw economic protection as an indirect benefit of the regulation.
Operators and regulators alike argued that the measure helped to keep the industry alive
because having invasive organisms could affect the state of the industry if their crops
became infected or sick, but they rarely acknowledged it as a form of direct economic
protectionism on the side of the federal government as it is often claimed by critics of
strong SPS regulation.
Industry elites are highly aware of the role that SPS regulations play on industry
survival. As a result they spend invaluable resources on political lobbying, research, and
control in order to maintain a strong body of regulation. While most Florida nursery
producers are small to medium sized, they are well organized under a variety of state
and national business groups such as the Florida Nursery Growers and Landscapers
Association (FNGLA), the American Nursery and Landscapers Association (ANLA) and
the Farm Bureau of Florida, which lobby state and federal legislators in favor of plant
nursery owners and operators.
In many ways, the overwhelming support for SPS regulation in the nursery industry is
founded on a socially constructed ideology about the unknown effects and dangers that
invasive plants and organisms could have on local ecosystems. Certainly, by arguing
that the beliefs and ideas of industry elites regarding SPS regulation are socially
constructed I do not mean that some of their fears are unfounded, but rather that in
many ways the discourses and market-place behaviors of industry elites have been
greatly influenced by the claims of powerful actors in the scientific and political
communities, and thus have been widely accepted as ultimately true and immovable by
a variety of industry operators and professionals.
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The socially constructed nature of the regulation ideology was made clear to me
through many levels of the industry professional structure. In my interviews with
scientists of the USDA the defense of a strong SPS regulation was consistently
presented to me as a necessary protection to our state’s ecology, but when I probed
deeper, the scientists conceded that political lines do not adequately represent
geographical areas or hardiness zones and most importantly that a large amount of
invasive organisms make their way into our state through the millions of travelers and
imports that come into the country through south Florida ports on a yearly basis. Still, the
scientists’ discourses were based on the idea that science should serve as the ultimate
arbitrator and guide to determine the course of regulation and that it is their research that
supports the policy both at the state and federal level and not political actors as many
international trade analysts argue.
For industry insiders who work for and represent the professional associations, the
science based claims of regulators serve to justify their own discourses about regulation
and in turn they use the claims to lobby political legislative bodies in support for strong
protectionist measures. This is also true for operators, who organize together through
the existing professional organizations in efforts to maintain their market position in a
clear opposition to international competitors or national competitors who may seek to
produce nursery plants abroad. In this sense, scientific claims become part of a strong
and well unified body of regulation that is supported by a widespread ideology and
discourse of ecological and economic protection and which have real implications for the
success and permanence of the industry in the state and in the U.S.
Another important factor embedded in the interaction of industry elites lies in the
relationships that they have forged between one another. It became clear to me during
early parts of my filed work that the lobbyists, professional representatives,
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organizational leaders, economic researchers, and many of the prominent operators of
the industry have very close working and even personal relationships with one another
and that these connections often stretch to the regulators of the industry. These
relationships are forged through a variety of committees, boards, and initiatives that
bring a variety of actors together and which directly force them to work with one another.
They also have a strong influence in the way contingency to threats from invasive plants
or insects works, as the groups are able to quickly disseminate information across the
state’s nursery operators, scientists, and professional representatives. In addition, the
many boards and committees in which members of the plant nursery elite sit help to craft
and reshape a variety of messages, discourses, and policies that effectively shape the
course of the industry.
In many ways the success, permanence and durability of the plant nursery industry
in the state of Florida can be attributed to a combination of factors embedded in the
beliefs and interactions of industry elites and the de-regulatory policies that they have
been able to institutionalize. First, because regulation is in great part driven by the
ideologies of powerful actors within the industry and supported by the collective efforts of
thousands of small and medium sized producers, it has become part of a greater
collective effort to maintain a strong market presence, despite recent trends to outsource
production in a variety of industrial sectors of the US. Second, the relationships among
industry elites – including regulators, operators, and professional representatives –
allows for a very unified system of policy creation which is consistent with many of the
neoliberal trends and theories of recent decades. In this sense trade regulation is the
result of a de-regulation in the process of policy creation and management, where
decisions are made in an overt agreement between the industry insiders and later
proposed and lobbied to the appropriate legislative bodies at the state and federal level.
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In the end the mutual bonds that develop between industry elites and policymakers
create new forms of regulatory regimes that are capable of exercising a great deal of
power on their own behalf. Within the context of neoliberal restructuring, this process
becomes one of deregulation of regulatory mechanisms. In other words, what industry
elites have been able to achieve through lobbying, and through working closely with
regulators and policymakers is to effectively take control of the process of policymaking.
Similar phenomena have been explained by traditional globalization scholars as a
process of de-evolution of state powers to private interests, but my evidence seems to
indicate that rather than giving full power to private interests, the state deposits its policy
making and enforcement capacity to an elite group conformed of actors of the private
sector, educators, and regulators of governmental agencies.
Discontinuities in Globalization: Theory and Trends
A second question I sought to answer through this dissertation was whether or not
the conditions of plant nursery production in the state of Florida fit the theories of
neoliberalism and globalization. Here my findings are mixed. Such theories do help
explain the ways in which de-regulation has facilitated the industrial success of the plant
nursery industry in the state. However, in several respects the conditions that I observed
require a new way of looking at globalization, specifically since local conditions and
institutional arrangements of the plant nursery industry demonstrate that processes of
global production, consumption, and trade assume a variety of discontinuous
characteristics.
Consistent with neoliberal ideology, trade and labor regulation in the State’s plant
nursery industry have become largely removed from governmental bodies or become
embedded in an overt relationship between private interests and governmental
regulatory agencies. Yet, consistent with the criticisms of neoliberalism the State still
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assumes the role of ensuring an appropriate institutional framework. The larger
framework, beyond the purview of this dissertation, includes ‘official’ structures such as
the military, defense, police, and the legal system (See Harvey 2005; Clarke 2005). This
dissertation’s focus on Florida’s plant nursery industry adds the institutions that affect
immigration control, wage labor, and the protection of the environment through
controlling imported live plants.
Much discussion about the economic restructuring of the last three decades has
centered on the way through which political and economic elites have succeeded in
consolidating a position of power and accumulation through the establishment of
influential networks and more specifically through the implementation of regulatory
regimes (Rapley 2004). Thus, it can be argued that in modern capitalist society, both
political and economic elites are related in mutual bonds of dependency that allow them
a high degree of political leverage and the ability to exclude the masses from the political
process. This notion is largely present throughout the literature on neoliberalism and
globalization, although different authors have conceptualized the issue as one of power
restoration to the economic and political class (see Canterbury 2005; Radice 2005; Tabb
2001; Rapley 2004).
Whether in the form of authoritarian or democratic governing, the relationship
between economic and political elites must work within the structure of the state. In this
sense, the neoliberal state can be described as a governing apparatus for which the
freedoms embodied in it reflect the interests of private property owners, businesses,
multinational corporations, and financial capital (Harvey 2005). It could be argued that
the state in turn responds to claims from capital by producing new forms of legality,
which advance the interests of certain economic actors while weakening those of others
(Sassen 1998). In this sense, it becomes clear that globalization “is about relations of
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relative power, dependence as much as exchange, and how otherness becomes
naturalized or provokes resistance. Far from being a merely technical matter,
globalization is a deeply political process (Tabb 2001; 13).”
In Florida’s plant nursery production, this phenomenon is visible through the
economic, environmental, trade, and labor policy driven by agreements between agency
regulators and the needs of the operators. Within this context, policies that require
approval or enforcement from state bodies of regulation are proposed and lobbied
through strongly unified messages by both local scientific regulators and professional
representatives that make claims on behalf of industry operators. In the state, thus, plant
nursery policy-making and regulation have become largely removed from governmental
oversight and justified by powerful industry insiders and regulators within the discourse
that industry insiders know best about the kinds of policies and regulations that
strengthen and protect the industry. Again, this perception fits well within the neoliberal
prescription that intrusive government intervention would be detrimental for the health of
the industry, and in a very real and practical way Florida’s Plant nursery elites hold
strong commitments to uphold their values about industry control and regulation.
But an interesting feature of Florida Plant nursery production lies in the process by
which local elites have taken over the regulatory process for the benefit and protection of
their own industry. As I demonstrated in chapters four and five, Florida plant nursery
production is dominated by thousands of small farms across the state and not by
powerful multinational corporations. This is a nuance within the existent theoretical
frameworks that prescribe globalization as process in which multinational corporations
drive economic policy and expansion across transnational borders. In the industry, thus,
it can be observed that the establishment of regimes by political and economic elites has
also had an impact on traditional modes of commodity production in the developed
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world. Berger and Piore (1980) foresaw some of these issues as embedded in the
relationship between market expansion and the survival of traditional industries 21 where
the survival and permanence of the traditional sector and its role can also be understood
as resulting from inherent features and tensions among actors in advanced industrial
societies. Just as in the neoliberal context of globalization, the resilience, adaptation,
and reproduction of traditional industries and business groups are centrally related to
economic incentives and market conditions that are politically arranged, and which can
be observed in the state’s willingness to overlook violations in labor practices, minimum
wage, and working conditions. As in the case of global economic development, these
relationships are forged by values, norms and expectations which groups in society hold
and which result in political decisions to protect the role and function of the traditional
firm (Berger and Piore 1980).
The intentions and institutional practices of industry elites has resulted in a strong
protection from international competition or from outsourcing, thus, reversing the trends
in neoliberal globalization in a variety of other industrial sectors across the developed
world. In this sense, the State of Florida presents an anomalous relationship to those
theories that indicate that unskilled jobs that do not need to be performed within the most
highly developed countries are outsourced to where labor is cheaper and more flexible.
Traditionally, cheap and specifically immigrant labor has been required in developed
countries only for the work that is place bound, such as cleaning of office buildings, and
highly perishable agricultural goods. Nursery plants on the other hand could be grown
more “efficiently,” that is with lower production costs, in many other countries, such as is
21

Berger and Piore (1980:91) define traditional industries as those that produce the same goods
and services as other, modern firms in the market, but which are characterized by smaller firm
size, higher labor capital ratios, lower productivity, and other characteristics associated with
small, independent property owners, farmers, shopkeepers, artisans, and certain small and
medium businessmen.
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the case with much of the cut-flowers sold in the U.S. Yet, neoliberal re-structuring in the
state’s plant nursery industry has created an environment where de-regulation serves to
constrain market freedoms of local and international actors and which carry important
implications in theoretical and practical terms.
At a theoretical level, it could be better argued that globalization, rather than being a
one-way process, is a process of multiple dimensions, directions, and outcomes which
operate in rather discontinuous modes. Globalization is said to be mediated by a
process of governance networks that potentially operate from the local to the
transnational and which require a variety of social mechanisms to enforce contracts and
standards of judging what is considered permissible behavior by participants. I argue
that these governance processes need to be analyzed further because they shed light
on how decisions made by a variety of actors influence the degree to which global
configurations of capital, culture, ethnicity, and class are produced in localities of the
developed world. It is the analysis of a variety of interactions between influential – and
their relationship to less and more influential – actors that sheds light on the processes
of globalization occurring in the world today. Thus, the differences in power relations and
dependencies among economic elites, their workers, related governmental agencies,
and policymakers are essential themes to the understanding of global re-configurations
around the world.
Traditional views of the process of globalization taking place in the world since the
1970s often describe the process as the transformation of capitalism through
international trade regulations to benefit the world’s powerful corporations amidst a
process by which technology and communication help to shift sites of production to
areas where labor is cheaper and more flexible. Such understandings of globalization
have also been complemented by cultural theories that promote an evolutionary view of
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globalization, and which focus on global reproductions and re-configurations of new
forms capital, labor and technologies (Tsing 2005). These views have come to dominate
the academic readings and popular perceptions about globalization with narrow
definitions which essentialize globalization as a one way process in which labor and the
environment in peripheral sites are transformed by the direct efforts of powerful actors in
the developed world. But the evidence gathered from the state of Florida’s plant nursery
industry demonstrates that the influence of those power elites also serves to create
conditions that are not consistent with other global modes of economic expansion.
In practical terms, it can be argued that the relegation of state powers to the elites
has not only resulted in market behavior that is contradictory to neoliberal thinking by
creating strong layers of regulation and control, but also by increasing the dependence
that the industry has on low wage workers of the developing world. In essence, a strong
commitment to SPS regulation; the exemption of agriculture from the NLRA; the rural
nature of most such employment, the unskilled or semi-skilled nature of the work, and;
the political clout of the industry over politicians representing these business interests
have had the unintended consequence of mobilizing thousands of low wage workers to
the state of Florida in an environment where protectionist measures make nursery plant
production a place bound economic activity for the workers. These contradictions are not
only visible in the labor dependence of employers, but also on the policy
implementations instituted by labor and immigration regulatory bodies.
The case that I present about plant nursery production in Florida, thus, illustrates the
processes through which business, government and science build a variety of global
socio-economic structures. Whereas the formula of multinational corporate labor
outsourcing is perhaps the best known component of this process, specific industries in
the developed world explicitly apply these methods and ideologies for their own benefit
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in ways that can have different outcomes. In this case, because the resource they
control is physical land and soil, their pursuit of maximum profitability with the
cooperation of regulators and scientists requires, instead of free market, an appeal for
localized protectionist strategies.
Reproducing Inequalities: Implications for a Marginal Labor Force
My early research with plant nursery workers originally led me to look further into
Florida’s plant nursery industry. While that original work centered on wage theft and
worker abuse within the industry, I decided to look at the structural conditions that affect
the labor force in relation to their economic integration, patterns of migration and the
processes of marginalization which they must endure. To this end I interviewed both
employers and workers, hoping to get a clearer picture of how the values, discourses,
and policies of industry elites compared to the economic conditions and life outcomes of
the workers, their families, and the communities in which they had settled.
When I spoke with industry operators about the conditions that their workers faced,
they often took pride in employing such marginal individuals because to the employers
this was an opportunity for immigrant workers to assimilate to US culture and to its
economic structures. Many of the operators spoke of their workers with pride, often
relating stories of success about workers that had learned English while working for
them and about workers who had moved up the company ladder to become managers
or foremen. At the same time, the employers often displayed a strong sense of
racialization toward their workers and their abilities. Most of the operators thought that
the indigenous workers were better suited for farm labor because this is what they had
been doing at their homelands before coming to the US and because they believed that
American workers had become lazy and unwilling to work the land. Yet, when I asked
why they did not provide better wages, training, or health insurance for their workers,

203

operators often spoke about their bottom line, arguing that as employers they had to
choose between giving jobs or benefits to people, but that they most certainly could not
do both.
To me, employer discourses and expectations about their workers’ labor prospects
and assimilation were consonant with traditional conservative values about individual
freedoms and hard work as mechanisms to achieve economic success. However, what
did not come across as clear to me was the employers’ lack of awareness that by
expecting individuals to succeed on their own terms through hard work, discipline and
dedication, a system of uneven investments and returns is institutionalized and
maintained. In the employers’ characterizations of their workers, there exists a blind spot
about the sacrifices and investments that workers must make to reach their industrial
sector.
For the workers of Florida’s plant nursery industry, the trip to Florida is often one of
unlimited economic and emotional investments which do not end when the workers find
jobs and settle in the state’s immigrant communities. For the employers, the need for an
employee is often satisfied with an announcement to one of their workers, who in turn
usually call a relative or friend to fill those jobs. However, the experiences of many of the
workers are filled with economic investments that range from selling or mortgaging their
lands in Central America or with borrowing money from neighbors. In addition, the
journey through Mexico and the US often entails risking their lives at the hand of law
enforcement and smugglers in the Mexico –US border, and later risking hunger and
uncertainty as they finish the trip to the State of Florida. Once settled, they must endure
the risks of health and unfair wage and labor practices as the employers do little to
provide such care. The process is complimented by a growing system of deportation and
immigration control on the part of the US government, which in the aftermath of the
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terrorist attack of 911 and of the recent economic recession have heightened border
security and immigration control.
By hiring undocumented workers, employers of the plant nursery industry have in
essence tapped into a seemingly unlimited source of cheap and vulnerable labor. This
is not to say that the employers do not care about their workers’ wellbeing, but at a
structural level the benefits for the industry are immense as the costs of labor in terms of
health, training, education, wages, and relocation are transferred almost entirely to the
workers of the industry. This has other important ramifications for the labor force, for it
creates marginal communities of individuals who have little protection from unfair state
and market conditions and policies, perpetuating the existence of a powerless and
voiceless underclass.
One way in which I thought it would be possible to observe the degree of marginality
of the workers was through the cases of wage abuse that originally drew me to do
research in the industry. My findings in this area suggest that wage theft occurs in similar
ways to those previously reported by the media and research literature (see Mahler
1995; Stepick 1998, Pisani and Yoskowitz 2002; Ness 2005; Fine 2006; Stephen 2007,
Bobo 2009). I found that paying under the minimum wage, “shaving” hours, and simply
not paying wages due are some of the ways in which workers suffer abuses from their
employers. My analysis also indicates that harassment often results in those cases
where employees were willing to speak out and complain. These findings are important
because they empirically document the existence of wage theft within the plant nursery
industry, although none of the operators with whom I spoke admitted to this kind of
behavior. However, my findings suggest that a lot of the wage and hour abuses tend to
take place within those nurseries that are not registered with the state and which are the
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same ones that legitimate operators accuse of bringing down prices and creating uneven
competition.
In many cases, it was the worker’s lack of knowledge of and access to information
regarding laws and rights at the workplace that seemed to be partly responsible for the
wage and hour violations. In this area, I found that the majority of my informants had no
clear idea of what the state’s minimum hourly wage was. Many of them complained to
me that there were no posters informing them of basic work standards or regulations at
their job sites and that they would not be able to extract such information from their
employers. The workers also expressed that reliable information is not available from coworkers. Indeed, little information about wages is shared among workers. In addition,
several informants revealed that they would not know who to seek information or help
from if they experienced wage theft or any other form of abuse at their workplace.
The lack of knowledge about informational and assistance resources is exacerbated
by the fact that many of the workers in the industry are partially or completely illiterate
and, thus, would not be able to read written information even if made available to them.
Also, many workers come from rural areas in Guatemala and lack Spanish skills, which
could help them in Miami-Dade’s highly Hispanized environment. In addition, for many
of my informants, complaining about irregularities on their paychecks brought
harassment and contempt from their supervisors, illustrating the strong relation that
exists between complaining to supervisors and the harassment practices that employers
in turn develop toward their employees. Many operators, as I demonstrated in chapter
six fire or harass their workers soon after these complain about their unpaid wages.
In addition, I also found that the absence of unions and the relative diminished
capacity of labor oriented community organizations to help the workers make it
particularly difficult for workers to succeed in getting better wages or at least better
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working conditions from their employers. There are hardly any official avenues to
complain when abuses are taking place or bodies that could intercede for them in
recuperating lost wages. Furthermore, the resource that workers have of complaining to
the federal DOL is often suppressed by the workers’ fears of deportation. As a result
they often remain quiet and fail to report abuse from unscrupulous employers.
The case study I present here serves to demonstrate the way in which conditions
that the immigrant workers must face create marginal spaces for their livelihood in
industries and areas of the developed world. Like many of the plant nursery workers that
I interviewed, the investments and risks they must take to come work in the United
States continue years after their arrival in the country. In the state of Florida thousands
of workers must continue to negotiate with unfair wage systems, lack of healthcare, and
lack of unemployment benefits while often living lives of fear and isolation due to their
migratory status. These conditions coupled with lack of unions and with limited
organizational support also add to the vulnerability of a labor force, which, despite their
sacrifices – human and economic – continues to get scrutinized and marginalized by
those who benefit most from their presence in the country.
Crossing Borders: What the Theory Books Don’t Tell You
A final question I sought to answer in this dissertation was if and how labor-migration
trends in the plant nursery industry are consistent with current theories of globalization or
if they represent anomalies in their relationship to integration, policy implementation, and
institutional organization of labor migrants in the developed world. From my analysis, it is
clear that while some theories correctly address some of the issues related to migration
and institutional integration of labor migrants, other views need to be better addressed or
incorporated into the discussion. As I discussed in chapter 4, neoclassical explanations
of migration provide a rather economic argument on the conditions that spark the
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movement of people from economically depressed areas to more developed areas in
search of better wages. Although I saw evidence of such economic calculations in the
part of most of the workers within my sample, it is evident that such theories fail to
explain the geographic and industrial destinations that migrants choose.
Another set of explanations argue that the decision to migrate and its destination are
often related to the social networks that people have pre-established in developed areas
of the world. In this sense again, evidence from my sample of workers suggests that
they chose to travel to areas where family members and friends had previously been
established and could offer support in housing and labor markets while alleviating the
newcomers’ anxieties of learning some of the customs and practices of the receiving
culture. Still, theories that concentrate exclusively on social capital neglect the larger
socioeconomic structures of developed countries where as the manufacturing base
erodes and a two tired service economy intensifies, more jobs are made available for
low-income migrant workers of the developing world. Such theories appropriately
address the structural conditions that stimulate large numbers of low-wage immigrants in
the developing world to migrate, despite a growing unemployment and the proliferation
of dead end, wage-depressed jobs at the receiving countries. These theories, however,
fail to address how the needs of specific industries and specific migrant workers are met
and fulfilled in an increasingly globalized marketplace.
Certainly the data that I collected from my sample of workers validates many of the
already existing theories of labor migration. However, the stories and lives of many of
the farm workers that I interviewed substantiates the idea that the migration of
individuals may also be based on broad institutional arrangements that span across
continents or geographical regions in spite of the existence of rigid political, economic,
racial, and class borders. To be more specific, there seems to be a lack of discussion of
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the specific efforts of small industrial producers in the developed world to maintain a
constant supply of immigrant low wage labor for their business (see notable exceptions
in Portes 1997; Cameron et al. 2010). In the case of plant nursery production in the
State of Florida, the values and attitudes of industry operators seem consistent with
those of other Agriculture industry operators who have bypassed African American or
White laborers in search of more docile workers and flexible environments (see
Hollander 2008). Clearly this is not only about micro or macro economics, but rather
about values and attitudes of institutional actors in different locations of the world.
What this means for the plant nursery industry in Florida is that while employers must
negotiate with the demands of growing real estate prices, of big chain suppliers that
dictate the price of plants, and of generalized low wages that compete with those paid by
companies in the developing world, they also have very clear definitions of the kinds of
workers that they want at their operations and of the process to attract them to the state.
For workers in those developing areas, that means navigating through some of the
economic, social, and structural areas described by the aforementioned theories, but
also negotiating the kinds of jobs that best fit their human capital, including their
technical, educational, and job skills. Thus a special kind of fit develops between small
business operators in plant nursery production and the workers thousands of miles away
that are deemed “adequate” because of the kinds of skills they possess and their
demeanors, which, ultimately help to initiate the process of international migration.
Discussion and Recommendations
The case study I present in this dissertation highlights the interconnectedness that
exists between a variety of actors in an ever-evolving globalizing world. As I tried to
demonstrate in this manuscript, the process of globalization does not explicitly
correspond to the market behaviors of multinational corporations expanding to less
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developed countries in search for cheaper labor and weak environmental regulations.
The process also does not correspond to cultural views of globalization as a process
where borders are broken down by the increased spread of trends, business, fashion, or
information across international borders. Instead, as I have argued, globalization is a
discontinuous process which takes specific characteristics due to the attitudes,
behaviors, and characteristics of a variety of structural, institutional and political
arrangements that can vary according to the products made, and localities where they
are produced. Within the context of a growing neoliberal economic and political global
environment, thus, my findings of the conditions of plant nursery production in the State
of Florida demonstrate that a group of well-organized business entrepreneurs have
situated themselves in positions of power and effectively created an institutional regime
along other industry professional insiders and political elites. This form of interaction has
a variety of consequences for trade and migration, which, are planned and executed at a
localized level, but directly take on international and global connotations.
In the State of Florida, owners and employers in the plant nursery industry have
been able to successfully resist global trends in free trade and instead operate in a
protected market. They have done this by using an ideology supported by science and
by the explicit support of politicians. In this particular case, thus, the neoliberal ideology
has been implemented through a set of policies that while keeping small and middle
range business alive, has become dependent on a seemingly endless supply of marginal
low-wage, immigrant workers. This market behavior also creates intense competition
from local producers who often violate the few legal restraints they have (e.g., the low
number of wage violation investigations by the federal DOL) in order to get ahead.
Still, the relationship between the protected nature of the industry and dependence
to low wage workers is not all too clear. Especially, since their protected status could
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indicate that the wages could be higher. In essence, it seems that the necessarily low
wage nature of the industry grows from a confluence of factors that include the
exemption of agriculture from the NLRA; the rural nature of most such employments,
which also make organizing harder; the availability of a low wage workforce, which is
overwhelmingly immigrant and poor; the unskilled or semi-skilled nature of the work,
and; the political clout of the industry over politicians representing these business
interests. It is important, however, to also take into consideration the values and
expectations of Florida plant nursery operators in regards to their labor force. As
Hollander (2008) demonstrates, the presence of immigrant workers in the sugar fields of
the State of Florida responded to direct efforts of entrepreneurs and policy makers to
circumvent the use of local Black and poor White laborers, and to secure a docile labor
force that was willing to work for low wages and without complaining too much for poor
working conditions.
For the workers the conditions within the global market place are quite different.
Again, neoliberal trends for them are clearly at work, keeping borders open for goods
and for service workers at the high end of the labor market, but placing costs and
dangers on workers who have little recourse to protect their interests. For many of the
workers, free trade along with civil war and violence means they can't make a living in
their home country. They can opt to come to the US, but only at their own cost and risk,
and once here they can work for low wages in often unsafe conditions and even then
employers can exploit them beyond the limits of the law and with limited liability.
At an institutional level, this case study provides an early attempt to better
understand the nature and structure of ornamental agriculture in the State of Florida. As
I argued earlier, only a handful of economic reports on this industry are available and to
my knowledge none address the interactions and market behaviors of industry players.
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Clearly, more research is needed to better understand the roles and conditions of market
players, including the demographic, economic, and employment characteristics of the
labor force. In addition, there is a lack of academic analysis of organizing and of the
community organizations that perform a variety of in-valuable services to the workers. At
a broader level, there is a need to further study the roles that traditional firms play in
larger processes of globalization, including the way in which strongly rooted local
business practices affect the conditions of market players across international borders.
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APPENDICES: APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS AND DIVERSITY OF CROPS
Floriculture Crops
Bedding and garden plants: Annual or biennial finished flowering plants intended for
seasonal outdoor use. Among the major annuals are begonias, geraniums, impatiens,
marigolds, pansy/viola, and petunias. This category also includes vegetable-type
ornamental plants, vegetable transplants for garden use, and herbaceous perennials,
but exclude commercial vegetable plants. The plants are marketed as flats, pots, or
hanging baskets.
Cut foliage or greens: Cultivated ornamental stems, branches, or leaves grown as filler
and foliage for cut flower arrangements and bouquets. Leatherleaf ferns, largely grown
in Florida, are a major cut green.
Cut flowers: Blossoms from flowering plants sold as stems, bunches, or arrangements;
the flowers may be fresh, dried, or preserved. The major commercial varieties include
standard carnations, roses, pompon chrysanthemums, gladioli, tulips, orchids, lilies,
alstroemeria, delphinium and larkspur, gerbera daisies, iris, lisianthus, and snapdragons.
Floriculture crops: Ornamental plants without woody stems, including annual and
perennial bedding and garden plants, cut flowers, cut cultivated greens, potted flowering
plants, indoor foliage plants, and unfinished propagative material. All other ornamental
plants are classified as nursery crops.
Foliage plants: Finished plants in pots or hanging baskets for indoor or patio use; they
are classified as floriculture crops. Woody foliage plants intended for outdoor or
landscape use are classified as nursery crops. Include ficus, ivy, cacti, ferns, palms,
succulents, and indoor/patio shrubs, trees, and vines.
Greenhouse crops: Crops grown under covered protection, including floral, foliage, and
vegetable plants (largely tomatoes), unfinished plants, transplant seedlings, bulbs,
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turfgrass sod, aquatic and hydroponic plants, cultivated mushrooms, herbs, and seeds.
Grower sales receipts from greenhouse crops include vegetable and fruit transplants for
commercial production. Some nursery crops are grown in greenhouses before sale or
transplant.
Herbaceous perennials: Field and container-grown plants intended for outdoor use,
including hardy/garden chrysanthemums, hosta, and other herbaceous perennials.
Unlike annuals, perennials live and bloom for many years; they are dormant in the
winter. Unfinished plants are excluded.
Nursery crops: Finished ornamental plants and trees with woody stems, including
broadleaf evergreens, coniferous evergreens, deciduous shade trees, deciduous
flowering trees, deciduous shrubs and other ornamentals, fruit and nut plants intended
for outdoor and landscape use, cut and live Christmas trees, and propagation material or
lining-out stock. Also include ornamental vines, turfgrass sod, and other groundcovers.
Crops are sold as “balled in burlap,” bare root, or are container-grown.
Ornamental crops: Also known as environmental horticulture or green crops. All
floriculture and nursery plants, shrubs, trees, and grasses for outdoor and indoor use are
classified as ornamental. Their purpose is to beautify, decorate, or enhance the
environment, but are not cultivated for food. They include nursery stock and propagative
material such as bulbs, cuttings and slips of plants, seedlings, and seed plants grown in
greenhouses but exclude plants intended for commercial food production such as
vegetables.
Potted flowering plants: Plants intended only for indoor or patio use, including plants
grown from bulbs. Plants intended for landscape use are excluded. Include African
violets, florist azaleas, florist chrysanthemums, Easter lilies, orchids, poinsettias, roses,
and spring bulbs (tulips, hyacinths, daffodils/narcissus, other lilies). Other potted plants
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include anthurium, begonia, carnation, hibiscus, hydrangea, cyclamen, kalanchoe, and
gardenia.
Production area: The gross physical space used for commercial propagation of
floriculture plants, including aisles and walkways, in open ground (field) or covered by
greenhouses made of glass, fiberglass, film plastic, or shade and temporary cover.
Excludes non-ornamental crop growing areas, such as fruit and vegetable farms, sod, or
tree and shrub nurseries.
Propagative material: Includes cuttings, liners, plug seedlings, prefinished plants, or
tissue cultured plantlets, and unfinished plants sold to other growers for further growing.
Excludes seeds, bulbs, tubers, rhizomes, or corms grown for sale to bulb forcers and
gardeners. Also excludes transplants for commercial production such as vegetable,
strawberry, and tobacco plants.
Wholesale value of sales: The value of all crops grown then sold by their growers on a
gross wholesale basis before deductions for sales commissions, transportation costs,
and other similar charges. The percentage of sales at wholesale is the crop portion not
sold at retail or marketed directly to the final consumer. It is computed as the product of
the average wholesale price and the total quantity of crops sold by the producer at
wholesale.
Nursery Crops
Broadleaf evergreens: Broadleaf trees and plants that retain their leaves year round
such as azaleas, boxwood, holly, and rhododendron.
Christmas trees, cut and to be cut: Evergreen trees grown to be sold as cut Christmas
trees. Balled and burlapped trees are included in coniferous evergreens.
Coniferous evergreens: Cone-bearing trees and plants that retain their needle-like or
scale-like leaves year round such as arborvitae, cedar, fir, pine, and spruce, including
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balled and burlapped Christmas trees. Christmas trees grown for cutting are not included
in this category.
Deciduous flowering trees: Ornamental trees that lose their leaves during the cold
months and are grown and known for their flowering ability such as dogwood, hawthorn,
magnolia, and redbud.
Deciduous shade trees: Trees that lose their leaves during the cold months and are
primarily used for shade such as ash, birch, maple, oak, and willow.
Deciduous shrubs: Plants and trees that lose their foliage during the cold
Fruit and nut plants: Plants and trees primarily used for fruit and nut production,
including citrus and deciduous fruit trees, nut trees, grapevines, and small fruit plants
such as blueberries and grapevines. Strawberry plants for home use are included in this
category. Strawberry plants for commercial producers are included in the transplants
category.
Ornamental grasses: Include grasses (for landscape or garden use), sedges, and reeds.
Sod, turf, and range grasses are specifically excluded from this category.
Other woody ornamentals, vines, and ground covers: Include climbing clematis, ground
covers, and other vines.
Palms: Plants of the family arecaceae (palmae) used for outdoor landscaping. Palms
sold for indoor or patio use are not included in this category.
Propagative nursery materials or lining-out stock: Unfinished plants of the nursery crops
in this survey to be further grown (such as lining-out stock, root stock, rooted cuttings,
seedlings, and tissue-cultured plantlets) by other growers.
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